Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

2002

Lori Haase v. Ashley Valley Medical Center and
Columbia Ashley Valley Medical Center, and John
Doe Defendants 1 Through 10 : Brief of Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Douglas G. Mortensen; Matheson, Mortensen, Olsen & Jeppson; Attorneys for Appellant.
Robert R. Harrison; Snow, Christensen & Martineau; Attorneys for Appellees .
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Haase v. Ashley Valley Medical, No. 20020524 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2002).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/3851

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

V
w
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

LORI HAASE,

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
LORI HAASE

Plaintiff/Appellant,
vs.
Case No. 2:0020524-CA
ASHLEY VALLEY MEDICAL CENTER
AND COLUMBIA ASHLEY VALLEY
MEDICAL CENTER, AND JOHN DOE
DEFENDANTS 1 THROUGH 10,
Defendants/Appellees.

Appeal from Amended Judgment on Verdict entered by the Eighth Judicial
District Court, per the Honorable Douglas L. Cornaby, Senior Judge, on June 24,
2002.

Robert R. Harrison, #A7878
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN &
MARTI NEAU
Attorneys for Appellee andCrossAppellant
10 Exchange Place, 11 th Floor
P.O. Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Telephone: (801) 521-9000

Douglas G. Mortensen, #2329

MATHESON, MORTENSEN, OLSEN
& JEPPSON, P.C.
Attorneys for Appellant andCrossAppellee
648 East First South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Telephone: (801) 363-2244
Utah i.

P sri®x:% Stagg
C. ; * .: t.r*2 Court

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

LORI HAASE,

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
LORI HAASE

Plaintiff/Appellant,
vs.
Case No. 2:0020524-CA
ASHLEY VALLEY MEDICAL CENTER
AND COLUMBIA ASHLEY VALLEY
MEDICAL CENTER, AND JOHN DOE
DEFENDANTS 1 THROUGH 10,
Defendants/Appellees.

Appeal from Amended Judgment on Verdict entered by the Eighth Judicial
District Court, per the Honorable Douglas L. Cornaby, Senior Judge, on June 24,
2002.

Robert R. Harrison, #A7878
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN &
MARTINEAU
Attorneys for Appellee andCrossAppellant
10 Exchange Place, 11 th Floor
P.O. Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Telephone: (801) 521-9000

Douglas G. Mortensen, #2329

MATHESON, MORTENSEN, OLSEN
&JEPPSON, P.C.
Attorneys for Appellant andCrossAppellee
648 East First South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Telephone: (801) 363-2244

TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

iii

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

1

ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

1

ISSUES SOUGHT TO BE PRESERVED

2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

4

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

11

ARGUMENT

11

I.

II.

III.

IV.

V.

UNDER CONTROLLING UTAH CASE LAW, THE JURY'S
TRUE INTENT GOVERNS AS TO THE DAMAGES
MRS. HAASE IS TO RECEIVE FOR THE HOSPITAL'S
NEGLIGENCE

11

THE MARSHALED EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT OF TRIAL
COURT'S APPARENT FINDING THAT THE JURY'S
INTENT WAS TO AWARD MRS. HAASE ONLY $246,000
FOR THE HOSPITAL'S NEGLIGENCE

15

THE INTENT OF THE JURY TO AWARD MRS. HAASE
$820,000 FOR THE HOSPITAL'S NEGLIGENCE IS
OVERWHELMINGLY CLEAR FROM THE JURORS' MARCH 21
AFFIDAVITS AND MAY 2 DECLARATIONS IN OPEN COURT

23

THE JURY BASED ITS AWARD ON WHAT IT THOUGHT
THE HOSPITAL OWED, NOT ON PRINCIPLES OF
APPORTIONMENT OF FAULT, ABOUT WHICH IT HAD
RECEIVED NO INSTRUCTIONS

27

THE ERROR MRS. HAASE SEEKS TO CORRECT WAS A
"CLERICAL," NOT A "JUDICIAL," ERROR

30

i

VI.

VII.

THOUGH JUDICIAL OR ATTORNEY ERROR MAY HAVE
CAUSED OR CONTRIBUTED TO THE DISPARITY BETWEEN
THE COURT'S AND THE JURY'S UNDERSTANDING OF
THE JURY'S DAMAGE AWARD, THAT DISPARITY OF
UNDERSTANDING PROVIDES NO BASIS FOR
RETRIAL

31

REMANDING FOR A NEW TRIAL WOULD PENALIZE A
NON-ERRING PREVAILING PARTY AND WASTE COURT
AND LITIGANT RESOURCES

34

CONCLUSION AND REQUESTED RELIEF

36

ADDENDUM

38

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
RULES
Rule 52(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
CASE AUTHORITIES
Bishop v. GenTec Inc. 48 P.3d 218 (Utah 2002)
Drop Anchor Realty Trust v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co.. 496 A.2d 339, 346 (N.H. 1985)
Eastridae Development Co. v. Halpert Associates. 853 F.2d 722, 783 (10th Cir.
1988)
Fried v. MCGrath. 135 F.2d 833, 834 (D.C. Cir. 1943)
Moulton v. Staats. 27 P.2d 455, 459 (Utah 1933)
Newport Fisherman's Supply Co.. Inc. v. Derecktor. 569 A.2d 1051, 1053 (R.I.
1990)
Richards v. Siddowav. 471 P.2d 143, 145 (Utah 1970) (quoting 46 Am.Jur. 2d
Judgments § 202).
Stanger v. Sentinel Sec. Life Ins. Co.. 669 P .2d 1201,1206 (Utah 1983) (quoting
Jean F. Rydstrom, Annotation, Construction of Rule 60(a) of Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure Authorizing Correction of Clerical Mistakes in Judgements. Orders, or
other Parts of Record, and Errors Therein. 13 A.L.R. Fed. 794 (1972))
State v. Lovegren. 798 P.2d 767, 771 (Utah App. 1990)
State v. Moore. 802 P.2d 732, 739 (Utah App. 1990).
State in Interest of JRT v. Timperlv.750 P.2d 1234, 1236 (Utah App., 1988)
Suniland Corp. v. Radcliffe. 576 P.2d 847 (Utah 1978)
Umphrev v. Sprinkel. 682 P.2d 1247, 1255 (Idaho 1983)
Young v. Young. 979 P,.2d 338, 342 (Utah 1999); Rule 52(a), URCP

-iii-

OTHER AUTHORITIES
Competency of Juror's Statement or Affidavit to Show That Verdict in Civil Case
Was Not Correctly Recorded. 18 ALR 3d 1133;
Propriety of Reassembling Jury to Amend. Correct. Clarify or Otherwise Change a
Verdict After Discharge or Separation at Conclusion of Civil Case. 19 ALR 5th
622.

-IV-

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
UCA § 78-2a-3(2)(j) confers jurisdiction on this Court to decide this appeal.

ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Did the district court err in apparently finding that the jury

intended to award Mrs. Haase only 30% of its $820,000 damage award for
the hospital's negligence?
This is a question of fact to be reviewed under a "clearly erroneous"
standard. Young v. Young. 979 P.2d 338, 342 (Utah 1999); Rule 52(a), URCP.
Under this standard, the appellant must prove the district court's apparent finding
is "against the clear weight of the evidence". State in Interest of JRT v.
Timperly.750 P.2d 1234, 1236 (Utah App., 1988).

2.

Did the district court fail to follow Utah law in refusing to

effectuate the jury's true intent to award Mrs. Haase $820,000 for the
hospital's negligence?
This is a question of law, reviewable for "correctness." This Court need give
no deference to the district court's ruling. Bishop v. GenTec. 48 P.3d 281 (Utah
2002); Moulton v. Staats. 27 P.2d 455, 459 (Utah 1933).
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ISSUES SOUGHT TO BE PRESERVED
The hospital has filed a cross appeal seeking a new trial due to what it
contends were errors in evidentiary rulings by the trial court. Mrs. Haase
opposes remand for retrial. (See Arguments VI and VII, infra at pp. 31-35).
However, in the event this Court is inclined to order a new trial, she wishes to
preserve her right to appellate review of several evidentiary rulings which were
unfavorable to her. Issues raised by those unfavorable rulings include these:
1.

Did the trial court abuse its discretion in refusing to allow the jury to
consider authenticated medical records of the surgeon's treatment in
a Dayspring Drug Addiction Treatment Program when those records
were offered to rebut the hospital's claim it did not know the surgeon
had a substance abuse problem and neither requested nor required
him to submit to substance abuse treatment?1

2.

Did the trial court abuse its discretion in refusing to permit the brief
factual testimony of Dr. Raymond Middleton to be presented to the
jury either via live telephonic examination or by the reading of his
deposition transcript when, at the time of trial, Dr. Middleton was
retired, living in St. George, and unable without hardship to appear
personally at trial in Vernal?

3.

Did the trial court abuse its discretion in refusing to permit two Salt
Lake physicians who had treated the surgeon for drug and/or

1

At least 5 separate entries in this chart indicate the surgeon had been
sent for treatment there by the hospital. The surgeon's treatment occurred just 6
months before he operated on Mrs. Haase. Witnesses who were not allowed to
testify at trial (Drs. Collins and Burgoyne) would have testified the surgeon failed
to submit to the recommended out-patient treatment following his discharge.
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emotional problems prior to his surgery on Mrs. Haase (Drs. Collins
and Burgoyne) to testify at trial via telephone?
4.

Did the trial court abuse its discretion in refusing to permit the brief
testimony of fact witness Bryan Gibby to be presented to the jury via
live telephonic examination when, at the time of trial, Mr. Gibby (a
physical therapist who had worked with the surgeon in Vernal) was
living in Illinois and could not appear personally at trial in Vernal
without great hardship on himself and his family?

5.

Did the trial court abuse its discretion in precluding the introduction of
evidence that the hospital was owned by Columbia/HCA and
precluding any reference to the hospital at trial by its true name,
Columbia/HCA Ashley Valley Medical Center?

6.

Did the trial court abuse its discretion in refusing to allow the jury to
consider any portion of the videotaped deposition testimony of Dr.
Robert Dunn, an orthopedic surgery expert from New Jersey?

7.

Did the trial court abuse its discretion in refusing to allow the jury to
be informed that, at the hospital's request, the surgeon had submitted
to several drug screen tests near the time of his surgery on Mrs.
Haase and that the hospital was unable and/or unwilling to produce
the results of those tests?

8.

Did the trial court err as a matter of law in concluding that a statutory
peer review privilege precluded Mrs. Haase's introduction of
substantial evidence and testimony against the hospital, even though
the individual who was the subject of the alleged peer review was, at
the time of trial, deceased?

9.

Did the trial court err in refusing to allow the jury to consider an
assessment of punitive damages against the hospital when the
hospital's own expert testified that permitting an uncredentialed
surgeon to operate on patients would constitute reckless conduct?

Mrs. Haase defers her briefing of these issues to the submission she will file
in response to the hospital's cross-appeal.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE2
This is an appeal from the trial court's refusal to enter judgment in the
amount of $820,000, as supported by the jury's post-verdict affidavits and in-court
declarations.
Mrs. Haase sued the hospital for negligently credentialing and retaining a
dangerously impaired orthopedic surgeon who caused her serious permanent
injury by severing her patellar tendon during a questionable surgery to repair a
minimally displaced tibial plateau fracture. ( R. 3-10). The surgical error and
injury occurred six years before Mrs. Haase's case against the hospital came to
trial. ( R. 3-10). Mrs. Haase's claim against the surgeon was settled three years
earlier. ( R. 895-899).

That settlement occurred some fifteen months after the

surgeon had died. Terms of the settlement were confidential but included
express provision that Mrs. Haase would be free to pursue her claim against the
hospital. ( R. 895-899, 1170-1173).
Prior to trial, Mrs. Haase's counsel filed a formal motion in limine seeking
clarification as to how the trial court intended to handle the matter of Mrs. Haase's
prior settlement with the surgeon's estate.

2

Counsel also included the matter in a

All references to the district court record shall be cited as "R.
Plaintiff Lori Haase shall be referred to as "Mrs. Haase." Defendant Ashley
Valley Medical Center shall be referred to as "the hospital."
-4-

"

proposed agendum of legal issues he hoped would be addressed before trial.3
(R. 934-940).
Despite counsel's effort, the issue was not resolved prior to trial. However,
the court did instruct the jury that the surgeon's negligence "is not at issue in this
trial. This trial is about what happened before the surgery." ( R. 982; R. 1358 at
p.4).

A few weeks before trial, the hospital decided not to contest the

surgeon's negligence and asked the court to declare the surgeon's negligence to
be an established fact. The court honored that request. ( R. 796-810; 1162).
After both sides had rested, the court reviewed proposed jury instructions
with counsel in chambers. During this session, which was not "on the record,"
counsel debated one another's proposed jury instructions, with the court selecting
those instructions it felt were appropriate. The form of the special verdict was
also discussed. The special verdict form submitted on behalf of Mrs. Haase did
not ask the jury to apportion fault between the hospital and the surgeon. ( R.
857-859; Exhibit 3, attached). Significantly, neither did the one submitted on

3

That proposed agendum was delivered to the court and the hospital's
counsel two days before trial. Of the 17 issues it asked to be considered, only
one is entirely capitalized: The one dealing with whether the fault of the surgeon
should be apportioned with that of the hospital. ( R. 936).
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behalf of the hospital. (See Exhibit 2, attached)4.

The parties' disagreement

over the special verdict had nothing to do with apportionment of fault. Rather, it
concerned the hospital's contention that in order to find for Mrs. Haase, the jury
should have to find specifically that the surgeon was "physically impaired at the
time he operated on Lori Haase".

The court brought the debate to an end

without indicating which of the parties' proposed special verdict forms it would
employ. It dismissed counsel for a brief lunch break with the indication that the
reading of jury instructions would occur immediately after the lunch break,
followed by closing arguments.
Following the lunch break, the court read its jury instructions to the jury and
for the first time revealed to counsel the special verdict form it intended to use,
which it apparently had created on its own during the lunch break. That form
contained a blank for the surgeon's percent of negligence. Counsel were neither
asked nor permitted to comment on the court's special verdict form prior to its
being presented to the jury. They had no opportunity even to see it until shortly
before it was read to the jury.

4

The Eighth District Court Clerk has no record of a special verdict form
having been filed by the hospital. However, plaintiff's counsel received a
proposed special verdict form from the hospital's counsel shortly before trial along
with the hospital's proposed 27 jury instructions. It is appended hereto as Exhibit
2.
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The jury received no instruction concerning comparative negligence or
apportionment of fault. ( R. 1006-1053).

The jury also received no instruction

explaining the impact of apportionment of fault decisions on the actual amount of
the damage award Mrs. Haase would receive. ( R. 1006-1053). Neither party
had requested any such instructions prior to trial. Mrs. Haase had not requested
any because she had consistently contended, for a variety of reasons, that the
jury should not be asked to apportion fault between the surgeon and the hospital.
( R. 943-959). Again, neither counsel knew that the court had decided to ask the
jury to apportion fault between the hospital and the surgeon until the court
presented its own special verdict form to the jury shortly before closing arguments
were delivered.
The 48 instructions given by the court contain no guidance or standards as
to how the surgeon's negligence should be "deliberated". They do not even
discuss or mention the surgeon's negligence. The only reference to physician
negligence appears in Instruction No. 24 which merely states:
A physician's negligence does not raise a presumption
that the hospital was negligent in granting the physician
privileges.
( R. 1030). Again, the court instructed the jury at the beginning of the trial that
the surgeon's negligence was not at issue. ( R. 982,1358 at p. 4).
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During its deliberations, the jury sent out a note to the court requesting
clarification of its task in assessing damages. ( R. 1005). Although this was an
occasion for the court to allow counsel to help dispel any misunderstanding the
jury may have had due to an absence of apportionment instructions, the court did
not contact counsel. Rather, it returned a terse note to the jury undertaking to
answer its question. ( R. 1005; Exhibit 6, attached). It is apparent that the
seven-word response did not satisfactorily clarify the matter for the jury. In the
end, the jurors were left to their own assumptions based on what they
understood. (R.1058-59 ; Exhibit 8, attached, at pp. 1-2).
The jury foreman signed the special verdict form. It contains an award of
$820,000 in damages5. It also lists fault at 30% for the hospital and 70% for the
surgeon. (R. 1054-1055).
The verdict was returned at approximately 11:00 p.m. The court invited the
jurors to go home and suggested that if counsel wanted to ask them questions,
they could do so the next day. ( R. 1357 at p. 8; Exhibit 6, attached). The next

5

During the trial, four witnesses testified concerning Mrs. Haase's general
damages: Mrs. Haase's mother and two daughters and Mrs. Haase herself. Two
expert witnesses testified as to special damages: Rehabilitation Specialist/Life
Care Planner Helen Woodard and Economist Patricia Pacey, Ph.D. Dr. Pacey
testified that based on Ms. Woodard's finding and her own calculations, Mrs.
Haase's special damages were at least $1,241,900 (Trial Transcript Vol. IV, 618652). The hospital offered no rebuttal evidence or witnesses on damages.
-8-

morning, Mrs. Haase's counsel discovered from his juror interviews that the
special verdict form as interpreted by the court did not reflect the jury's true intent.
Seven of the eight jurors indicated without equivocation that they intended to
award Mrs. Haase the full $820,000 for the hospital's negligence. ( R. 10581067 and 1108-1109; Exhibit 6, attached). The eighth juror indicated she had
agreed during deliberations to go along with the others but she declined to sign
an affidavit reflecting her intentions or understanding. Affidavits were prepared,
signed and filed with the court. ( R. 1056 -1081 and 1108 -1109; See Exhibit "6",
attached).
After considering the affidavits, the trial court ordered that the jury be reconvened six weeks after the trial. ( R. 1138-1139). At that time, the jurors
were asked to respond to questions. One of the questions put to the jurors was
this:
"Was it your intent to award Mrs. Haase the total
sum of $820,000 for injuries sustained by her as a
result of the hospital's negligence"?
( R. 1358 at p. 17; See Exhibit "5", attached at p. 17). Six of the seven jurors
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present6 responded in the affirmative. ( R. 1358 at pp. 17-19; See Exhibit "5",
attached at pp. 17-19; See and hear also actual videotape of hearing for proof as
to the number of affirmative responses, including Mr. Labrum's).
Another question posed to the jurors was:
"Was it your intent to award Mrs. Haase only
$246,000 for the damages she sustained as a result
of the hospital's negligence?
( R. 1358; Exhibit 5, attached, P.19, lines 1-18). The same six jurors again
responded "no" (Id. at lines 22-25).
Finally, the six jurors who had responded with clarity to that question were
posed this question:
Hearing what you have heard now from the Court about
the $246,00 judgment, did you inaccurately record on
the special verdict form your actual intent?
( R. 1358; Exhibit 5, attached at p. 24, lines 5-7) (Emphasis added). The record
clearly reflects six individual affirmative responses to this question. ( R. 1358 at pp.
24-25;Exhibit 5, attached at pp. 24-25; Also, see and hear actual videotape of
proceeding).

6

One of the jurors (Becky Solomon) was absent when the jury was reconvened and the eighth juror was not asked the question, having declined
earlier to sign an affidavit but having indicated her agreement to "go along with
the others". (See paragraph 4 of Affidavit of Frank J. Falk, 8th affidavit included in
Exhibit "8", Exhibit "5", attached at pp. 17-19; see also Exhibit "9", attached).
-10-

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The jury intended to award Mrs. Haase $820,000 for the hospital's negligence.
Jurors made that intent clear in the affidavits they signed on the day following trial
and in their declarations in open court when they were re-impaneled some six weeks
later. Under Utah law, the jury's intent is to be carried into effect.
If the trial court genuinely believed the jury did not intend to award Mrs. Haase
the full $820,000 for the hospital's negligence, its belief was clearly erroneous and
against the clear weight of evidence. If the trial court did not so believe, it erred as
a matter of law in substituting its own judgment for the jury's.

ARGUMENT
I
UNDER CONTROLLING UTAH CASE LAW, THE
JURY'S TRUE INTENT GOVERNS AS TO THE
DAMAGES MRS. HAASE IS TO RECEIVE FOR
THE HOSPITAL'S NEGLIGENCE.
It is well-established law that a court should enter judgment based on the
actual intent of a jury in rendering its verdict. See 75B Am.Jur.2d, Trial §1789. If the
verdict form completed by the jury does not accurately "reflect the jury's intent, the
trial court may amend or modify the verdict to conform to the jury's intent and enter
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judgment accordingly". Moulton v. Staats. 27 P.2d 455,459 (Utah 1933). See also,
e.g., Eastridge Development Co. v. Halpert Associates. 853 F.2d 722,783 (10th Cir.
1988); Fried v. MCGrath. 135 F.2d 833,834 (D.C. Cir. 1943); Newport Fisherman's
Supply Co.. Inc. v. Derecktor. 569 A.2d 1051.1053 (R.I. 1990): Drop Anchor Realty
Trustv. Hartford Fire Ins. Co.. 496 A.2d 339,346 (N.H. 1985); Umphrevv.Sprinkel.
682 P.2d 1247, 1255 (Idaho 1983). Entry of a judgment based on a verdict which
does not accurately reflect the jury's intent undermines the public's confidence in the
judicial system and frustrates the interests of justice.
The affidavits seven of the eight jurors signed on the day following the
announcement of their verdict clarifies the verdict and explains the jurors' true
intent. That the affidavits should be considered and declared dispositive is
strongly suggested in our Supreme Court's recent decision in Bishop v. GenTec:
We disagree with the trial judge's characterization of the
substance of the motion and conclude. ..that the affidavits
were admissible, and that the jury verdict should be
amended to reflect the true intent of the jury.

* * * *

"[l]n this broad approach to correctibility under Rule 60(a),
it matters little whether an error was made by the court
clerk, the jury foreman, counsel, a party, or the judge
himself, so long as it is clearly a formal error that should
be corrected in the interest of having judgment, order, or
other part of the record reflect what was done or
intended." Stanger v. Sentinel Sec. Life Ins. Co.. 669 P .2d

-12-

1201, 1206 (Utah 1983) (quoting Jean F. Rydstrom,
Annotation, Construction of Rule 60(a) of Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure Authorizing Correction of Clerical Mistakes
in Judgements. Orders, or other Parts of Record, and
Errors Therein. 13 A.L.R. Fed. 794 (1972)).
Prior to the adoption of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
we addressed the issue of whether a trial court could
correct a jury verdict to reflect the true intent of the jury. In
Moulton v. Staats. 27 P.2d 455 (Utah 1933), we allowed
the trial court to correct a jury verdict to reflect the true
intent of the jury. In Suniland Corp. v. Radcliffe. 576 P.2d
847 (Utah 1978), Justice Maughan argued that juror
affidavits were admissible "to demonstrate what verdict
was actually agreed upon." id. at 850 (Maughan, J.,
dissenting)at 946 n.1. More recently, the Tenth Circuit
Court of Appeals has also determined that, under the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a jury verdict may be
corrected to reflect the true intent of the jury. See
Eastridqe Dev. Co. v. Halpert Assocs.. Inc.. 853 F.2d 772,
783 (10th Cir. 1998).
Bishop is not arguing in this case that the mistake was a
judicial error made in rendering the judgment, but rather
that the error was clerical and was made by the jury in
"recording the judgment as rendered." We agree that
accurately recording the intent of the jury in its calculation
of the damage award constitutes correction of a clerical
error, not a judicial error. "The distinction between judicial
error and clerical error. ..depends on whether it was made
in rendering the judgment or in recording the judgment as
rendered." Richards v. Siddowav. 471 P.2d 143, 145
(Utah 1970) (quoting 46 Am.Jur. 2d Judgments § 202).
Accordingly, the juror affidavits should have been
admitted. On remand the jury verdict should.be corrected
to reflect the true intent of the jury by increasing the
general and special damages to $1,000,000 and
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$1,067,000 respectively, and then deducting Bishop's
percentage of fault as required by the LRA.
Bishop v. GenTec Inc. 48 P.3d 218,

(UT 2002).

A trial court may and should consider evidence which clarifies the jury's true
intent. Moulton. 27 P.2d at 459. See also, Eastridae Development Co.. 853 F.2d
at 783. As succinctly noted by our Supreme Court in Moulton:
The general rule, that statements of jurors will not be received
to establish their own misconduct, or to impeach their verdict
agreed on, does not prevent the reception of their evidence as
to what really was the verdict agreed on, in order to prove that,
through mistake or otherwise, it has not been correctly
expressed, as the agreement reached by the jury, and not the
written paper filed, is the verdict; and a showing that the writing
is incorrect is not an impeachment of the verdict itself.
Affidavits of jurors are admissible to show that the verdict, as
received and entered of record, by reason of a mistake, does
not embody the true finding of the jury.
27 P.2d at 459 (citations omitted).
Utah law on clarification of jury verdicts is consistent with the law of many
other jurisdictions. That law is organized and summarized in two relevant ALR
articles: Competency of Juror's Statement or Affidavit to Show That Verdict in Civil
Case Was Not Correctly Recorded. 18 ALR 3d 1133; Propriety of Reassembling
Jury to Amend. Correct. Clarify or Otherwise Change a Verdict After Discharge or
Separation at Conclusion of Civil Case. 19 ALR 5th 622. These two articles
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(comprising 199 pages of reported cases and analysis) provide support for several
basic principles recognized by Utah's Supreme Court, including these:

1)

A verdict is what the jury intended;

2)

If a verdict does not express the jury's true intent, clarification or
correction is appropriate;

3)

Juror affidavits which explain the intended verdict are admissible
to clarify the verdict; and

4)

Once a jury has been discharged or separated, the jury may be
reconvened for the limited purpose of explaining or clarifying its
decision but not to re-deliberate, reconsider the facts, or alter its
original intent.

II.
THE MARSHALED EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT OF THE
TRIAL COURT'S APPARENT FINDING THAT THE
JURY'S INTENT WAS TO AWARD MRS. HAASE ONLY
$246,000 FOR THE HOSPITAL'S NEGLIGENCE.
INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT
The trial court made no express findings and gave no explanation as to why
it decided to enter judgment in the amount of $246,000 rather than $820,000. Its
only statement on the record is brief and opaque:
I recognize there's some confusion in the jury instructions.
And that responsibility, of course, falls on me
but, I'm

-15-

going to just order the judgment for the $246,000, which is
the 30% and which probably means you'll want to appeal
it. And I just have to let it go.7
( R. 1357 at p. 9 and R. 1358 at p. 27).
It is apparent, but only apparent, that the trial court found the jurors' true
intent was to award Mrs. Haase $246,000 for the hospital's negligence.8 (See R.
1357 at p. 9 and R. 2358 at pp. 27-28).

An appellant generally is required to

marshal evidence supporting the finding of fact in dispute. This requirement "serves
the important function of reminding litigants and the appellate courts of the broad
deference owed to the fact finder at trial." State v. Moore. 802 P.2d 732, 739 (Utah
App. 1990). This Court, however, grants deference only when the disputed finding
is sufficiently detailed to disclose the evidentiary basis for the court's decision. A trial
court's decision is afforded no deference when its findings are inadequate. State v.
Lovegren. 7988 P.2d 767, 771 (Utah App. 1990). This Court has declared:
There is . . . no need for an appellant to marshal the
evidence when the findings are so inadequate that they
cannot be meaningful challenged as factual
determinations.

7

The court went on to speculate on the possibility of a reviewing court
ordering a new trial and stated its "hope" that a new trial not be ordered, "from the
point of view its very, very expensive. And I would hate to see the parties go
through it again". ( R. 1358 at p. 28; Exhibit "5", p. 28).
8

It is possible, however, the district court simply decided to substitute its
own judgment for the jury's. See Argument VI, infra, at pp. 31-34.
-16-

Rather, appellant can simply argue the legal insufficiency
of the court's findings as framed.
Woodward v. Fazzio. 823 P.2d 474, 477-478 (Utah App. 1991).
Mrs. Haase, therefore, appears to have the option of marshaling evidence
supporting the district court's assumed finding or challenging the legal sufficiency of
the ruling as made. Mrs. Haase seeks to avoid further delay and sees no point in
having the case remanded for an explanation of why the trial court entered judgment
in the smaller amount. She contends the decision was wrong, whatever its basis,
and prefers to attack that decision on the record as it exists. She asks this Court
to determine that the decision was clearly erroneous, an abuse of discretion and
incorrect as a matter of law, or reversible by whichever standard this Court deems
applicable. (See Arguments III, VI, infra).

The Marshaled Evidence
A.

The Percentage and Damage Figures Entered
on the Special Verdict Form Itself.

A finding that the jury intended Mrs. Haase to receive only 30% of its $820,000
damage award may be inferable from the special verdict itself.

( R. 1055). While

it is not clear the jury understood why it was being asked to assign a percentage to
the surgeon's negligence or the effect of its doing so, it is clear the jury foreman
entered 70% beside the surgeon's name and 30% beside the hospital's name. It
-17-

is also clear the jury assessed damages at $820,000 - $600,000 in special damages
and $220,000 in general damages.

B.

The Court's Response to the Jury's Mid-Deliberation Question.

The court may well have based its decision to enter judgment on only 30% of
the jury's $820,000 damage award on what it perceived to be the clarity of its
response to the note the jury sent out during its deliberations. The note reads:
Your Honor,
In figuring damages, do we figure the percentage of total
damages, or the whole damage & the court figures the
percentage that we decide.
( R. 1005; Exhibit 6, attached).
The court returned to the jury a seven word response:
Figure the total value of all damages.9
( R. 1005; Exhibit 6, attached).

9

However, what may have seemed perfectly clear to the trial court may not
have been clear to the jurors. Neither the question nor the answer referred to the
surgeon or his negligence or to damages which might be considered attributable
to the surgeon's negligence.
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C.

Juror Responses to Individual Polling Immediately
Following the Reading of the Verdict.

After completing its deliberations, the jury was brought back into the
courtroom. The court and counsel were present. At that time, the court asked the
jury foreman to hand the verdict to the bailiff who then delivered it to the court. The
court then read the verdict aloud. After doing so, the court asked if either counsel
wanted the court to poll the jurors.

Mrs. Haase's counsel responded in the

affirmative. The court then asked each individual juror if each response to each of
the questions on the special verdict form reflected his or her verdict.

Each

responded in the affirmative. (R. 1357 at pp.4-7). Arguably, this could be construed
as reflecting an intent consistent with the court's intent to enter judgment in the
amount of 30% of the $820,000 damage award.10

10

It is significant, however, that the jury had left the courtroom before the
trial court directed counsel to prepare judgment for 30% of the $820,000 award.
(R.1357 at pp. 8-9 ). Having been absent when that direction was given, the
jurors had no opportunity to object or express surprise at the trial court's
misunderstanding of their intent.
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D.

Isolated Excerpts of Juror Responses to Questions the Court
Posed to Them When They Were Re-impaneled Six Weeks after
the Trial.

When the court re-impaneled the jury on May 2, 2002, it told the jurors:
We brought you back to determine what you intended
when you signed your verdict. . . . We are not going to
ask you to reconsider your verdict. We are not going to
ask you to deliberate any more. We are only going to
inquire into what you intended on the night you signed that
verdict.
( R. 1358; Transcript of May 2, 2002 proceedings at 2-3; See Exhibit 5, attached).
The first question the court posed was: "Did your verdict of $820,000 include
all of the plaintiff's injuries, those caused by Dr. Hawkes as well as those caused by
Ashley Valley Medical Center?". (R. 1358 at p.5; see Exhibit 5, attached, p.5). The
court started with the jury foreman, who responded:
My answer, I believe we were trying to clear up a question
that we had when we were coming to that judgment on
that. I don't recall the exact way it was stated to you on
the (inaudible).
Id.

The court then reviewed with the jurors what had occurred on the night they

were deliberating as to the note they sent out and the response the court sent back.
After reviewing those matters, the court returned to the question and this further
response was given by juror Chat Watt:
My intention, when I went through it, it was my impression
that we were going for the whole, the totality for the
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plaintiff in this case. And the amount that we were coming
up with was the totality. . . .
The Court: Okay. . . . Did your 820,000 verdict include
all of the plaintiffs injuries, those caused by Dr. Hawkes
as well as those caused by Ashley Valley Medical Center?

Mr. Watt:

It was mine.

The Court: It was the total $820,000, was her total
damages?
Mr. Watt:
Id. at 7.

It is what I thought was the total damage.

Although other jurors responded inconsistently with this response and Mr.

Watt himself later stated an intent and understanding completely contrary to the
conclusion the court drew from the foregoing response, the district court may have
inferred from this response that the entire jury intended to award Mrs. Haase only
$246,000 for the hospital's negligence.
On pages 10 and 11 of the May 2 transcript, juror Ardith Atwood11, identified
only as "unidentified woman juror", expressed to the court her understanding of what
she thought the damage award meant. Although her statements are somewhat
opaque and indicate she believed it would be up to the judge to decide whether Mrs.
Haase would receive $820,000 or $246,000 from the hospital, they may support a

11

Ms. Atwood was the one juror who declined to sign a post-trial affidavit,
with the simple indication that she had agreed "to go along with the others" on the
matter of damages. ( R. 1068-70; See Exhibit 8, attached).
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conclusion that she believed part of the $820,000 damage award represented what
Mrs. Haase had already received in settlement from the surgeon.12
On page 12 of the transcript, the court asked the jurors whether the thought
ever occurred to them "that the damages to be one hundred percent would have to
be over two million?". The court apparently intended by this question to mean that
in order for Mrs. Haase to receive $820,000 for the hospital's negligence they would
have to have found a total damage award of over two million dollars. Juror Fagnan
and the "unidentified woman juror" (Ardith Atwood) responded in the negative.13

Mrs. Haase's counsel has scrutinized the record for other evidence
supporting a finding that the jurors intended Mrs. Haase to receive only $246,000
for the hospital's negligence and has found none.

12

If that was her view, it was a one-juror minority view. See R. 1056-67;
1108-09; R. 1358 and Exhibit 9, attached).
13

Juror Fagnan went on to explain that she and her fellow jurors
understood the focus of the case was on the damages resulting from the
hospital's negligence. She stated:
When we were deliberating, I don't remember us
talking about like breaking down this is the harm that
was caused by the hospital, this is the harm caused by
the doctor. . . . - because we were focusing on the
hospital. ( R. 1358 at pp. 9-10; see Exhibit 5,
attached).
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III.
THE INTENT OF THE JURY TO AWARD MRS.
HAASE $820,000 FOR THE HOSPITAL'S
NEGLIGENCE IS OVERWHELMINGLY CLEAR FROM
THE JURORS' MARCH 21 AFFIDAVITS AND MAY 2
DECLARATIONS IN OPEN COURT.
On the day following announcement of its verdict, seven of the eight jurors
signed affidavits. One of the affidavits is written entirely by hand. In it, juror Toni
Fagnan avers:
During our deliberations, my fellow jurors and I had a
question about our award of damages and how our
"number" would be effected by our apportionment of
fault between Dr. Hawkes and the hospital.
Specifically, we didn't know and wanted to know
whether Lori Haase would get the whole sum we
arrived at or only a percentage of it. We sent a note
out to the judge seeking an answer. He wrote back
suggesting we refer to a particular jury instruction.
Neither the judge's note nor the jury instruction
answered our question....
/ believed and intended that Lori Haase would get
the total amount of the number we finally awarded $820,000 and I believe my fellow jurors believed and
intended the same.
( R. 1058-59; Exhibit 8, attached) (Emphasis added). The other six affidavits are
identical in form and state:
Based on my understanding of the information and
instructions given to us, it was my intention and belief
that the full amount of the sum awarded in general and
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special damages - $820,000 would go to the plaintiff, not
30% of that sum.
One of the affiants, Chad Watt, deleted the phrase "not 30% of that sum".
However, his deletion did not alter his clearly stated intent that Mrs. Haase would
receive the full $820,000 awarded, for the hospital's negligence. ( R. 1358;
Exhibit 9, pp. 5-6, attached; See also Exhibits 5 and 8).
Finding the jurors' post-verdict affidavits insufficiently dispositive, the trial
court ordered the jury re-impaneled for a special hearing on May 2, 2002. At the
beginning of that hearing, the trial court acknowledged it had instructed the jury
before the trial started that the negligence of Dr. Hawkes "is not at issue in this
trial. This trial is about what happened before the surgery".

( R. 1358; Exhibit

5, attached, p.4 at lines 9-11). After undertaking to ask its own questions of the
jurors, the court allowed counsel to question the jurors.
Attached to this brief as Exhibit "9" is an Analysis of Juror Intent based
on the entire May 2 proceeding and the affidavits which seven of the jurors had
signed on the day following trial. The eight jurors who decided the case were
Becky Solomon, Ray Labrum, Roberta Welch, Carrie Murray, Tonie Fagnan,
Chad Watt, Tracy Cook and Ardith Atwood. Exhibit "9" sets forth a juror-byjuror analysis based on all the available evidence.
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During questioning by Mrs. Haase's counsel, one of the jurors, Ray
Labrum, walked into the courtroom, having arrived at the hearing late. When Mr.
Labrum entered the courtroom, the court interrupted counsel's questioning of
individual jurors and immediately directed two questions of its own to Mr. Labrum.
Without any possibility of being influenced or confused by any questions or
answers which had preceded his entry into the courtroom, Mr. Labrum responded
to the court's questions as follows:
The Court: . . . Did your $820,000 verdict include all of the
plaintiffs injuries, those caused by Dr. Hawkes as
well as those caused by Ashley Valley Medical
Center?
Mr. Labrum:

No.

The Court: Second question. Was it your intent to award the
plaintiff $820,000 from Ashley Valley Medical
Center for injuries sustained by her as a result of
the hospital's negligence?
Mr. Labrum:

Yes.

( R. 1358; Exhibit 5, page 18, lines 2-11) (Emphasis added).
Before Mr. Labrum had entered the courtroom, Mr. Mortensen had posed
this question to the jurors individually: "Was it your intent to award Mrs. Haase the
total sum of $820,000 for injuries sustained by her as a result of the hospital's
negligence?" ( R. 1358; Exhibit 5, p. 17, lines 21-23). (Emphasis added). The
record shows that at least four of the jurors had individually responded in the
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affirmative when the questioning was interrupted by the court's acknowledgment
of Mr. Labrum's late arrival and interruption of the proceeding by its above-quoted
interrogation of Mr. Labrum. Mr. Mortensen was then allowed to continue. He
posed this question to the jurors: "Was it your intent to award Mrs. Haase only
$246,000 for the damages she sustained as a result of the hospital's
negligence?" ( R. 1358; Exhibit 5 attached, p.19, lines 1-18).

As the court then

acknowledged, six of the seven jurors present responded "No". (Id. at lines
22-25).
Finally, Mrs. Haase's counsel was allowed to ask this question of the six
jurors who had responded with clarity to his prior question:
Hearing what you have heard now from the court about
the $246,000 dollar judgment, did you inaccurately
record on the Special verdict form your actual
intent?
(Id. p.24, lines 5-7) (Emphasis added). The record clearly reflects six individual
affirmative responses to this question. ( R. 1358 at pp. 24-25).
The clear weight of the evidence supports but one conclusion: The jurors
intended to award Mrs. Haase $820,000 for the hospital's negligence.
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IV.
THE JURY BASED ITS AWARD ON WHAT IT
THOUGHT THE HOSPITAL OWED, NOT ON
PRINCIPLES OF APPORTIONMENT OF
FAULT, ABOUT WHICH IT HAD RECEIVED
NO INSTRUCTIONS.
There is no evidence the jury was confused or indecisive about its core
determinations. Clearly, it concluded from the evidence it heard that the hospital
was negligent and that its negligence proximately caused significant injury to Mrs.
Haase. At least seven of the jurors clearly desired and intended that Mrs. Haase
receive the full $820,000 it awarded, for the hospital's negligence.
The jury was forced to make its assessment of comparative fault in a virtual
vacuum. It is strongly apparent the jury considered its apportionment assessment
essentially irrelevant to its other determinations, including its damage award.
Two weeks before trial the hospital filed a motion in limine seeking to
preclude the admission at trial of any evidence of the surgeon's breach of the
standard of care applicable to him. ( R. 796-8). On page 3 of its supporting
memorandum, the hospital declared:
Defendant submits herewith its stipulation that Thomas
Hawkes, M.D., violated the standards of care for
orthopedic surgeons in the performance of this
operation on the plaintiff.
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( R. 808). The hospital even submitted a formal "Stipulation as to Breach of the
Standard of Care by Thomas Hawkes, M.D.". ( R. 798-9).

Its clear purpose in

doing so was to preclude the jury from considering the particulars of the
surgeon's negligence. Though the stipulation was unilateral, the trial court
accepted and honored it. At the hospital's request, the surgeon's negligence was
declared to be an established fact. Because of this, no evidence was presented
to the jury of the surgeon's actual negligence. The jury, therefore, had no direct
evidence on which to compare the surgeon's fault with the hospital's fault.
The jurors received no clue why they were asked to apportion fault
between the hospital and the surgeon nor what the impact of that apportionment
would be. They were told repeatedly that they were to concern themselves only
with the hospital's negligence and liability. They listened to a case which from
beginning to end was about what the hospital did and they decided the case
against the hospital and against no one else.
The hospital submitted 27 proposed jury instruction, none of which dealt
with apportionment of fault, comparative negligence, contributory negligence or
concurrent causation. (Exhibit 12, attached). Mrs. Haase's proposed instructions
also did not cover such matters. (Exhibit 13, attached). Her contention from the
beginning was that the jury should not be asked to compare fault or apportion
damages between the hospital and the surgeon.
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The trial court determined on its own to give the jury a special verdict form
asking it to compare fault. However, the court did not give the jury any
instructions on comparative negligence or apportionment of fault and did not tell
the jury what it intended to do with the fault apportionment figures it was being
asked to enter on its verdict form. The jury, therefore, was in the dark as to
whether or how its comparative fault figures would impact Mrs. Haase. It had no
idea that the court intended to enter judgment for only 30% its $820,000 damage
award.
As soon as the jury learned (upon being re-impaneled six weeks after the
trial) that the court intended to enter judgment against the hospital in the amount
of only $246,000, six of them unequivocally and unreservedly declared that their
actual intent had been inaccurately recorded on the special verdict form. (R.
1358 at pp. 24-25; Exhibit 5, attached).
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V.
THE ERROR MRS. HAASE SEEKS TO
CORRECT WAS A "CLERICAL,"
NOT A "JUDICIAL," ERROR.
Our Supreme Court could not have been clearer when it stated in the
penultimate paragraph of its recent GenTec decision:
We agree that accurately recording the intent of the jury
in its calculations of the damage award constitutes
correction of a clerical error, not a judicial error.
Bishop v. GenTec Inc.. 48 P.3d 218; 2002 UT 36, at paragraph 32 (Utah 2002).
Here, six individual jurors have clearly and unequivocally averred after learning of
the court's intent to award judgment against the hospital for only $246,000 that
they had inaccurately recorded on the special verdict form their actual intent.
(See May 2, 2002 transcript, p. 24, lines 5-7; R. 1358).
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VI.

THOUGH JUDICIAL OR ATTORNEY ERROR MAY HAVE
CAUSED OR CONTRIBUTED TO THE DISPARITY
BETWEEN THE COURT'S AND THE JURY'S
UNDERSTANDING OF THE JURY'S DAMAGE AWARD,
THAT DISPARITY OF UNDERSTANDING PROVIDES NO
BASIS FOR RETRIAL.
Two questions may arise in the minds of this reviewing Court:
1.

Why did the trial court and the jury not share the same
understanding of the jury's damage award? and

2.

When the jury's actual intent became known, why did the trial court
not follow it?

These questions will be considered in reverse order.
The trial court may well have declined to enter judgment on the full amount
of the jury's damage award based on its own belief that the jury's award was too
high. However, no motion for Remittitur was filed, briefed or argued and the court
made no effort to consider Remittitur sua sponte. The trial court never expressed
a view that the jury's award was excessive, nor did the hospital ever contend
such. The record is devoid of any contention that Mrs. Haase does not deserve
to receive $820,000 for the hospital's negligence.
The difference between the jury's and the court's understanding of the
jury's damage award probably arises from the fact that the jury was given no
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instructions on comparative negligence or apportionment of fault. The jury was
repeatedly told and understood that Dr. Hawkes was not on trial and his
negligence was not at issue. (R. 982; 1358 at p. 4; See also Exhibit 5, p. 4).
Moreover, the hospital had actually conceded the surgeon's negligence prior to
trial, wanting to preclude the introduction at trial of direct evidence of the
egregiousness of the surgeon's errors. Since the surgeon's negligence was not
at issue during the trial, the jury was without substantive basis to compare the
surgeon's negligence with the hospital's.
The trial court fashioned its own special verdict form at the conclusion of
trial after rejecting the special verdict forms proposed by counsel for both sides.
Counsel had no input into the creation of the special verdict form the court chose
to employ, was not invited to comment on it and was given no opportunity to
submit additional instructions to explain the apportionment issues which the
court's special verdict form necessarily created.
The special verdict form adopted by the court appears to have been taken
from one of the MUJI comparative fault special verdict forms. Unfortunately,
none of those forms was designed for a case in which fault is being apportioned
between a named defendant and a non party. Confusion might have been
avoided or lessened by adding a clarifying phrase to Question No. 4 on the
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special verdict form. For example, Question No. 4 may have avoided
misunderstanding if it had stated:
State the amount of special and general damages
sustained by the plaintiff as a proximate result of both
the hospital's and Dr. Hawkes' negligence, combined.
MUJI's proposed comparative negligence instruction for multiple defendant
cases may well have provided the clarity jurors sought. It may have been helpful
for the jurors to have been told something like this:
The total special and general damages sustained by the
plaintiff may have been the proximate result of the
negligence of Ashley Valley Medical Center or the
negligence of Dr. Thomas Hawkes or the negligence of
both of them, combined. Your task is to compute the
total damages sustained by Mrs. Haase which were
proximately caused by the negligence of either or both
of the parties named in Question No. 3, above. The
result will be that the Court will then award as damages
to Mrs. Haase in this case the percentage of that total
damage figure which is attributable to the hospital's
percentage of negligence. For example, if you find the
hospital's negligence to be 30%, then the plaintiffs
recovery will be reduced by 70%. In other words, the
plaintiff will receive only 30% of the total damage figure
you list in response to Question No. 4 on the Special
verdict form.
That the jury was not adequately instructed on matters of comparative
negligence and apportionment of fault may be regrettable. However, that
provides inadequate basis for ordering a new trial. Having been told the
surgeon's negligence was not at issue, having been given no clear basis for
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apportioning negligence between the surgeon and the hospital, and having been
given no clue as to how, if at all, its comparison of fault percentages would impact
Mrs. Haase's actual recovery from the hospital, the jury made its decision based
on the evidence before it, and what it understood its duty to be. At this point, its
intent and desire for Mrs. Haase to receive $820,000 for the hospital's negligence
is clear and should be carried into effect.

VII.
REMANDING FOR A NEW TRIAL WOULD PENALIZE
A NON-ERRING PREVAILING PARTY AND WASTE
COURT AND LITIGANT RESOURCES.
Mrs. Haase's case against the hospital did not go to trial until six years
after she was injured by the surgeon from whom the hospital failed to protect her.
The trial lasted nine days. After both sitting Eighth District Court judges recused
themselves, a senior judge from Davis County was brought in to preside over the
case. The attorneys for both sides were from Salt Lake. They and the judge
spent the two weeks the trial lasted living out of Vernal area motels.

So too did

Mrs. Haase and her family, who had moved to Bakersfield, California, several
years earlier. Their return to Vernal for trial caused them considerable
inconvenience and expense, which they could ill afford. Expert witnesses
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traveled to Vernal from Washington, Wisconsin and Colorado, at considerable
expense to the parties. Other expert and fact witnesses testified by videotape,
which itself involved unusual expense. Two witnesses testified by telephone, one
of whom was a veteran, 86 year-old surgeon from Southern California who would
have had difficulty physically coping with the significant elevation in altitude, had
he been required to appear in person.
Mrs. Haase's out-of-pocket expenses incident to the trial exceeded $35,000.
If the case were remanded for a new trial, those expenses would have to be
duplicated, as would the expenses incurred by the hospital and Utah's court system.
Justice would be ill-served by the duplication of such expense. Remanding the case
for a new trial would have the effect of significantly punishing the innocent prevailing
party.

Mrs. Haase committed no errors warranting a new trial. She cannot be

faulted for the court's failure to give the jury adequate instructions and information
concerning apportionment of fault, nor can she be faulted for the jury's not sharing
the court's intent and understanding of the impact of the apportionment figures on
the damage award.
Likewise, the jury did nothing wrong. It had ample evidence on which to
determine the hospital's negligence and to determine the damages flowing from
such negligence. It did so. It is clear the jury intended to award Mrs. Haase
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$820,000 for the hospital's negligence. Its intent should be carried into effect without
further delay.
To rule otherwise would be to punish Mrs. Haase for misunderstandings she
did not create and which, by the clear weight of evidence, the jurors' post-trial
declarations resolve.

CONCLUSION AND REQUEST FOR RELIEF
As a matter of law and sound policy, the jury's intent should be carried into
effect. In this case, the jury's true intent was to award Ms. Haase $820,000 for the
hospital's negligence.

The jury was not informed why it was being asked to

compare the surgeon's negligence with the hospital's nor how Mrs. Haase would be
impacted by the fault percentages they entered on the verdict form. The jurors
cannot be faulted for not sharing the court's understanding of their intent.
Regardless of the reasons for the misunderstanding, the juror's actual intent as
revealed in their post-trial declarations should govern.
Mrs. Haase requests this Court to reverse the trial court's decision to enter
judgment on only 30% of the jury's $820,000 damage award and to instruct the trial
court to enter judgment in favor of Mrs. Haase against the hospital in the amount of
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$820,000, plus taxable costs of $4,570.19. Mrs. Haase also requests interest on the
award at the prejudgment legal rate of 10% per annum.

Respectfully submitted this A)*'day of November, 2002.

Wfc^£>
Morterysen
Matheson, Mortensen, Olsen & Jeppson, P.C.
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant
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EXHIBIT 1

°epury
Douglas G. Mortensen, USB #2329
MATHESON, MORTENSEN, OLSEN & JEPPSON, P.C.
648 East 100 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102

Telephone (801)363-2244
Attorneys for Plaintiff
IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
OF UINTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

LORI HAASE,

AMENDED
JUDGMENT ON VERDICT

Plaintiff,
vs.

Civil No. 98-0800377

ASHLEY VALLEY MEDICAL CENTER
AND COLUMBIA ASHLEY VALLEY
MEDICAL CENTER, AND JOHN DOE
DEFENDANTS 1 THROUGH 10

Judge Douglas L. Cornaby

Defendants.
Based upon the answers provided in the jury's special verdict form and on this
Court's Ruling on Motion to Accept Costs and Disbursements:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that plaintiff Lori
Haase be and the same is hereby granted judgment against Ashley Valley Medical
Center in the amount of Two Hundred Forty Six Thousand Dollars (3246,000.00), plus
plaintiff's taxable costs incurred herein in the amount of Four Thousand Five Hundred
Seventy Dollars Nineteen Cents ($4,570.19) for a total judgment of Two Hundred Fifty

Thousand Five Hundred Seventy Dollars Nineteen Cents ($250,570.19) which
judgment shall bear interest at the judgment rate of 4.28% per annum from May 7,
2002, the date of this Court's original Judgment on Verdict herein.
DATED this / 7

day of June, 2002.

BYTHE£OURT:
^ouglast^Gtfrnaby' District Court Juck^e

APPROVED AS TO FORM:
obert R. Harrison >

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
in

I certify that on the / r day of June, 2002 I caused to be served via the method
indicated a copy of the foregoing to the following:
Robert R. Harrison
Snow, Christensen & Martineau
10 Exchange Place, 11 th Floor
P.O. Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145

D
D

Honorable Douglas L. Cornaby
Eighth District Court Judge
3612 North 2900 East
Layton, UT 84040

/

•

•

D
D

U.S. Mail
Facsimile
Hand-Delivered
Federal Express

/*

,<"\

•

JUH.
Pldg Judgment on Verdict.0614
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U.S. Mail
Facsimile - 363-0400
Hand-Delivered
Federal Express
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EXHIBIT 2

EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURTS
From the Desk of:
Michelle Thomas
Deputy Court Clerk
920 East Hwy. 40
Vernal, UT 84078
(435) 781-9307 Phone
(435) 789-0564 Fax

Facsimile Transmittal Sheet
Date: July 23, 2002

Total N u m b e r of Pages (Including Cover Sheet):

To: Frank Faulk

Company

Phone:

Fax: 801-363-2261

4

Matheson, Mortensen, Olsen & Jeppson,
P.C

Comments: Following is the Plaintiffs "Special Verdict Form" you requested. It was only
"Received" into the file. It was received on March 4, 2002. It does not have a
"FILED" date on it because this type of document is not "FILED" until signed.
There is no record of a "Special Verdict Form" filed by the Defendant.
There is no record in the file that the Plaintiffs or Defendant's "Proposed Jury
Instructions" were ever filed.
Please feel free to call me at the number listed above if you need further
information.
Please remit $3.00 for the cost of the fax. Thank you.

IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UINTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

LORIHAASE,
SPECIAL VERDICT
Plaintiff,
vs.

No. 98-0800377

ASHLEY VALLEY MEDICAL CENTER,

Judge Douglas L. Cornaby

Defendant.

We, the jurors empaneled in the above-entitled case, answer the questions put to us as
follows:
1.

Do youfindfroma preponderance of the evidence that Dr. Thomas Hawkes was

physically impaired at the time he operated on Lori Haase?
Yes
No

If you answered question number 1 "no" then do not answer the
following questions. Have your foreperson sign the verdict and return to
the courtroom.
2.

Do youfindfrom a preponderance of the evidence that Dr. Thomas Hawkes' physical

impairment was a proximate cause of injury to Lori Haase?
Yes
No

If you answered question number 2 "no" then do not answer the
remaining questions. Have your foreperson sign the verdict and return
to the courtroom.
3.

Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that Ashley Valley Medical Center,

through its administrators, knew or should have known that Dr. Thomas Hawkes was physically
impaired at the time he operated on Lori Haase?
Yes
No

If you answered question number 3 "no" then do not answer the
remaining questions. Have your foreperson sign the verdict and return
to the courtroom.
4.

Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that Ashley Valley Medical Center,

acting through its administrators, was negligent in not restricting Dr. Hawkes' operating privileges at
the time he operated on Lori Haase?
Yes
No

If, and only if, you answered questions numbered 1 through 4
"yes," then answer the following question.

-2-

5.

What sum of money do you find from a preponderance of the evidence will fairly and

adequately compensate Lori Haase for her injuries:
Special damages

$

General damages

$

TOTAL

DATED this

$

day of February, 2002.

Jury Foreperson
N:\10749\l 51\MN\SPECVERD.DWS
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ROBERT R. HARRISON (A7878)
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
Attorneys for Defendant Ashley Valley Medical Center
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
Post Office Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Telephone: (801) 521-9000

IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UINTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

LORI HAASE,
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
Plaintiff,
vs.
No. 98-0800377
ASHLEY VALLEY MEDICAL CENTER
and COLUMBIA ASHLEY VALLEY
MEDICAL CENTER and JOHN DOE
DEFENDANTS 1 THROUGH 10,

Judge Boyd Bunnell

Defendants.

Pursuant to Rule 4-502, Code of Judicial Administration, Robert R Harrison of Snow,
Chnstensen & Martineau, attorneys for Defendant Ashley Valley Medical Center, hereby certifies
that he served upon all counsel of record the following
i

DEFENDANT'S PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS AND SPECIAL
VERDICT and SPECIAL VERDICT.

DATED this

/

day of March, 2002.
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU

Robert R. Harrison
Attorneys for Defendants

-2-

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I state that I am employed by the law offices of Snow, Christensen & Martineau,
attorneys for defendants herein; that I served the attached CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE (Case
Number 98-0800377, Eighth Judicial District Court in and for Uintah County) upon the parties
listed below by placing a true and correct copy thereof in an envelope addressed to:
Douglas G. Mortensen
Matheson, Mortensen, Olsen & Jeppson
Attorneys for Plaintiff
648 East 100 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Honorable Douglas L. Cornaby (Original and one copy)
3612 North 2900 East
Layton, Utah 84040
and causing the same to be hand delivered on the //

N:\10749\151\CERTSERV.WPD
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• *

day of March, 2002

Tab 3

EXHIBIT 3

EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURTS
From the Desk of:
Michelle Thomas
Deputy Court Clerk
920 East Hwy. 40
Vernal, UT 84078
(435) 781-9307 Phone
(435) 789-0564 Fax

Facsimile Transmittal Sheet
Date: July 23, 2002

Total Number of Pages (Including Cover Sheet)

To: Frank Faulk

Company

Phone:

Fax: 801-363-2261

4

Matheson, Mortensen, Olsen & Jeppson,
P.C

Comments: Following is the Plaintiffs "Special Verdict Form" you requested. It was only
•'Received" into the file. It was received on March 4, 2002. It does not have a
"FILED" date on it because this type of document is not "FILED" until signed.
There is no record of a "Special Verdict Form" filed by the Defendant.
There is no record in the file that the Plaintiffs or Defendant's "Proposed Jury
Instructions" were ever filed.
Please feel free to call me at the number listed above if you need further
information.
Please remit $3.00 for the cost of the fax. Thank you.

JUL-23-2002 IUt u*:<rc rn vuinm. om uw, w W .

Douglas G. Mortensen, USB #2329
MATHESON, MORTENSEN, OLSEN & JEPPSON, P.C.
648 East 100 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Telephone (801)363-2244
Attorneys for Plaintiff
IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
OF UINTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

LORI HAASE,
SPECIAL VERDICT FORM
Plaintiff,
vs.

Civil No. 98-0800377

COLUMBIA ASHLEY VALLEY
MEDICAL CENTER,

Judge Douglas L. Cornaby

Defendant.

MEMBERS OF THE JURY:
Please answer the following questions, in the order presented, based on the jury
instructions and the evidence presented in this case. If you find the evidence
preponderates in favor of the issue presented answer "yes". If you find the evidence is
so equally balanced that you cannot determine a preponderance of the evidence, or if
you find that the evidence preponderates against the issue presented, answer "no".

-

~ . ~ . wwivi

i n n nu. 400 f03 UDM

P

QUESTION NO. 1: Was the defendant Columbia Ashley Valley Medical Center
negligent in any respect as alleged by the plaintiff?
ANSWER:

Yes

No

QUESTION NO. 2: Was Columbia Ashley Valley Medical Center's negligence a
proximate cause of injury sustained by the plaintiff?
ANSWER:

Yes

QUESTION NO. 3:

No

State the amount of special and general damages

sustained by the plaintiff as a proximate result of the injuries complained of.
Special Damages (both past and future):

$

General Damages (both past and future):

$

QUESTION NO. 4:

Do you find this an appropriate case for the assessment of

punitive or exemplary damages against Columbia Ashley Valley Medical Center?
ANSWER:

Yes

QUESTION NO, 5:

No

If you have answered Question No, 4 "yes", what do you

find to be an appropriate sum of punitive or exemplary damages against
Columbia Ashley Valley Medical Center?
$

DATED this

day of March, 2002.

Foreperson
-2-

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that on the ) day of March, 2002 I caused to be served via the method
indicated a copy of the foregoing to the following:

Robert R. Harrison
Snow, Christensen & Martineau
10 Exchange Place, 11 t h Floor
P.O. Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145

•

Honorable Douglas L. Cornaby
Eighth District Court Judge
3612 North 2900 East
Layton, UT 84040

/

»

•
•
D
D

•

U.S. Mail
Facsimile - 363-0400
Hand-Delivered
Federal Express
U.S. Mail
Facsimile
Hand-Delivered
Federal Express

o
£

Pldg Special Verdict Form.0301

^JL^L'sT^Jts

Tab 4

EXHIBIT 4

INSTRUCTION NO.

'

It is my duty to instruct you in the law that applies to this case, and it is your duty, as
jurors, to follow the law as I state it to you, regardless of what you personally believe the law is
or ought to be. Even if you do not like the laws that must be applied, you must use them. On
the other hand, it is your exclusive duty to determine the facts in this case, and to consider and
weigh the evidence for that purpose.

Your responsibility must be exercised with sincere

judgment, sound discretion and honest deliberation.

INSTRUCTION NO.

x

This case must not be decided for or against anyone because you feel sorry for anyone or
angry at anyone. It is your sworn duty to decide this case based on the facts and the law, without
regard to sympathy, passion or prejudice.

INSTRUCTION NO.

3

This case must be decided only upon the evidence which you have heard from the
witnesses, and have seen in the form of documents, photographs or other tangible things admitted
into evidence.
Anything you may have seen or heard from any other source may not be considered by you
in arriving at your verdict.
You should not consider as evidence any statement of the lawyers made during trial.

INSTRUCTION NO.

^

CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE
A fact may be proved by circumstantial evidence. Circumstantial evidence consists of
facts or circumstances that give rise to a reasonable inference of the truth of the facts sought to
be proved.

INSTRUCTION NO.

£

Remember, the lawyers are not on trial. Your feelings about them should not influence
your decision in this case. The lawyers are here to represent the best interests of their clients. It
is the duty of the lawyer on each side of a case to object when the other side offers evidence which
the lawyer believes is not admissible. You should not speculate as to the reasons for the
objections, nor should you allow yourself to become angry at a party because a party's lawyer has
made objections.

INSTRUCTION NO.

S

Remember, the lawyers are not on trial. Your feelings about them should not influence
your decision in this case. The lawyers are here to represent the best interests of their clients. It
is the duty of the lawyer on each side of a case to object when the other side offers evidence which
the lawyer believes is not admissible. You should not speculate as to the reasons for the
objections, nor should you allow yourself to become angry at a party because a party's lawyer has
made objections.

INSTRUCTION NO.

C

It has never been my intention to give any hint that you should return one verdict or
another in this case. Please understand that I do not wish in any way to influence your verdict.
It would be improper for me to do so. Deciding a proper verdict is exclusively your job. I cannot
participate in that decision in any way. Please disregard anything that I may have said or done
if it made you think that I preferred one verdict over another, that I believed one witness over
another, or that I considered any piece of evidence more important than another.
You are the exclusive judges of the facts and the evidence. It is your duty to render a just
verdict based upon the facts and the evidence.

INSTRUCTION NO.

7

Your attitude and conduct at the outset of your deliberations is very important. It will not
be productive for any of you, upon entering the jury room, to make an emphatic expression of
your opinion on the case, or to announce a determination to stand for a certain verdict. When that
happens, your sense of pride may be aroused and you may hesitate to recede from an announced
position, even if shown that it is wrong. Remember that you are not partisans or advocates in this
matter, but are judges. Your deliberations in the jury room are for the ascertainment and
declaration of the truth and the administration of justice.

INSTRUCTION NO.

?

Your verdict must be based solely and exclusively upon the evidence in this case and upon
the instructions outlining the law as given to you by the Court. You should not be influenced by
preconceived opinions or prejudices or by sympathy or any other motive except to do justice
between the parties to this case. You should not allow any sympathy which you may have for the
Plaintiff to influence you in any degree whatsoever in arriving at your verdict. This does not
mean that you may not sympathize with the Plaintiff, because it is only natural and human to
sympathize with persons who have sustained misfortune, but you are instructed that you must not
permit your feelings of sympathy to influence a fair and impartial consideration of the evidence.
Further, you are not permitted to base your verdict on speculation, guesswork or
conjecture, nor upon what you think ought to be the law or the facts in this case.

INSTRUCTION NO.

^

You are the exclusive judges of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight of the
evidence. In judging the weight of the testimony and credibility of the witnesses, you have a right
to take into consideration any biases, any interest in the result, and any motive or lack of motive
to testify fairly. You may consider the witnesses' conduct while testifying before you, the
reasonableness of their statements, their apparent frankness or candor, or the want of it, their
opportunity to know, their ability to understand, and their capacity to remember. You should
consider these matters you believe have a bearing on the truthfulness or accuracy of the witnesses'
statements.

INSTRUCTION NO.

sc

If you believe any witness has willfully testified falsely as to any material matter, you may
disregard the entire testimony of that witness, except as that witness may have been corroborated
by other credible evidence.

INSTRUCTION NO.

//_

INCONSISTENT STATEMENTS
You may believe that a witness, on some former occasion, made statements
inconsistent with that witness' testimony given here in this case.
That does not necessarily mean that you are required to entirely disregard the
present testimony. The effect of such evidence upon the credibility of the witness is for
you to determine.

INSTRUCTION NO.

cz_

DEPOSITION TESTIMONY
In the present action, certain testimony has been read to you by way of
deposition. You are not to discount this testimony for the sole reason that it comes to
you in the form of a deposition. It is entitled to the same consideration as if the witness
had personally appeared.

INSTRUCTION NO.

£_

The rules of evidence ordinarily do not permit the opinions of a witness to be received as
evidence. An exception to this rule exists in the case of expert witnesses. Witnesses who, by
education, study and experience, have become expert in some art, science, profession or calling,
may state opinions as to any such matter in which that witness is qualified as an expert, so long
as it is material and relevant to the case. You should consider such expert opinion and the
reasons, if any, given for it. You are not bound by such an opinion. Give it the weight you think
it deserves. If you should decide that the opinions of an expert witness are not based upon
sufficient education and experience, or if you should conclude that the reasons given in support
of the opinions are not sound, or that such opinions are outweighed by other evidence, you may
disregard the opinion entirely.

INSTRUCTION NO.

,'u
- *

An opinion is the expression of a conclusion or judgment which does not purport to be
based on actual knowledge. In determining whether a panicular statement was a statement of fact
or merely an expression of opinion, you may consider the surrounding circumstances under which
it was made, the manner in which the statement was made and the ordinary effect of the words
used. You may also consider the relationship of the panies and the subject matter with which the
statement was concerned.

INSTRUCTION NO.

/3T

OUT OF STATE/TOWN EXPERTS
The fact that an expert witness resides cr pursues his or her profession in
another state or community should not effect the weight you give that witnesses'
testimony. A party may rely upon qualified experts from other states £ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ B in
presenting evidence to the jury.

INSTRUCTION NO.

£_

CONFLICT BETWEEN MEDICAL EXPERTS
In resolving any conflict that may exist in the testimony of medical experts, you
may compare and weigh the opinion of one expert against that of another. In doing
this, you may consider the relative qualifications and credibility of the expert witnesses,
as well as the reasons for each opinion and the facts and other matters on which
opinions are based.

INSTRUCTION NO.

,'7

Whenever in these instructions it is stated that the burden, or the burden of proof, rests
upon a certain party to prove a certain allegation made by him, the meaning of such an instruction
is this: That unless the truth of that allegation is proved by a preponderance of the evidence, you
shall find that the same is not true. If the evidence is evenly balanced, as to its convincing force
on any allegation, you must find that such allegation has not been proved.

INSTRUCTION NO.

y

The term "preponderance of the evidence" means thai evidence which, in your minds,
seems to be of the greater weight; the most convincing and satisfactory. The preponderance of
the evidence is not determined by the number of witnesses, nor the amount of the testimony, but
by the convincing character of the testimony, weighed impartially, fairly and honestly by you.
If the evidence is evenly balanced as to its convincing force on any allegation, you must find that
such allegation has not been proved.

INSTRUCTION NO.

/*

PROXIMATE CAUSE
A proximate cause of an injury is that cause which, in natural and continuous
sequence, produces the injury and without which the injury would not have occurred. A
proximate cause is one which sets in operation the factors that accomplish the injury.
To find "proximate cause," you must first find a cause and effect relationship
between the negligence and plaintiffs injury. But cause and effect alone is not enough.
For injuries to be proximately caused by negligence, two other factors must be present:
1.

The negligence must have played a substantial role in causing the
injuries; and

2.

A reasonable person could foresee that injury could result from the
negligent behavior.

INSTRUCTION NO.

.Uo

CONCURRENT PROXIMATE CAUSES
There may be more than one proximate cause of the same injury. If the
negligence a person and a corporation combines to produce an injury, and the
negligence of each of them is a proximate cause of the injury, then the person and the
corporation must share liability for the resulting injury, in proportion to their individual
negligence.

INSTRUCTION NO.

;i'

A person has a duty to use reasonable care to avoid injuring other people or property.
"Negligence" simph means the failure to use reasonable care. Reasonable care doeb not require
extraordinary caution or exceptional skill. Reasonable care is what an ordinaiy. prudent person
uses in similar situations.
The amount of care that L consideied "reasonable" depends on the situation. You must
decide what a prudent person with similar knowledge would do in a similar situation.
Negligence may arise in acting or in failing to act.
A party whose injuries or damages are caused by another party's negligent conduct may
recover compensation from the negligent party for those injuries or damages.

INSTRUCTION NO.

n

NEGLIGENCE OF COMMISSION VERSUS OMISSION
Negligence is of two kinds. The first kind is the doing of something that an
ordinarily careful and prudent person or, in this case, hospital, would not have done
under the same or similar circumstances; the second kind is the omission to do
something than an ordinarily careful and prudent person or, in this case, hospital, would
have done in the same situation.

INSTRUCTION NO.

23

NON NEGLIGENCE OF PLAINTIFF
You are instructed as a matter of law that the plaintiff, Lori Haase, was not
negligent.

INSTRUCTION NO.

2*

A physician's negligence does not raise a presumption that the hospital was negligent in
granting the physician privileges.

INSTRUCTION NO.

S^

DUTY OF HOSPITAL TOWARD PATIENT
It is the duty of a hospital toward a person received as a patient to use
reasonable care in the selection of both its employees and its staff physicians and
surgeons and in otherwise providing for the needs of the patient.

INSTRUCTION NO. £L
You must determine whether Defendant complied with the standards of care applicable to
it based upon the information available to it prior to the Plaintiffs surgery, rather than on the
basis of facts which are revealed by later developments.

INSTRUCTION NO.

JJ

DUTY OF HOSPITAL TO COMPLY WITH STANDARD OF CARE
A hospital is required to exercise the same degree of care ordinarily possessed
and used by other hospitals in good standing. The law requires a hospital to exercise
the degree of care that other qualified hospitals would ordinarily exercise under the
same circumstances.

INSTRUCTION NO.

#8

You are instructed that the hospital has a governing body that is legally
responsible for the conduct of the hospital as an institution; the governing body of the
hospital must ensure that the medical staff is accountable to it for the quality of medical
care provided to patients. The hospital, through its governing body and medical staff, is
under a duty to exercise reasonable care in granting physicians the privilege to admit
and treat patients in the hospital based upon the practitioner's competence, training,
character, experience and judgment; the medical staff has a duty to examine the
credentials of candidates for medical staff appointment and to make recommendations
to the governing body on the appointment of candidates; privileges may not be granted
solely on a practitioner's certification, fellowship or membership in a specialty body or
society.
Negligent credentialing on the part of the hospital is the failure of the hospital,
through its governing body and medical staff, to use reasonable care in granting a
surgeon the privilege to admit and perform surgery on patients in the hospital;
"reasonable care" does not require extraordinary caution or exceptional skill.
Negligence may arise in acting or in failing to act.
A party whose injuries or damages are caused by another party's negligent
conduct may recover compensation from the negligent party for those injuries or
damages.

INSTRUCTION NO.

*P

VIOLATION OF INDUSTRY STANDARD
A violation of an industry' standard intended to protect patients from harm is
evidence of negligence if it is shown that:
1.

The person injured belongs to a class of people the standard intended to
protect; and

2.

The standard intended to protect against the type of harm which in fact
occurred as a result of the violation.

INSTRUCTION NO.

Jc

Hospitals are prevented, by Utah law. from disclosing the contents or substance of
meetings or documents which are part of the peer review and quality improvement
process. You must not conclude that the inability to discuss those processes is evidence
of improper behavior on the part of the hospital.

INSTRUCTION NO.

,/

The only way you may properly learn the applicable standard of care is through evidence
presented during this trial by individuals testifying as expert witnesses and through other evidence
admitted for the purpose of defining the standard of care.
In deciding whether a hospital properly fulfilled its duties, you are not permitted to use a
standard derived from your own experience with physicians, hospitals or any other standard of
your own.

INSTRUCTION NO. JxCORPORATION ACTS THROUGH ITS AGENTS
Ashley Valley Medical Center is a corporation and, as such, can act only through
its officers and employees, and others designated by it as its agents.
Any act or omission of an officer, employee or agent of a corporation, in the
performance of the duties or within the scope of the authority of the officer, employee or
agent, is the act or omission of the corporation.

INSTRUCTION NO.

S3

SCOPE OF AGENTS AUTHORITY DEFINED
In order for Ashley Valley Medical Center to be heid responsible for the act or
acts of one or more of its employees, the act or acts must be within the scope of the
agent's employment authority either expressed or implied. However, it is not necessary
that the specific act, or failure to act, be expressly authorized by the employer to bring it
within the scope of the agent's employment. An act is within the scope of an agent's
authority if it is done while the agent is doing anything which his or her contract of
employment expressly or impliedly authorizes him or her to do or which would be
reasonably incidental to his or her employment.

INSTRUCTION' NO. **
Each licenced hospital in the State of U;ah shall ha\'e s governing body
called the board. The board is legaih responsible for the conduct oi the hospital.
The board is also responsible for the appointment of the medical staff.

INSTRUCTION NO. -~r
The adrr.irdstr.itor shall function as h;._r J:. letw em :he board, the medical
staff, the r.ur^ing' stiff and departments o: :l\e hospital.

INSTRUCTION NO.

Jfc

LIABILITY FOR PHYSICIAN PREDICATED ON NEGLIGENCE
IN EXTENDING AND/OR CONTINUING STAFF PRIVILEGES
The law requires a hospital to screen its medical staff to ensure that only
competent physicians are permitted to treat its patients. If, therefore, you find from the
evidence that Ashley Valley Medical Center knew or ought to have known that Dr.
Hawkes' condition or propensities made him a danger to patients and that but for
Ashley Valley's failure to remove him, failure to adequately monitor and supervise him
or failure to cease extending him privileges to operate in the hospital Mrs. Haase's
injury would have not occurred, you must find for the plaintiff against the hospital.

INSTRUCTION NO.

31

ROLE OF CUSTOM IN JUDGING BEHAVIOR
When deciding whether a corporation is negligent, you may consider customs of
behavior, such as business customs or industry customs, However, following a custom
does not necessarily mean a corporation exercised ordinary care. It is merely a factor
you may consider. A custom or standard may be negligent in and of itself.

INSTRUCTION NO. 3$
CHARTS AND SUMMARIES
Certain charts and summaries have been shown to you in order to help explain the facts
disclosed by the books, records, and other documents which are in evidence in the case.
However, such charts or summaries are not in and of themselves evidence or proof of any
facts. If such charts or summaries do not correctly reflect facts or figures shown by the
evidence in the case, you should disregard them.

INSTRUCTION NO.

j?
/—

It is your duty, as jurors, to consult with one another and to deliberate with a view to
reaching an agreement, if your individual judgment allows such agreement. You each must decide
the case for yourself, but only after consideration of the case with your fellow jurors. You should
not hesitate to change an opinion when convinced that it is wrong. However, you should not
surrender your honest convictions concerning the effect or weight of evidence for the mere
purpose of returning a verdict or solely because of the opinion of the other jurors.

INSTRUCTION NO, <&
It is your duty to make findings of fact as to the questions I will submit to you. In making
your findings of fact, you should bear in mind that the burden of proving any disputed fact rests
upon the party claiming the fact to be true, and that fact must be proved by a preponderance of
the evidence.
This is a civil action and six members of the jury may find and return a verdict. At least
six jurors must agree on the answer to each question, but they need not be the same six on each
question. As soon as six or more of you have agreed on the answer to each question, have the
verdict signed and dated by your foreperson and then return it to this room.

INSTRUCTION NO. •»./
INTRODUCTORY INSTRUCTION ON DAMAGES
If you find the issues in favor of Lori Haase and against Ashley Valley Medical
Center, then it is your duty to award Lori Haase such damages that you find from a
preponderance of the evidence will fairly and adequately compensate her for the injury
and damage sustained.

INSTRUCTION NO. -?2—
GENERAL DAMAGES
In awarding such damages, you may consider any pain, discomfort, and
suffering, both mental and physical, its probable duration and severity, and the extent to
which the plaintiff has been prevented from pursuing the ordinary affairs of life as
previously enjoyed. You may also consider whether any of the above will, with
reasonable certainty, continue in the future. If so, you may award such damages as will
fairly and justly compensate the plaintiff for them.
No definite standard or method of calculation is prescribed by law to fix
reasonable compensation for pain and suffering. Nor is the opinion of any witness
required as to the amount of such reasonable compensation. Furthermore, the
argument of counsel as to the amount of damages is not evidence of reasonable
compensation. In making an award for pain and suffering, you shall exercise your
authority with calm and reasonable judgment and the damages you fix shall be just and
reasonable in light of the evidence.

INSTRUCTION NO.

/S

SPECIAL DAMAGES
The law also allows you to award special damages. Special damages are those
that are alleged to have been sustained in reference to the special circumstances of the
plaintiff. They include the reasonable value of medical and nursing care, both medical
and non-medical services and supplies and tools reasonably required and actually
given in the treatment and/or care of the plaintiff and the reasonable value of such
items that more probably than not will be required and given in the future.
Special damages also include lost earnings and loss of future earning capacity or
loss of earning power.
In awarding such damages, you may consider the reasonable value of working
time lost to date. In determining this amount, you should consider (1) evidence of the
plaintiff's earning capacity; (2) earnings; (3) how the plaintiff ordinarily was occupied;
and (4) what the plaintiff was reasonably likely to have earned in the time lost if the
plaintiff had not been injured.
If you find the plaintiff has suffered a loss of earning capacity, you should award
the present cash value of earning capacity reasonably likely to be lost in the future as a
result of the injury in question.
Special damages also include the reasonable value of the loss of employed
related benefits, such as loss of or reduction in retirement benefits, health benefits, paid
vacation, employee stock options and savings benefits and the like.

INSTRUCTION NO. &

AMOUNT OF DAMAGE NEED NOT BE PROVED WITH PRECISION

Although an award of damages may not be based only on speculation, some
degree of uncertainty in the evidence of damages will not relieve a defendant from
recompensing a wronged plaintiff. As long as there is some rational basis for a damage
award, it is the wrongdoer who must assume the risk of some uncertainty. Where there
is evidence of the fact of damage, a defendant may not escape liabiity because the
amount of damage cannot be proved with precision. The amount of damages may be
based on approximations if the fact of damage is established and approximations are
based on reasonable assumptions or projections.

INSTRUCTION NO. - S~
The amount of damages for any loss to be suffered in the future would not be the present
payment of the total of such damages, but must be discounted to the present cash value of such
future benefit. Therefore, in determining the present value of any future benefit lost to the
Plaintiff as a result of the injury, you should calculate the same on the basis that any sum you
might award will be invested with reasonable wisdom and frugality, and that all of it, except the
amount currently needed to compensate for the loss sustained, will be kept so invested as to yield
a rate of return consistent with reasonable security.

INSTRUCTION NO.

*/L

The law forbids you to decide any issue in this case by resorting to chance. If you decide
that a party is entitled to recover, you may then determine the amount of damages to be awarded.
It would be unlawful for you to agree in advance to take the independent estimate of each juror,
then total the estimates, draw an average from the total, and to make the average the amoxmt of
your award. Each of you may express your own independent judgment as to what the amount
should be. It is your duty to thoughtfully consider the amounts suggested, test them in the light
of the law and the evidence and, after due consideration, determine which, if any, of such
individual estimates is proper.

INSTRUCTION NO.

*7

COLLATERAL SOURCE

Any fact or inference in the evidence that any portion of the damages may have
been paid by some entity other than the defendant is not to be considered by you to
diminish any of the damages, if any, to be awarded.
In awarding such damages, you may consider the reasonable value of medical
hospital and nursing care, services and supplies reasonably required and actually given
in the treatment of the plaintiff and the reasonable value of similar items that more
probably than not will be required and given in the future.
It is the court's duty following the trial to see that what other damages are
awarded are allocated or distributed to the party who, by law, is entitled to receive them.
You are instructed not to concern yourself with such matters. They will be handled by
the court in due course following trial. This instruction applies with respect to past,
present and future damages.

INSTRUCTION NO.

/ /

Upon retiring to the jury room you will select one of you to act as foreperson, who will
preside over your deliberations and sign the verdict to which you agree. The foreperson should
not dominate the jury, but the foreperson's opinion should be given the same weight as the
opinions of the other members of the jury.

/
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May 2, 2002.

Vernal, Utah.
PROCEEDINGS

THE COURT:

You can be seated.

Record can show that

counsel and the plaintiff and some of the jurors are present.
Appreciate your being here.
Let me just check to see those not here.
six jurors out of the eight that are present.
why the other two are not.
Carie Murray.
Chad Watts.

One would be.

We have no idea

Let's see —

And so Becky Sullivan is absent.

And Ardith Atwood.

Cook, Toni Fagnan.

There are

you are

And you are

And Roberta Welch.

Tracy

And Ray Labrum is not here.

Appreciate your being here.
When we left, we didn't anticipate we were going to
see you again as jurors.

But we appreciate you being here. We

brou ght you back to determine what you intended when you signed
your ve rdict.

You, I th ink most of you, if not all of you,

have si gned an affidavit
sign th ose affidavits?

Is there anybody here that didn't
You did not.

Okay.

Now, let's see,

just so I get it right, that would be Ardith Atwood.

You did

not sig n an affidavit.

And the other five <of you here did sign

the aff idavits.

Was there any, counsel, that didnft

Okay.

sign the affidavits besi.des Mrs. Atwood?
MR. MORTENSEN:

No.

THE COURT: Okaiy.
reconsi der your verdict.

We are not going to ask you to

We are not going to ask you to
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May 2, 2002.

Vernal, Utah.
PROCEEDINGS

THE COURT:

You can be seated.

Record can show that

counsel and the plaintiff and some of the jurors are present.
Appreciate your being here.
Let me just check to see those not here.
six jurors out of the eight that are present.
why the other two are not.
Carie Murray.
Chad Watts.

One would be.

We have no idea

Let!s see —

And so Becky Sullivan is absent.

And Ardith Atwood.

Cook, Toni Fagnan.

There are

you are

And you are

And Roberta Welch.

Tracy

And Ray Labrum is not here.

Appreciate your being here.
When we left, we didn't anticipate we were going to
see you again as jurors.

But we appreciate you being here. We

brought you back to determine what you intended when you signed
your verdict.

You, I think most of you, if not all of you,

have signed an affidavit.
sign those affidavits?

Is there anybody here that didn't

You did not.

Okay.

Now, let's see,

just so I get it right, that would be Ardith Atwood.

You did

not sign an affidavit.

And the other five of you here did sign

the affidavits.

Was there any, counsel, that didn't

Okay.

sign the affidavits besides Mrs. Atwood?
MR. MORTENSEN:
THE COURT:

No.

Okay.

reconsider your verdict.

We are not going to ask you to

We are not going to ask you to
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deliberate any more.

We are only going to inquire into what

you intended on the night you signed that verdict.

Ifm going

to refer to some things that I have here, however.

As we began

the case, I gave you —

first instruction I gave you, there was

some preliminary jury instructions before the trial started.
I'm going to quote from a part of that first one.

"In this

case, the plaintiff alleges she was injured by a surgeon during
an operation he performed in 1996.

Her claim against the

surgeon, Dr. Thomas Hawkes, has been settled.
negligence is not at issue in this trial.

And his

This trial is about

what happened before the surgery."
There was an instruction more before that, there was
more after that.

And I am repeating again today, that the

plaintiff has settled her claim with Dr. Hawkes.

And so,

nothing more is going to be received by the plaintiff from Dr.
Hawkes.

The amount of that settlement was never made public

and probably never will be made public.

When you returned your

verdict, after we determined that was in fact your verdict, do
you remember I asked you each individual questions about it.
And then we excused you.

And then I told counsel based on the

verdict that you had told the total negligence between Ashley
Valley Medical Center and Dr. Hawkes at 100 percent, ask you to
make the determination of how much or what percentage of each
of them the negligence was caused by.

And your answer was

70 percent by Dr. Hawkes and 30 percent by Ashley Valley

4

Medical Center.

Based on that then, I directed counsel that a

verdict of 30 percent of the injury should be attributed to the
hospital, or $246,000, gave them a judgment for that amount.
When you signed the affidavits, it brought the
question back up to the court.

And rather than just rely upon

those affidavits, the court directed you to come back in today.
First question for you, did your verdict of $820,000
include all of the plaintiff's injuries, those caused by Dr.
Hawkes as well as those caused by Ashley Valley Medical Center?
Let me ask first —
foreman.

as I recall, Mr. Watts, you were the

Let me just start with you and ask what your answer

to that is.
MR. WATTS:

My answer, I believe we were trying to

clear up a question that we had when we were coming to that
judgment on that.

I don't recall the exact way it was stated

to you on the (inaudible).
THE COURT:

Let me refer to something, if I can.

MR. WATTS: Okay.
THE COURT:

I have, and, counsel, I think has been

given a copy of this, haven't you?
MR. HARP. IS ON:
THE COURT:

Yes, sir.

About 10 o'clock it was getting late. And

the court was trying to decide whether we would put it off
until the next day to finish the deliberations or finish.
the jurors chose to finish.

And

But they sent out this question

5

dated March 20th, 2002.

"Your Honor, in figuring damages, do

we figure the percentage of the total damages or the whole
damages and the court figures the percentage that we decide?
I added just a simple little thing there.
not present.

Counsel was

Counsel was each in their motel waiting for a

call from the clerk to reassemble.

I just added at the bottom,

"Figure the total value of all damages."
And now, Ifm sure you didn't know what the results of
that was going to be.
instruction.

I referred you with that to another

And I111 read that instruction.

I understand in

the replies that were given that it was not helpful to you.
But Ifm going to read it to you anyway.
"Any fact or inference in the evidence that of portion
of Mrs. Haasefs damages have been paid by some person or entity
other than Mrs. Haase is not to be considered by you or used to
diminish the damage award you make, if any.

The fact, if it be

a fact that any one of the plaintiff's claim that any of the
plaintiff's claimed expenses or damages were or may be paid by
some source other than the plaintiff's own funds does not
affect the plaintiff's right to recover for such expenses or
damages.

It is the court's duty following trial to see what

other damages are awarded.

What other damages awarded or

allocated or distributed to the party who by law is entitled to
receive them, you are instructed not to concern yourself with
such matters.

They will be handled by the court in due course
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following trial.

This instruction applies with respect to

past, present and future damages."
That was the instruction that the court referred you
to.

It was the only one that the court could see would be of

any help to you to answer that question.

Now, I come back to

the question that I ask you of what you intended.
MR. WATTS:

My intention, when I went through it, it

was my impression that we were going for the whole, the
totality for the plaintiff in this case.

And the amount that

we were coming up with was that totality.

For (inaudible) .

THE COURT:
these questions.

Okay.

You can stay seated as you answer

It will probably be easier for you.

Let me

ask you the question again, because itfs very carefully worded.
Did your 820,000 verdict include all of the plaintiff's
injuries, those caused by Dr. Hawkes as well as those caused by
Ashley Valley Medical Center?

It's not the only question we

may ask you, but that!s the first question.
MR. WATTS:

It was mine.

THE COURT:

It was the total 820,000, was her total

MR. WATTS:

It is what I thought was the total damage.

THE COURT:

Okay.

damages?

Now, of the other five jurors

sitting there, do any of you —

did any of you have a different

understanding?
MS. MURRAY:

Judge

—
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THE COURT:
MS. MURRAY:

State your namef if you would,
Carie Murray.

I intended her to get that

much money.
THE COURT:
MS. MURRAY:
THE COURT:

Now, I'm —

let me —

Okay.
Let me ask another little question.

I'm

sure that all of you intended she would receive all 820,000.
That your affidavits' clear on that.
question though.

That's not quite this

And there were some things that you didn't

know that we couldn't tell you.

The amount of the settlement

for Dr. Hawkes we couldn't tell you that.

The legal effect was

that, whatever that sum was, that took care of his 70 percent
of damages because that was negotiated.
to the question.

Now, go ahead.

So it brings me back

Finish the explanation that

you are making.
MS. MURRAY:

Apparently, we should have awarded her

over $2 million for her to get $820,000.
THE COURT:
million figure?

That's correct.

That's right.

Where did you get the two

But where did you get it from?

Did you talk about it that night?
MS. MURRAY:
THE COURT:

No.
All right.

Where did you get the figure

from?
MS. MURRAY:
THE COURT:

Well, I figured it out later.
All right.
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MS. MURRAY:

But I —

I —

when we finished at night,

I thought she was going to receive 820,000.

So that would be

the 30 percent of the 2 million, is what I thought.
THE COURT:

Okay.

MR. WATTS:

When we --

THE COURT:

I'm going to have to have you speak your

name each time.
MR. WATTS:

When we brought the question to your

attention, I believe we were trying to come to that, whether we
needed to not necessarily do the math and try to say that this
is what the total is, this is what she gets out of it, the
plaintiff in this case gets out of it.

We were trying to

figure out if what we were given would be the amount which
would be concerned is that 30 percent without doing the math or
anything like that.

I think that was the intention of the

question when it was written, as we were discussing it as it
was being written.
THE COURT:

Anybody else on that answering on that?

Ifm going back to the original question now.

Did the 800 --

did your 820, 000-dollar verdict include all of the plaintiff's
injuries, those caused by Dr. Hawkes as well as those caused by
Ashley Valley Medical Center?
MS. FAGNAN:

Toni Fagnan.

When we were deliberating,

I don't remember us talking about like breaking down this is
the harm that was caused by the hospital, this is the harm that
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was caused by the doctor.

We were just trying —

were focusing on the hospital-

because we

And so I don't remember us

talking about saying okay, the doctor did "X" amount of dollars
of damage here and the hospital did thisthat's the question.

We weren't talking about the doctor and

the hospital between ourselves.
But I —
it.

I mean, I think

And I'm still very confused.

it was a confusing thing.

We really struggled with

So it was still just unknown what the damages -- what we

were figuring. *

y *

^^^

UNIDENTIFIED WOMAN JUROR:

I think I felt like we were

trying to decide what it would, dollar-wise, would cost for her
to be adequately taken care of the rest of her life, in
essence.

We figured that we thought she should be able to work

part-time.

We didn't think she was totally disabled.

We

thought that it would cost "X" amount of dollars for help for
her in the house and things we have talked about in her
testimony.

And that's the way we came up with the 820,000.

But I felt like that she had received part of that through the
other settlement.

I knew that she had had another settlement.

But I think we were thinking that's what would take care of
her.

And so it wasn't a total thing that we thought — we

thought she had already received part of it through a
i

settlement.
THE COURT:

Okay.

The only other question I have on

it, was the $820,000 intended to be solely from Ashley Valley
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Medical Center for the injuries she suffered by the hospital's
negligence?

-

,

UNIDENTIFIED WOMAN JUROR:
THE COURT:

Say that again, please.

Was it your intent to award the plaintiff

820,000 from Ashley Valley Medical Center for injuries
sustained by her as a result of the hospital's negligence?
Now, this question overlaps what you have just been asked.
you have all been answering the same question.

And

But you just

got through answering, Mrs. Atwood, that question.
said, you intended it to come from two sources.

I think she

Is that right?

One settled --

\\c^k <t,L&-^ J^* y^r
MS. ATWOOD:
THE COURT:

r Oh

She had-already received-^ne—paxt.
Yes.

Anybody else want to comment on it.

UNIDENTIFIED WOMAN JUROR:

That was' not my intention.

My intention was for her to get the $820,000.
THE COURT:

Now, I just have two of you.

The other

four of you want to answer on that?
UNIDENTIFIED WOMAN JUROR:
THE COURT:

Okay.

That was my intent.

You are --

UNIDENTIFIED WOMAN JUROR:

That's what I thought would

happen.
THE COURT:
MS. FAGNAN:
THE COURT:

—

Toni Fagnan.

Toni Fagnan.
You expected 820,000 was going to come

from the hospital?
11

MS. FAGNAN:

That's what I hoped.

there was a question of the percentage.

I hoped because

In making that

verdict, I still didn't know if she would get the 820 or if
that percentage would come down.
the whole amount.

So I hoped that she would get

But I didnft know that she would.

That was

my thinking.
THE COURT:

Did the thought ever occur to you that the

damages to be 100 percent would have to be over 2 million?
MS. FAGNAN:
THE COURT:
MS. FAGNAN:
THE COURT:
MS. FAGNAN:
THE COURT:

For?
For the hospital to pay that amount.
Pardon me?
For the hospital to pay 820,000.
No, that didn't.
Did that ever occur to anybody?

UNIDENTIFIED WOMAN JUROR:
MS. FAGNAN:

No.

Not until later.

For me, it was hard to try to think

in that many zeroes, if you want to know the truth.
THE COURT:
MS. FAGNAN:
THE COURT:
intends to ask.

I don't deal in that many zeros either.
Very intimidating thing.
Now, that's all the questions the court

Now —

MR. MORTENSEN:

Yes, I would ask, first of all, I have

some questions that each of them be asked to answer those two
questions.

I think just before Miss Fagnan spoke, we didn't

get the name on the record of the juror seated in the corner
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who said it was her intent to award $820,000 to this woman for J

1

the hospital
THE COURT:

Tracy Cook, is that who you are talking?

MR. HftRRxaOISI: Ttfo. I am talking to Tracy Cook.
MS. COOK:
intent.

No, I agreed with Carie.

That was my

1

It was for her to get 820,000 from the hospital. I

didn't realize that she would only get 30 percent of that.
MR. MORTENSEN:

Right.

And I saw, when you were

asking the second question, I saw an affirmative head nod from
the juror who hasn't yet spoken -THE COURT:

Mrs. Welch.

MR. MORTENSEN:

-- Mrs. Welch, that the $820,000 was

intended to be solely from Ashley Valley for the hospital's
negligence.

That's what I understood.

MS. WELCH: Yes.
MR. MORTENSEN:

That would be your answer to that

question?
MS. WELCH: Yes.
MR. MORTENSEN:

Okay.

And I believe from the

supplemental answer that Mr. Watts gave, that that
substantially modifies his first response.

The way I

understood, th** way he said after the more complete explanation
1

t

was given, that the $820,000, in his mind, was going to be
construed as the 30 percent of the total damage.

I thought

that's what his answer was the second time he was allowed to
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speak.
THE COURT:
asking —

I don't think that we ought to be

I don't think thatf at this point, you know, it's

different.

I don't want you to phrase so that he answers, has

to answer to your positive statement.

I just -- if he wants to

add it differently or state what your intent was, you can go
ahead and do it, Mr. Watts.
MR. WATTS:

You know, with the other jurors, I never

went through and figured it would be a 30/70 split.

To tell

you the truth, not having experience in civil, I have
experience in criminal, but I didn't really understand what the
70/30 was all about; mostly other than probably trying to -- I
don't know really what it was about.

Because of the fact that

there was already a settlement reached with Dr. Hawkes that,
you know, we were -- we were made known there was some kind of
a settlement, and we had to keep that out of our decision. I
think, you know, at the time of the trial, at least for me, it
seemed like the Dr. Hawkes, you know, obviously, the person who
was an actor in this was not on trial.

It was Ashley Valley.

So my attention was towards Ashley Valley and not towards Dr.
Hawkes.
THE COURT:

Okay.

By the answers of the jurors, the

court thinks it's bound to direct the judgment as I did before
for 246,000 or 30 percent.

Now, with that having been said,

counsel, you can ask any questions you want.
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MR. MORTENSEN:

Thank you.

of them to respond separately.
on this end.

I would like to ask each

And I'll start with Miss Welch

Did either Mr. Mortensen or Mr. Faulk apply any

pressure on you to sign the affidavit you signed?
MS. WELCH:

No.

MR. MORTENSEN:

Mrs. Atwood?

Well, you didn't sign

one.
MS. ATWOOD:

I didnft sign one.

MR. MORTENSEN:

I'll come back on that.

Mr. Watts?

No?
MR. WATTS: No.
MR. MORTENSEN:
MS. COOK:

Miss Cook?

No.

MR. MORTENSEN:

May the record show that all of the

witnesses who are here who signed affidavits indicated rhat
neither Mr. Mortensen or Mr. Faulk applied any pressure on them
to sign allBltodidb 1>
THE COURT:

The record can show that.

MR. MORTENSEN:

Now, starting at the other end.

Did

you sign your affidavit voluntarily and willingly?
UNIDENTIFIED WOMAN JUROR:

Yes.

UNIDENTIFIED WOMAN JUROR:

Yes.

UNIDENTIFIED MAN JUROR:
UNIDENTIFIED WOMAN JUROR:
MR. MORTENSEN:

I 'did'.
Yes.

May the record show that the five
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->r\+s*ir* r
jurors who signed afterwards have all responded in the
affirmative?
THE COURT:

It can show that.

MR. MORTENSEN:

Was your desire in signing the

affidavit to clarify your intent as to the awarding of damages
to Mrs. Haase?
UNIDENTIFIED WOMAN JUROR:

Yes.

MR. WATTS: Yes.
UNIDENTIFIED WOMAN JUROR:
MR. MORTENSEN:

Yes.

May the record show that air signing

jurors have indicated in the affirmative?
THE COURT: Yes.
MR. MORTENSEN:

Has anyone applied any pressure on you

in any way concerning your verdict against the hospital or your
affidavits?
UNIDENTIFIED WOMAN JUROR:

No.
<yO-<_ £<~-~ - f

UNIDENTIFIED WOMAN JUROR:

/<Z2>^J*m

No.

MR. WATTS: No.
UNIDENTIFIED WOMAN JUROR:
MR. MORTENSEN:

No.

Mrs. Atwood, did you agree to go along

with other jurors on the matter of damages?
MS. ATWOOD:

Yes.

In our deliberation, I still

thought that the court would determine whether it was 30 or 70.
But I thought —

I felt that 820,000 was a good amount. And I

thought that the court would take into consideration what she
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had received before.
knew that.

That we didn't know that.

But the court

And so they would make the judgment whether 820,000

was hospital or had she already received enough so that that
was part of that 30 percent was there.
MR. MORTENSEN:

But was it your understanding it went

the other way you had agreed to go along as well?
MS. ATWOOD:

Oh, not necessarily.

I would have to

rethink that.
THE COURT:

I think that it's not proper to ask her to

rethink anything.
MR. MORTENSEN:
THE COURT:

Ifm not asking her to.

The only thing I!m going to permit him to

ask questions is what you intended that night, not what you
thought about since.

Not what you did.

You could rethink it

and go back to the jury room knowing we would change some
instructions knowing what we know, you see.
understand what you were asked to do.

So you had better

If -- but we are not

doing that.
MR. MORTENSEN:

Okay.

to answer this same question.
order.

I would like to ask each juror
I guess we could go in the same

Was it your intent to award Mrs. Haase the total sum of

$820,000 for injuries sustained by her as a result of the
hospital's negligence?
UNIDENTIFIED WOMAN JUROR:

Yes.

UNIDENTIFIED WOMAN JUROR:

Yes.
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1

MR. WATTS:

2

UNIDENTIFIED WOMAN JUROR:

3

MR. MORTENSEN:

4

Yes.
Yes.

Okay." Wa-s it your understanding at

the time that you —
THE COURT:

5

Just a minute.

Come on in.

Go ahead,

6

counsel.

But we won't have him answer any questions at this

7

point.

8

ask two questions first without going to the detail. Let's

9

see, you are Mr. Labrum, right?

I may ask him in a minute.

10

MR. LABRUM:

11

THE COURT:

12

MR. LABRUM:

13

But let me do it. Let me

Yes.
Appreciate your being here.
I'm sorry I was late.

I thought it was

tomorrow.
THE COURT:

14

We have asked each of the other jurors

15

several questions about what they intended the night that the

16

verdict was rendered, not what you have thought about since,

17

not what you would do if you were going back in the jury room

18

now, but what you intended the night that you signed your

19

verdict.

20

include all of the plaintiff's injuries, those caused by Dr.

21

Hawkes as well as those caused by Ashley Valley Medical Center?

22

First question, did your 820,000-dollar verdict

MR. LABRUM:

What did I think at the time?

I took it

23

that I understood it to say that she was to get 600,000 to take

24

care of her for the rest of her life.

25

pain and suffering.

And the 220,000 was for

18

THE COURT:

Okay.

Let me go back and ask the question

again, because that isn't what I asked you.

Did your

820,000-dollar verdict include all of the plaintiff's injuries, J
those caused by Dr. Hawkes as well as those caused by Ashley
Valley Medical Center?
MR. LABRUM:
THE COURT:

No.
Second question.

Was it your intent to

award the plaintiff 820,000 from Ashley Valley Medical Center
for injuries sustained by her as a result of the hospital's
negligence?
MR. LABRUM:

Yes.

THE COURT:

Okay.

MR. MORTENSEN:

Go ahead with your question.

Was it your understanding, at the time

you agreed to the damage figures set forth on the special
verdict form, that Mrs. Haase would be awarded only 30 percent
of the sum of those damages?

Otherwise stated, was it your

intent to award Mrs. Haase only $246,000 for the damages she
sustained as a result of the hospital's negligence?

^ka^
-HYveiA ^
see.

UNIDENTIFIED WOMAN JUROR:

No.

UNIDENTIFIED WOMAN JUROR:

No.

__ .

r

h*

MR. WATTS: No.
MR

- MORTENSEN:

May the record show that six —

let's

All of the jurors except Mrs. Atwood have responded

negatively to the two questions I just posed.
THE COURT:

Yes.

Record can show that.

19

1

MR. MORTENSEN:

2

THE COURT:

3

I

Thank you.

Thank you.

Any questions you want to ask

them, counsel?

4

MR. HARRISON:

I would like to ask each of you — and

5

I realize some of you have spoken to this already —

but I need

6

to do this for the record.

7

deliberations have any confusion or uncertainty as to the legal

8

effect of apportionment of fault or any other aspect of your

9

deliberations in reaching a verdict?

Did you at any point during your

10

MR. WATTS:

(Inaudible.)

11

UNIDENTIFIED WOMAN JUROR:

12

MR. HARRISON:

Is that the answer?

Were you confused?

Did you feel that

13

you didn't adequately understand apportionment of fault? I

14

believe one person said something about didn't really

15

understand the 70/30 business.

16

little bit —

17

you rendered you had on this issue or other issues some

18

confusion or lack of understanding or uncertainty about the

19

effect legally of what you were doing?

20

22
23
24
25

I'm asking you if in reaching the verdict that

MR. MORTENSEN:

21

it be clarified.
I

Maybe that's putting it a

I just want the question, I ask that

Not during the deliberation, but the end of

the deliberation were they confused.
I

Is that the question or

any -- I want to make sure we are not talking about —
THE COURT:

After —

when the verdict was rendered —

you are not asking what occurred during the deliberations. We
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have to be speaking of what occurred at the time —

at the time

the verdict was signed and came back into court.
MR. HARRISON:
grounds.

Were you unsure — I f m on delicate

I want to make sure the jury understands what I am

asking, but I don't want to be prompting.
THE COURT:

Re-ask if you want.

MR. HARRISON:

Okay.

I!m trying to ask for a response

from each of you to the general issue that some of you have
suggested this, is that you were not sure about how the
allocation of fault, the apportionment of fault, the
percentages, how that would affect your verdict.
help?

Okay.

Does that

All right.

MR. MORTENSEN:

Your Honor, Ifm going to have to

object to that under rule 606 of the rules of evidence. I
think the question asks them to pry into their deliberating
process.
THE COURT:

Well, if the question is asking about the

deliberative process, of course, I'm going to sustain the
objection.

But I didnft understand it that way.

I understood

the question to be is, at the time you rendered the verdict,
did you have any —

you use the words that you want to.

MR. HARRISON:

Any lack of understanding, uncertainty.

I don't want to put words in your mouth.

That's the concept

I'm going for.
UNIDENTIFIED WOMAN JUROR:

Where do I start?
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MR. -MQRT-ENSEN:MS. ATWOOD:

With anyone.

Yes.

They were not clear to me.

UNIDENTIFIED WOMAN JUROR:
sure.

Mrs. Atwood?

I agree.

I'm still not

You know, Ifm confused over the 70/30.
MR. HARRISON:

answer I wanted.

Okay.

That's the answer —

that's the

Sir?

MR. WATTS:

I believe after our question to the judge,

(inaudible) deliberation, I think after the question to the
judge to help us come up with or determine that total, I felt I
was clear on my understanding.
UNIDENTIFIED WOMAN JUROR:

I understood when we got

finished that she would receive the 820,000 from the hospital.
And the —
wasn't?

do you want me to tell the first clue I knew she

Do you want me to go into more?
MR. HARRISON:
THE COURT:

No.

No, not what you found out afterwards. I

think your answer would be after.
UNIDENTIFIED WOMAN JUROR:
intended her to receive.

All I knew is what I

I didn't know if we had to do math or

not.
MR. HARRISON:
MR. LABRUM:

Okay.
I was confused on 70/30.

I wasn't too

sure of what she was going to get out of the 820. But I
assumed she would get 820.
MR. HARRISON:

And

—
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UNIDENTIFIED WOMAN JUROR:
because I kind of know what to do.

I wasn't real confused,
It was just trying to help

everybody trying to figure out what we needed to do if it was
going to end up this way, I would have went with a higher
amount if I knew what was going to happen.
MR. HARRISON:

I would like to ask each of you if you

have discussed your verdict or your deliberations with anyone
other than Mr. Mortensen and his associates since the trial, of
course.
UNIDENTIFIED WOMAN JUROR:
MR. LABRUM:

Yes.

MR. HARRISON:

My wife."

How about you?

UNIDENTIFIED WOMAN JUROR:
MR. HARRISON:

Sure.

Okay.

Not really.

Nobody.

Your Honor, it is my

understanding that two of the jurors indicated that they didn't
really discuss how to allocate fault.

I wonder if it's

appropriate to ask all the jurors if they concur in what those
two had said or if that's something to take up in another
forum.
THE COURT:

Well, I think we would be asking what the

cu^reGt-ibQns were, if you go into that.

And I have kept you away

from that.
MR. HARRISON:
no other questions.

Well, if that's the case, then I have

Thank you.

MR. MORTENSEN:

Thank you all too.

I have one further question for the

23

jurors

—
THE COURT:

Go ahead,

MR. MORTENSEN:

—

to respond to this.

The six jurors

who responded to my last two questions, hearing what you have
heard now from the court about the 246,000-dollar judgment, did
you inaccurately record on the special verdict form your actual
intent?

Do you understand the question?
UNIDENTIFIED WOMAN JUROR:

Yes, I did.

UNIDENTIFIED WOMAN JUROR:

I don't understand.

MR. IIARRIGQN:

Well, there's an indication that the

amount that will be awarded to Mrs. Haase, based on the way the
verdict form was filled out and signed, will be $246,000, not
$820,000.

And my question is, did the special verdict form

inaccurately record your intent?
UNIDENTIFIED WOMAN JUROR:

Well, my intent

-820,000.
MR. MORTENSEN:

So your answer to that question is

yes?
UNIDENTIFIED WOMAN JUROR:
MR. MORTENSEN:
MS. FAGNAN:

Miss Fagnan?

Yes.

MR. MORTENSEN:
MR. WATTS:

Yes.

Mr. Watts?

Having had this hearing today, I think it

explained it to me, so yes.
MR. MORTENSEN:

Miss Welch?
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MS. WELCH:

Yes,

UNIDENTIFIED WOMAN JUROR:

Yes.
^C*>f»

MR. MORTENSEN:
THE COURT:
short?

Okay.

All right.

Thank you.
Do we figure that to be fairly

And we are going to excuse ycu now and express thanks

for coming.

You are free to leave.

VOICE:

(Inaudible.)

THE COURT: Yes.
(Whereupon, the following proceedings were held in
open court outside the presence of the jury.)
THE COURT:
the courtroom now.

Record can show the jurors have all left
Does counsel want to do anything with the

court?
MR. MORTENSEN:

Well, I would just like to state that

I think the answers that we received from the late arriving
juror and the answers that we received to the questions I posed
to the jurors, I submit mandate an entry of judgment in the
larger amounts.

And they clearly stated what their intent was.

And I think what the controlling precedent case law is, is that
the intent of the jurors is to control and to be given, to be
given effect.

And I think they all very clearly said they

never intended to award her for the hospital's negligence only
246,000, but they did intend to jmda^ from the hospitalfs
negligence $820,000.

And I recognize that Ardith Atwood does

not say that's the case.

But it's the six out of eight. And
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we had six.

Clearly, six jurors who said that.

responses mandate that result.
MR. HARRISON:

I think their

Thank you.

Your Honor, I think what the response

indicates is that there was substantial confusion among the
jurors about what they were communicating.

They have — many

of them said this morning they still don't understand the
process.

The continuing arguments of counsel in the briefs to

the court are that the jury was confused, didn't understand,
needed more clarity.

The case law which counsel has offered to

the court very clearly says without exception that that is the
kind of error that is not susceptible to revision on the basis
of affidavits.

And that something other than a post-trial

revision is an appropriate alternative for a plaintiff or for a
party who feels that they have been disadvantaged.

We disagree

strongly that anything from this morning mandates anything
other than the order which this court has indicated it will
enter.

Thank you.
MR. MORTENSEN:

at 3:30 in the morning —

Just briefly, Your Honor.

We got up

after we got up 6 o'clock at night —

after we got this last brief last night is when I opened my
mail and looked through again, the distinction between clerical
error and judicial error and looked at all the cases, and they
are all clear that in this context what happened here was a
clerical error, not a judicial error.
matter who made the error.

Cases all say it doesn't

What matters is, was it an error in
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the thinking deliberative process or an error in recording it.
And the answers that they gave, especially to the last
question, is they said what was written down on the special
verdict form was an error by us.
That's not what we intended.

This was a clerical error.

We intended the other thing. All

of the cases that we looked at, and there are several, and they
only end with the Gen Tech (phonetic) case.

But the Gen Tech

case, pardon the expression, but they talk about cases being on
all fours.

That one is on all fours.

room for interpreting otherwise.
THE COURT:

Thank you.

Thank you.
I recognize there's some

confusion in the jury instructions.
of course, falls on me.

And I submit there isn't

And that responsibility,

It would have been a lot easier if

counsel had done what the court asked them to do a month prior
to trial with regard to submitting agreed upon jury
instructions, and then a week before trial, and then the day of
trial starting, and then when we met, of course, we spent, oh,
several hours trying to work them out.

And it was very

difficult, because to me it seems like this is something
counsel, having been through this so many times, should be able
to agree on, knows but couldn't agree on —
very many of them.

couldn't agree on

But, I'm going to just order the judgment

for the 246,000, which is the 30 percent and which probably
means you'll want to appeal it.
And it will have to —

And I just have to let it go.

what happens will happen.

I think there
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is enough problem it may be one of ynn tn npppal or overrule —
not overruled, sustain on appeal —
the right word.
me at all.

not sustain.

Not saying

That to order a new trial would not surprise

I would hope not only from the point of view it's

very, very expensive.
through it again.

And I would hate to see the parties go

But you each have your own point of view and

you have to go along with that.

That's all.

Thanks, counsel.
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EXHIBIT 7

IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
OF UINTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
LORI HAASE,
Plaintiff.

MAS 2 0 2002
j , ^
BY
-—^S_^

SPECIAL VERDICT FORM

vs.

Case Number 980800377

ASHLEY VALLEY MEDICAL CENTER,
Defendant

Judge Douglas L. Cornaby

MEMBERS OF THE JURY:
Please answer the following questions, in the order presented, based on the jury
instructions and the evidence presented in this case. If you find the evidence preponderates in
favor of the issue presented answer "yes". If you find the evidence is so equally balanced that
you cannot determine a preponderance of the evidence, or if you find that the evidence
preponderates against the issue presented, answer "no".
QUESTION NO. 1 Was the defendant Ashlev Vallev Medical Center, nealieent?
ANSWER:

X

Yes

No

If you answered question number 1 "no" then do not answer the following questions.
Have your foreperson sign the verdict and return to the courtroom.
QUESTION NO. 2 Was Ashley Valley Medical Center's negligence a proximate cause
of injury sustained by the Plaintiff?
ANSWER:

y

Yes

No

If you answered question number 2 "no" then do not answer the remaining questions.
Have your foreperson sign the verdict and return to the courtroom.

QUESTION NO. 3: Assuming the combined negligence of Dr. Thomas Hawkes and
Ashley Valley Medical Center to total 100 %, what percentage of that negligence is attributable
to:
A. Dr. Thomas Hawkes

7C

%

B. Ashley Valley Medical Center

3fl

%

C. Total

100

%

QUESTION NO. 4: State the amount of special and general damages sustained by the
Plaintiff as a proximate result of the injuries complained of.
Special Damages (both past and future):

$

General Damages (both past and future):

$

fp Op,

DATED this 20th day of March, 2002.

Foreperson
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NOTARY PUBLIC
KATHLEEN W.- GRAY
3 West Main
Vernal, Utah 84078
My-Commission Exoires
February 15, 20C6
STATE OF UTAH

—

MA5, 2 I 200?
JOANWJ^KEE.CLEHK
<?Y.

.DE=UTY

Douglas G. Mortensen, USB # 2329
MATHESON, MORTENSEN, OLSEN & JEPPSON, P.C.
648 East 100 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Telephone: (801) 363-2244
Attomevs for PLintiif

LORI HAASE,

JI HUN S AFFIDAVIT

Plaintiff,

Civil No. 98-0800377

vs.

ASHLEY VALLEY MEDICAL CENTER AND
COLUMBIA ASHLEY VALLEY MEDICAL
CENTER AND JOHN DOE DEFENDANTS
1 THROUGH 10

Judae Doualab L Lomabv

Defendants.

State ol I tuh
}ss.
Countv of Uintah

being first duly sworn, deposes and says:

1.

I was a member of the jury in this case. I have personal know ledw ot ttu' tacis I

state here.
2.

Based on my understanding of the information and instructions given to us, it was
my intention and belief that the full amount of the sum awarded in general and
special damages - $820,000.00 would go to the plaintiff, not 30% of that sum.

Dated this % \ day of March, 20002.

juror i r a c j bjnn LCOVi—
Subscribed and swom to before me this ,0_ I dav of March. 2002.

Notary Public

.-*J-tr>

JO****6,

Douglas O. Mortensen, USB # 2329
MATHESON, MORTENSEN, OLSEN & JEPPSON, P.C.
648 East 100 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Telephone: (801) 363-2244

e*

Attomevs for Plaintiff
J! ROR'S AFFIDAVIT

LORIHAASE.
Plaintiff.

Civil No. 98-0800377

vs.

ASHLEY VALLEY MEDICAL CENTER AND
COLUMBIA ASHLEY VALLEY MEDICAL
CENTER AND JOHN DOE DEFENDANTS
1 THROUGH 10,

Judae Douslas L. Comabv

Defendants.

State of Utah
}ss.

County of Uintah

J

£d<?ex~ afitJ&<u*>-~

1.

- being first duly sworn, deposes and says:

I was a member of me jury in this case. I have personal knowL-iine onhe tact;.,

state here.
2.

Based on my understanding of the information and instructions given to us, it was
my intention and belief that the full amount of the sum awarded in general and
special damages - $820,000.00 would go to the plaintiff, not 30% of that sum.

;
Dated this «?/. - * *day
of March. 20002.

fl<tou&q^g&
Juror

Subscribed and sworn to before me this Al^dav of March. 2002.

NOTARY PUBLIC
PEGGY S. MEHKLEY
3 West Main
V«mai. Utan 84078
Commission &cpir««
Auquat 30, 200S
STATE OF UTAH

Pfryj^S^Mcli?^
Notarv Public

FILED
DISTRICT COURT
UINTAH COUNTY, UT/.I-

HAF 2 1 2002
JOANNgTvlcKEE.
CLERK
IgTvId'
DEPUTY
BY.

Douglas G. Mortensen, USB # 2329
MATHESON, MORTENSEN, OLSEN & JEPPSON, P.C
648 East 100 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Telephone: (801) 363-2244
A rti mr ti >r Plaintiff

LOW HAASE.
JUROR'S AFFIDAVIT
Plaintiff.
Vb.

Civil No 98-0800377
ASHLEY VALLEY MEDICAL CENTER AND
COLUMBIA ASHLEY VALLEY MEDICAL
CENTER AND JOHN DOE DEFENDANTS
1 THROUGH 10.

Judge Douglas L. Comabv

Defendants.

<HI

il I i d h

}ss.

County of Uintah

}

GBniL, UMJO^

being first duly sworn, deposes and savs:

I »as a member of the jury in this case. I have , ™

njl knowledge ot die facts I

state here.
2.

Based on my understanding of the information and instructions given to us, it was
my intention and belief that the full amount of the sum awarded in general and
«

special damages - $820,000.00 would go to the plaiatiff, not 30% of that sum.

Dated this £\|_r day of March. 2060^.

M$J^

\Jj\AAJUb Y H o t ^ & M
Juror

Subscribed and sworn to before me this/71
| ! « dav of March. 2002
NOTARY PUBLIC
SA&3A3A 8. SPSiRS
3 Wast Main
Vernal. Utah 84078
Commission Expires
December 15 2004

STATE OF UTAH

mrdf)!^
Notarv Public

FILED
DISTRICT COURT
UINTAH COUNTY. UTAH

MAR 2 1 2Q02
BY.

JOANNEJSteKEE. CLERK
7
DE?UTV

(Z -—
^Er-

Douglas G. Mortensen, USB # 2329
MATHESON, MORTFNSFN OI SI IN & JEPPSON, P.C.
648 East 100 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Telephone: (801) 363-2244
nuri)e\'j lor Plaintiff

II NMIf

LORIHAASE,

\ n III \ S IT

Plaintiff,
Civil No. 98-0800377

vs.
ASHLEY VALLEY MEDICAL CENTER AND
COLUMBIA ASHLEY VALLEY MEDICAL
CENTER AND JOHN DOF DEFENDANTS
1 THROUGH 10,

Judae Doualas 1 ( i miabv

Defendants.

Sriit nl I tali

County of Uintah

\^£^Y\\\

1

}ss.
}

""^Cs N l ^ Y v,' i

being first duly sworn, deposes and says:

I was a member of the jury in this case. I have personal knowledge of the facts I

state here.
2.

Based on my understanding of the information and instructions given to us, it was
my intention and belief that the full amount of the sum awarded in general and
special damages - $820,000.00 would go to the plaintiff, not 30% of that sum.

Dated this £T\_ day of March, 20002.

Juror ^ ^ S

*t»V*r<\o^

Subscribed and sworn to before me this &\ dav of March. 2002.

/

"

•

-

Notary Public

^
DEANNA WRiGHT

Notary Public
State of Utcn
My Comm. Expires Jun 6.2DC3
147 East Main Uemc* UT 84078

„

FILED

MAR 2 I 2002
8Y.

McKEE. CLERK
DEPUTY

Douglas G. Mortensen, USB # 2329
MATHESON, MORTENSEN, OI St N & JEPPSON, PC.
648 East 100 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Telephone: (801) 363-2244
Attomev tot Plaintiff

LORI HAASE.

Jl WOW'S U'MDW >T

Plaintiff.
Civil No. 98-0800377

vs.

ASHLEY VALLEY MEDICAL CENTER AND
COLUMBIA ASHLEY VALLEY MEDICAL
CENTER AND JOHN DOF DEFENDANTS
1 THROUGH 10.

Judse Doudas 1. Lornabv

Defendants.

State
Countv of Uintah

— r\ 0j\ J,

1.

UAL^AJJ

• being first duly sworn, deposes and says:

I was a member of the jury in this case. I have personal knowledge of the far* [

state here.
2.

Based on my understanding of the information and instructions given to us, it was
my intention and belief that the full amount of the sum awarded in general and
special damages - $820,000.00 would go to the plaintiff, not 30% of Annum

Dated this .?/ dav of March, 20002.

Juror

Subscribed and sworn to before me this ^ i dav of March. 2002.

^Wftr ^' n°^HcUN)
Notarv Public

Douglas G. Mortensen, USB # 2329
MATHESON, MORTENSEN, OLSEN & JEPPSON, P.C.
648 East 100 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Telephone: (801) 363-2244
\ttomeys for Plaintiff
JUROR'S AFFIDAVIT

.ORIHAASE.
Plaintiff.

Civil No. 98-0800377

vs.

SHLEY VALLEY MEDICAL CENTER AND
)LUMBIA ASHLEY VALLEY MEDICAL
:
.NTER AND JOHN DOE DEFENDANTS
"HROUGH 10,

Judae Doualas L. Comabv

Defendants.

te of Utah
}ss.

nty of Uintah

}

being first duly sworn, deposes and says:

1.

I was a member of the jury in this case. I have personal knowledge of the facts I

state here.
2.

Based on my understanding of the information and instructions given to us, it was
my intention and belief that the full amount of the sum awarded in general and
special damages - $820,000.00 would go to the plaintiff, not 30% of that sum.

Dated this ^

day of March, 20002.
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Douglas G. Mortensen. USB # 2329
MATHESON, MORTENSEN, OLSEN & JEPPSON, P.C.
648 East 100 South
Salt Lake City. Utah 84102
Telephone: (801) 363-2244
Attorneys for Plaintiff

AFFIDAVIT OF FRANK J.
FALK

LORIHAASE.
Plaintiff.

Civil No. 98-0800377

vs.

ASHLEY VALLEY MEDICAL CENTER AND
COLUMBIA ASHLEY VALLEY MEDICAL
CENTER AND JOHN DOE DEFENDANTS
1 THROUGH 10,

Judae Doualas L. Comabv

Defendants.

State of Utah
}ss.

County of Uintah

}

Frank J. Falk. being first duly sworn, deposes and says:

1.

I am an attorney licensed to practice in this state.

2.

I have personal knowledge of the matters stated herein.

3.

On the morning following the jury's verdict in this case (which was announced at
11 p.m.)-1 participated in "exit" interviews with jurors, which we customarily
conduct in an effort to tlnd out how we might improve our presentation, what the
jurors found persuasive and what they found unpersuasive. During the course of
an early interview with a juror, I learned that that juror intended Lori Haase to
receive the full amount of the total damage figure listed on the Special Verdict
Form and thought that she would. I thereafter learned the same thing from exit
interviews with other jurors. I also learned that the jurors were uncertain on the
relation between their apportionment of fault and their award of damages and sent
a note to the judge seeking clarification. The note they received back did not
answer their question to their complete satisfaction so they made certain
assumptions based on what they understood and completed the Special Verdict
Form. All of the jurors with whom I spoke told me voluntarily and without any
prodding that they intended that the plaintiff receive the damage award they gave
and that they had already made the discounts they felt were appropriate.

4.

Late this afternoon after receiving affidavits from several jurors. I accompanied
plaintiffs chief counsel in this case to the home of the sister of juror Ardith
Atwood. where Mrs. Atwood was working. Mrs Atwood spoke with us briefly.
Although she declined to sign an affidavit; she did tell us that she agreed to ugo
along with the others" on the matter of damages. When asked if she personally
intended for the plaintiff to receive 30% of the S820.000 total damage figure. Mrs
Atwood replied tiiat she preferred not to answer that question.

Dated this P1 day of March. 20002.

Frank J. Falk^/
Attorney for Plaintiff
Subscribed and sworn to before me. a Clerk of the Court, this J/vj_day of March. 2002.

Name:
Clerk of the Coun
Eighth Judicial District Coun

Douglas G. Mortensen, USB #2329
MATHESON, MORTENSEN, OLSEN & JEPPSON, P.C.
648 East 100 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Telephone (801)363-2244
Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
OF UINTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
LORI HAASE,
AFFIDAVIT OF
DOUGLAS G. MORTENSEN

Plaintiff,
vs.

Civil No. 98-0800377
ASHLEY VALLEY MEDICAL CENTER
AND COLUMBIA ASHLEY VALLEY
MEDICAL CENTER, AND JOHN DOE
DEFENDANTS 1 THROUGH 10

:

Judge Douglas L. Cornaby

Defendants^
STATE OF UTAH

)
: ss
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
Douglas G. Mortensen, being first duly sworn deposes and says:
1.

I am counsel for the plaintiff in this action and have personal knowledge of

the facts stated in this affidavit.
2.

Following the announcement of the jury's decision in this case at

approximately 11:00 p.m., on March 20, it was apparent that the jurors were not

interested in staying later to discuss their decision with counsel or others. I therefore
decided to wait until the following morning to conduct our customary "exit interviews".
3.

On the morning following trial, Frank Falk and I began telephoning

members of the jury in an attempt to find out their impressions of various aspects of the
evidence presented to them. We prepared a common list of several questions relevant
to the case. Those questions included: How did you arrive at special damages of
$600,000?; How did you arrive at general damages of $220,000?; Why did it take 7
hours to reach your verdict?; What was your assessment of the experts who testified at
trial?; What was your assessment of the fact witnesses?; What was the most
persuasive evidence you considered?; What was the least persuasive evidence?; Were
you bothered by having to hear testimony by videotape, telephone or by the reading of
deposition transcript?; How did you apportion fault?
4.

We learned that the jurors carefully and painstakingly reviewed all of the

evidence which had been presented at trial, with each juror in turn discussing his or her
own notes on all of the evidence presented at trial. We learned that after reviewing all
of the evidence, the jurors voted by secret, written ballot on issues of the hospital's
liability. We learned that the jurors did in fact unanimously agree that the hospital was
negligent and that its negligence proximately caused injury to Lori Haase. We learned
that the jury then spent the bulk of its deliberation time considering damages. We were
told that the jurors found expert economist Patricia Pacey very credible and informative.
-2-

) one told us that he or she thought Dr. Pacey's figures were uway off in any respect.
i

e learned that they were uncertain on the matter of apportionment of fault and how
* apportionment affected the award of damages. We learned that the jurors sent a
te to the judge seeking clarification. Several jurors told us that the note they received
ck from the judge did not make the matter clearer to them. Some said they thought
it the judge's response had referred them to a jury instruction but that when they read
jury instruction, it didn't answer their question. It was clear from our interviews with
jurors that whatever their note to the judge said and whatever the judge's note back
hem replied, what they were really trying to determine was how to express their
jnt as the net dollar sum they wanted the plaintiff to receive from their finding of the
pitai's negligence. It became abundantly clear that the jurors' intent was that Lori
ase would receive the net figure of $820,000. Each juror who signed an affidavit
spendently and without reference to any other juror indicated an intent to award Mrs.
ise $820,000 for the hospital's negligence. It was clear that they had already,
ugh their own calculations and deliberations, "backed out" or apportioned off the
lages attributable to Dr. Hawkes' negligence.
5.

No pressure of any kind was applied to any of the jurors in connection

the signing of the affidavits. When one juror told us that she knew what she had
us was true but that she wasn't sure she wanted to sign an affidavit, she was
>uraged simply to think about it on her own and if she decided she wanted to sign
-3-

an affidavit, she could call us back. This discussion took place on a cell phone while
Mr. Falk and I were driving to a bank where another juror had agreed to meet us to
have his signature notarized. Several minutes later, we received a phone call on Frank
Falk's cell phone from the juror who had been invited to think about the matter. This
juror voluntarily called us back and expressed a desire to sign an affidavit so that there
could be no doubt as to her and her fellow jurors' true intent. We then arranged to
meet that juror at a place where that juror's signature could be notarized. When the 8th
juror stated a disinclination to sign any sort of affidavit, we immediately thanked her for
her time, apologized for inconveniencing her with our visit and departed. We made no
attempt of any kind to persuade her to sign an affidavit against her wish.
6.

One juror signed an affidavit late in the day at a place of considerable

distance from the nearest notary. She volunteered a willingness to take a blank form of
the affidavit to a notary the next day, sign it in front of the notary and personally file it
with the court. Again, no pressure of any kind was applied to any juror to sign an
affidavit.
DATED this fl-% day of March, 2002.

A

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME this £2^ day of March, 2002.

Notary Public
Pldg Affidavit Douglas G.Mortensen.0322

ANN BEHUMEN
MOTMY PUBUC-STATE OT OTM
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EXHIBIT 9

ANALYSIS OF JUROR INTENT
The intentions and understandings of the individual jurors deserve scrutiny. The
eight jurors who decided the case were Becky Solomon, Ray Labrum, Roberta
Welsh, Carrie Murray, Tonie Fagnan, Chad Watt, Tracy Cook, and Ardith Atwood.
All of the eight jurors except Ardith Atwood signed post-verdict affidavits. Six of
the seven affidavits were identical in form and state:
"Based on my understanding of the information and
instructions given to us, it was my intention and belief that
the full amount of the sum awarded in general and special
damages - $820,000.00 would go to the plaintiff, not 30% of
that sum".
Chad Watt deleted the phrase "not 30% of that sum". However, his deletion did not
change his clearly stated intent that Mrs. Haase would receive the full $820,000
awarded. (See analysis of Chad Watt intent, pp. 5-6, infra).
Becky Solomon did not appear at the May 2, 2002 hearing. The only thing
known about her intention is reflected in her March 21 affidavit. Her intention and belief
was that the full amount of the sum awarded - $820,000 - would go to the plaintiff, not
30% of that sum.
Ray Labrum signed an affidavit identical to Becky Solomon's. His statements at
the May 2 hearing were totally consistent with his affidavit and entirely clear and
unequivocal. He arrived at the hearing late. When he entered the courtroom, the court
interrupted Mr. Mortensen's questioning of individual jurors and immediately directed its
own questions to Mr. Labrum. Without any possibility of being influenced or confused
by any questioning which had preceded his entry into the courtroom, Mr. Labrum
responded to the court's questions as follows:

The Court:

. . . Did your $820,000 verdict include all of the plaintiffs injuries,
those caused by Dr. Hawkes as well as those caused by Ashley
Valley Medical Center?

Mr. Labrum: No.
The Court:

Second question. Was it your intent to award the plaintiff $820,000
from Ashley Valley Medical Center for injuries sustained by her as
a result of the hospital's negligence?

Mr. Labrum: Yes.
(May 2, 2002 hearing, page 18, lines 2-11) (Emphasis added). Mr. Labrum's intent is
therefore beyond dispute.
Roberta Welsh signed a post-verdict affidavit unequivocally stating her intention
and belief that the full amount of the sum awarded would go to Mrs. Haase, not 30% of
that sum. Her statements during the May 2 hearing were as unequivocal as Mr.
Labrum's. On page 11 of the May 2 transcript, the court asked jurors whether it was
their intent "to award the plaintiff $820,000 from Ashley Valley Medical Center for
injuries sustained by her as a result of the hospital's negligence." On that page, three
unidentified women jurors individually responded that their intent was for Mrs. Haase to
get the $820,000. Ms. Welsh was likely one of those three unidentified women jurors.
On page 13 of the transcript, Mr. Mortensen specifically asked Mrs. Welsh virtually the
same question and she responded unequivocally that the $820,000 was intended by
her to be solely from Ashley Valley for the hospital's negligence.

( May 2 transcript,

page 13 lines 12-18).
When the hospital's counsel, Mr. Harrison, began querying the jurors about the
extent of their confusion, Ms. Welsh (identified by the court reporter only as
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"unidentified woman juror"), responded:
I wasn't real confused, because I kind of know what to do. It
was just trying to help everybody trying to figure out what we
needed to do. If it was going to end up this way, I would
have went with a higher amount if I knew what was going to
happen.
(See May 2, 2002 hearing transcript, page 23 lines 1-5).
Thereafter, Mr. Mortensen asked the jurors whether, having heard what they had
heard from the court about entering judgment for only $246,000, they had inaccurately
recorded on the Special Verdict Form their actual intent. The six jurors to whom that
question was directed all responded in the affirmative. (May 2 transcript, pages 24-25).
Ms. Welsh was one of those jurors.
Carrie Murray signed an affidavit identical to the affidavit signed by five of her
fellow jurors. It was her intention and belief that the full amount of the $820,000 sum
would go to the plaintiff, not 30% of that sum. During the May 2 hearing, Ms. Murray
was the second juror to address the court. She stated unequivocally: "I intended her
to get that much money [the total $820,000]". (May 2 hearing transcript, p. 8).

She

admitted she only later realized that in order for Mrs. Haase to receive the full $820,000
sum, the jury should have put a figure on the special verdict form of over two million
dollars. That this realization came to her only later is not dispositive, however, because
she unequivocally volunteered to the court:
But I -1 - when we finished that night, I thought she was
going to receive $820,000. So that would be the 30% of the
two million, is what I thought.
(May 2 transcript, p. 8-9). Ms. Murray is, according to counsel's clear recollection, the
"unidentified woman juror" who responded on page 22 of the May 2 transcript:
-3-
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l understood that when we got finished that she would
receive the $820,000 from the hospital".
She clearly was one of the jurors who responded in the affirmative to Mr. Mortensen's
closing question as to whether the special verdict form, in light of the court's intention to
enter judgment against the hospital in the amount of only $246,000, inaccurately
recorded the jury's actual intent. (See page 24-25 of May 2 transcript).
Tonie Fagnan signed a handwritten affidavit slightly different and somewhat
longer than the others. It includes this statement:
. . . My fellow jurors and I had a question about our award of
damages and how our "number" would be effected by our
apportionment of fault between Dr. Hawkes and the hospital.
Specifically, we didn't know and wanted to know whether
Lori Haase would get the whole sum we arrived at or only a
percentage of it. We sent a note out to the judge seeking an
answer. He wrote back suggesting we refer to a particular
jury instruction. Neither the judge's note nor the jury
instruction answered our question.
We continued to deliberate, forming our own assumptions
on the matter. I believed and intended that Lori Haase
would get the total amount of the number we finally awarded
- $820,000.00 and I believe my fellow jurors believed and
intended the same.
(See Tonie Fagnan's March 21, 2002 affidavit herein).
During the May 2 hearing, Ms. Fagnan told the court that she "hoped" Mrs.
Haase would receive the full $820,000. She admitted the thought had never occurred
to her that, in the court's words, "the damages to be 100% would have to be over two
million". That is understandable, however, because she like the other jurors understood
that the focus of the case was on the damages resulting from the hospital's negligence.
Ms. Fagnan: When we were deliberating, I don't remember
us talking about like breaking down this is the harm that was
-4-

caused by the hospital, this is the harm caused by the
doctor. . . . - because we were focusing on the
hospital. (May 2 transcript, pp. 9-10).
The court had repeatedly told the jury that the case was not about Dr. Hawkes'
negligence. The jurors apparently assumed from such indication that they were
charged with responsibility for assessing the damages resulting from the hospital's
negligence only. Ms. Fagnan was among the six jurors responding affirmatively to the
final question: "Hearing what you have heard now from the court about the $246,000
judgment, did you inaccurately record on the Special Verdict Form your actual intent?"
Chad Watt also signed an affidavit indicating his belief and intent that Mrs.
Haase would receive the full $820,000 awarded by the jury. His answers to the court's
initial questions during the May 2 hearing reflect confusion over precisely what the
court was asking. That Mr. Watt misunderstood the court's initial questions is apparent
from his later explanation to the court:
" It seemed to me like the Dr. Hawkes . . . was not on
trial. It was Ashley Valley. So my intention was toward
Ashley Valley and not towards Dr. Hawkes." (Emphasis
added) (May 2, transcript, p. 14, lines 18-21).
Mr. Watt expressly responded in the affirmative to Mr. Mortensen's question:
"Was it your intent to award Mrs. Haase the total sum of $820,000 for injuries sustained
by her as a result of the hospital's negligence". (May 2 transcript, p. 17, line 21 - p. 18,
line 1). Later, Mr. Watt indicated unequivocally that it was not his intent to award Mrs.
Haase only $246,000 for the damages she sustained as a result of the hospital's
negligence. (May 2 hearing transcript, p. 18, lines 16-21).
Finally, Mr. Watt agreed that having heard what he had heard during the May 2
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hearing about the Court's intent concerning a $246,000 judgment, he did inaccurately
record his actual intent on the Special Verdict Form . (May 2 hearing transcript, p. 24).
Tracy Cook signed an affidavit identical in form to the affidavits of jurors
Solomon, Labrum, Welsh and Murray. She stated clearly and unequivocally at the May
2 hearing that her intent was to award Mrs. Haase $820,000 damages sustained by her
as a result of the hospital's negligence. (May 2 hearing transcript, pp. 11, 13 (lines 5-7),
15 (line 12), 17, 18, 24, 25). Ms. Cook's intent was stated perhaps most clearly on
page 13:
Ms. Cook:

No, I agreed with Carie. That was my intent.
It was for her to get $820,000 from the
hospital. I didn't realize that she would only
get 30 percent of that. (Emphasis added).

Ardith Atwood, the eighth juror, declined to sign an affidavit. Her statements a
the May 2 hearing are terse and opaque. Since Utah law requires the agreement of
only 6 of 8 jurors on any issue, her view on the damage award may be "thrown out" as a
one-person minority view. However, it is noteworthy that not even she understood or
intended that Mrs. Haase would receive only $246,000 for the hospital's negligence.
She claims to have believed it was up to the judge to decide whether Mrs. Haase would
get $820,000 or $246,000 from the hospital. (May 2 transcript, p. 16, line 22 - p. 17,
line 4).

-6-
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EXHIBIT 10

IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
OF UINTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

LORIHAASE,
Plaintiff,
PRELIMINARY JURY VERDICT RULING
vs.

ASHLEY VALLEY MEDICAL
CENTER,

Civil No. 93-0800377
Judge Douglas L Cornaby

Defendant.

The jury rendered a verdict in this case on March 22, 2002. The following day the
Plaintiff contacted each juror and most of them signed an affidavit stating they intended the
Plaintiff to receive the entire $820,000. The Plaintiff then submitted a verdict to the Court
different from the one directed by the Court along with a memorandum supporting her position.
The Defendant has responded with a memorandum in opposition. The Plaintiff then submitted a
eply brief together with a copy of what she claims is dispositive authority, to-wit, Patty Bishop,
t al. v. Gen Tec Inc., et al., 2002 UT 36 (filed by the Supreme Court of Utah on March 29, 2002.
inally, the Plaintiff submitted a notice to submit for decision.
This matter is not ready for a decision.
The Court is hereby ordering the jury to be reconvened at the Court's Building in Vernal
i Thursday, May 2, 2002, at 11 a.m. to. determine, if, in fact, there was a clerical error.
)unsel are invited to be present, personally or by associate counsel. The Court will make the

presentation. Counsel are also invited to submit to the Court prior to that time specific questions
they want the Court to ask the jurors. The Court expects this hearing to be limited in both time
and content. At this point in time, however, the Court does not know how it can avoid informing
J

the jury of the amount the Plaintiff has already receivedfromthe Estate of Dr. Hawkes.
The parties and their counsel are ordered not to have contact with any juror from this time
forward and until the hearing is ended.
Dated this 2nd day of April, 2002.

Certificate of Service
I certify that on the 2nd day of April, 2002,1 caused to be served via U.S. mail a copy of
the foregoing to the following:
Douglas G. Mortensen
Matheson, Mortensen, Olsen & Jeppson, P.C.
648 East 100 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Robert R. Harrison
Snow, Christensen & Martineau
10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor
P. O. Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
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2 Appeal and Liror 0842(1)

Patty BISHOP, individually and as pei
sonal representative of tht Lstate of
Douglas J Bishop, deceased, Bait J
Bishop, Douglas Wade Bishop, Bradley
David Bishop, and Joshua l e e Bishop
Plaintiffs and Appellants

A distiict couits disp)aiti n of a sum
maiv judgment motion is a questi )n of law
that the Supieme Couit levievvs foi conect
ness

v

The bupieme Couit accoids i tinl
courts intelpietation of a contiact no defei
ence and levievvs it foi conectness

GLN1LC INC, a Kentucky corporation,
and John Does I—V, Defendants ThirdPaitv Plaintilf, Appellee, and C i o s s - \ p
pellant
v
Valley Asphalt, Inc , a Utah eorpoiation,
Third-Partv Defendant and
Appellant
Nos 20000467 20000492
bupieme Couit of Ltah
Mai eh 29 2002
Keheanng Denied June 12 2002

Pel sonal lepiesentative of estate of de
ceased woikei bi ought wionglul death action
against asphalt silo manufactuiei Manufac
tin ei filed thn d pai ty complaint against em
ployei seeking indemnification The tnal
couit gianted summaiy judgment foi mmu
factiuei on indemnification claim Aftei juiy
tnal the Fouith Distiict Couit Ltah Coun
ty Raj Hauling Ji appoitioned judgment
Employei and pei sonal l epi esentativ e ap
pealed Manufactuiei cioss appealed The
Supieme Couit Dm ham J held that (1)
Liability Retoim Act impliedly pieempted
common law doctnne of lespondeat supenoi
(2) Art did not cieate unconstitutional classi
fication and (3) manufactuiei was not enti
tied to indemnification
Russon A C J concm I ed in I esult

1 Appeal and Liror 0842(1)
The application of LiabiliU Retoim Act
(LRA) in appoiturning fault is a legal ques
tion of statutoiy constiuction which the bu
pi erne Couit ieuews foi conectness
U C A 1953 78-27-37 to 78-27-43

3 \ppeal and Lrroi OSb3

4 \ppcal and L n o i O b 12(9)
Mi\ed questions of law and tact aie ie
viewed foi abuse of di action in applvmg the
1 iv\ t) the facts
5 Negligence 0>49(S 10)
Products I labihtv 0 2 8 42
Liability Refoim Act impliedh pieempt
ed common 1 iw doctnne of lespondeit supe
noi and theiefoie habihtv of immune em
plo\ei md emplovee should not hi\e been
combined m detei mining fault alloc ition in
wi ongful death action a^ unst manufactui ei
bv estate of woikei killed while lepanmg
asph lit silo whei e Act md common law w ei e
in conflict compliance with both was lmpossi
ble and application of lespondeat supenoi
w oulcl nulhf\ effects of section of Act pel mit
ting ieco\eiy foi mjuied plaintiffs horn any
defendant whose fault ombined with fault of
pei sons immune fiom suit exceeded tiult of
plaintiffs U C A 19oo 78-27-37 to 78-27-4 :>
b Constitutional 1 aw 0 2 4 3 1
Negligence O 2 0 3
Statutes 0 7 4 ( 1 )
Piovision of I lability Refoim Act that
allowed ieco\eiy foi mjuied plaintiffs tiom
any defendant whose fault combined with
fault of pei sons immune fiom suit exceeded
fault of plaintiffs did not cieate unconstitu
tional classification and thus Act did not
\iolate equal piotection oi Umfoim Opci i
tion of Laws piovision of state constitution
wheie Act served legitimate puipose of bal
ancing economic buiclens between mjuied
emplovee and defendant wheie immune em
ployei was also at fault
I S C A Const
Amend 14 Const Ait 1 § 24 L C A 19o3
78-27-37 to 78 27-43

BIbHOP v GLNTEC I M
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7 statutes 0 7 1
In scrutinizing a legislative measuie un
(lei Lnifoim Opeiation of Laws piovision of
„tue constitution the couit must deteimine
whethei the classification is leasonable
wnethei the objectives of the legislative ac
tion aie legitimate and whethei theie is a
ie is enable lelationship between the classifi
cation and the legislative pui poses Const
Ait 1 * 24
!> Indemnity 0 2 9
Mmutictuiei of asphalt silo was not
entitled to indemnification in wi ongful death
action bv employei of vvoiker killed while
peifoinnng lepau woik on silo wheie Ian
guuc in indemnification clause limited em
plovei s indemnification to situations where
emplovei itself was negligent theie was no
lefeience in indemnification clause to piod
ucts liability and language disci uming habih
tv foi any injiuy ansmg out of installation
did not apph to condition of product when
sold
9 Indemnity 0 3 0 ( 1 )
The common law geneially disfavois
agieements that indemnify paities against
then own negligence because one might be
caieless of anothei s life and limb if theie is
no penalty foi cai elessness
10 C o n t i a c t s O H 4
Paities seeking to exempt themselves
horn toil habihtv must cleaily and unequivo
callv expiess an intent to limit toit liability
vvithii the contiact without such an expies
sion of intent the piesumption is against any
such intention and it is not achieved by
infeience oi implication fiom geneial Ian
guige
11 Indemnity 0 3 0 ( 1 )
The Supieme Couit will not mfei an
intention to indemnify against othei kinds of
lnbihty including stiict habihtv wheie such
intention is not cleai lv expi essed
12 Indemnity 0 2 8
Allegations oi negligence contained in
claim foi pioducts liability did not tianstoim
c
Uim into one foi oiclmaiy negligence and
thus claim was not coveied bv indemnified
"c n language in pi oduct m\ oice

13 Products Liabihtv 0 8 , 11, 14
Pioducts habihtv alwavs lequnes pi oof
of a defective pioduct which can include
manufactuimg flaws design defects and m
adequate warnings legaidmg use
14 Trial 0 3 4 4
J u i v s enoi in lecoidmg judgment as
lendeied constituted clencal enoi not judi
cial ei 1 or and thus affidav its of jm 01 s w ei e
admissible to show juioi s xctual intent and
that juiy made mistake m calculating dam
age aw aid by sub ti acting plaintiffs piopoi
tion of fault Rules Civ Pioc Rules 59 60
15 Motions 0 1 5
It is the substance not the labeling of a
motion that is dispositive in detei mining the
chai actei of the motion

Allen K Young Spnngville foi plaintiffs
Paul M Belnap Andiew D Wnght Dan en
K Nelson Salt Lake City foi GenTec
Robeit G Gilchnst Maik L McCarty
Biandon B Hobbs Lynn S Davies, Salt
Lake Citv foi Valley Asphalt
DURHAM Justice
INTRODLC1ION
111 This appeal and ci oss appeal challenge
the judgment enteied m a wi ongful death
action bi ought by Patty Bishop individually
and as the executoi of the decedent Douglas
Bishops estate and Bishops children
Bishop an employee of Vallev Asphalt Inc
died as a 1 esult of pei sonal injuiies sus
tamed while peifoiming lepan woik on as
phalt silo components manufactui ed by Gen
Tec Inc and installed and maintained by
\dlley Asphalt
Bishop sued GenTec foi
pioducts habihtv and GenTec filed a thud
paity complaint against Valle\ Asphalt
seeking indemnification foi GenTec s negh
gence stiict habihtv and pioducts liability
based on the language in an invoice signed
by Vallev Asphalt With lespect to the in
demmfication the court gi anted GenTec s
motion foi summaiy judgment The juiy
allocated fault to both GenTec and Vallev
Asphalt Judgment was then apportioned
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pursuant to Utah's Liability Reform Act.
Bishop moved to amend the jury verdict
based on clerical error, but the trial court
denied the motion. Valley Asphalt and
Bishop appealed, and GenTec filed a crossappeal.
BACKGROUND
H 2 In late 1994 or early 1995, Valley Asphalt, planning to expand its asphalt storage
capacity, contacted GenTec, a manufacturer
and assembler of hot asphalt silos and silo
components, to purchase hot asphalt silo
components. Valley Asphalt purchased components for an asphalt silo from GenTec on
August 7, 1995, and signed GenTec's standard invoice entitled "Equipment Sales Order and Security Agreement." On the reverse side of the pre-printed invoice were
two sections entitled "INDEMNIFICATION" and "INSTALLATION," which purported to place limitations on GenTec's liability. Soon after completion of the purchase,
Valley Asphalt received the silo components
and constructed the system pursuant to the
specifications provided by GenTec.
II 3 On July 12, 1997, while inspecting and
attempting to repair one of Valley Asphalt's
asphalt silos, Bishop was caught between the
doors of the silo when they suddenly closed
and was crushed. He died later that day as
a result of his injuries. The components that
crushed Bishop were those purchased under
the August 7, 1995 invoice. Subsequently,
Bishop's executor filed this wrongful death
action against GenTec.
114 GenTec filed a third-party complaint
against Valley Asphalt, seeking apportionment of fault and indemnification under the
pre-printed terms on the reverse side of the
August 7, 1995 invoice. After review of GenTec's and Valley Asphalt's cross-motions for
summary judgment on the indemnification
question, the trial court found that the two
entities were sophisticated business entities,
that they negotiated the terms of the invoice
at arm's length, and that the language in the
invoice evidenced the intent of the parties to
reallocate all liability to Valley Asphalt, including claims against GenTec for negligence,
strict liability, and products liability.

11 5 The jury apportioned fault according to
a special verdict form, allocating 25 percent
of the fault to Bishop, 45 percent to GenTec,
and 30 percent to Valley Asphalt. In addition to apportioning fault, the jury determined the amount of general damages to be
$750,000 and special damages to be $800,000.
Because Valley Asphalt was a party immune
from suit pursuant to Utah Code Ann. & 7827-37(3)(a) (Supp.2001), the trial judge reapportioned Valley Asphalt's 30 percent fault
according to Utah's Liability Reform Act
("LRA"), Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-27-37 to 43 (1999), which resulted in allocating 64.29
percent of the total fault to GenTec and 35.71
percent to Bishop. The trial court then reduced the jury's damages award by the 35.71
percentage of fault allocated to Bishop.
Both GenTec and Valley Asphalt objected to
the reapportionment. They claimed that either Valley Asphalt's liability should be combined with Bishop's liability under the common law doctrine of respondeat superior or,
if respondeat superior did not apply, that the
reapportionment part of the LRA, section
78-27-39(2)(a), is unconstitutional under both
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution and the Uniform Operation of Laws
Clause of the Utah Constitution, art. I, section 24. The trial court overruled GenTec's
and Valley Asphalt's constitutional objections. With respect to the respondeat superior argument, the trial court found that the
LRA superceded the common law and that
"the statute clearly and unambiguously requires that [the] Court must consider the
fault of Mr. Bishop and Valley [Asphalt] separately."
K 6 After the trial ended and the jury was
excused, Bishop's counsel talked to at least
three of the jurors, including the jury foreman, all of whom subsequently signed affidavits indicating they had made a mistake in
their calculation of the jury award. In their
affidavits, the jurors testified that they had
mistakenly subtracted 25 percent (Bishop's
proportion of fault as determined by the
jury) from the general and &pecial damages,
not realizing that the subtraction for Bishop's
fault was the duty of the trial court, not the
jury. Relying on these affidavits, Bishop
moved to amend the jury verdict pursuant to
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Utah K. Civ. P. 59, or 60(a) or 60(b); later,
however, in a hearing on the matter, Bishop
modified his motion from a request for impeachment or amendment of the verdict under rule 59 or rule 60 to one solely for a
correction of clerical error under rule 60.
Bishop conceded that the juror affidavits
would not support a rule 59 motion to impeach the jury verdict.

ton, 942 P.2d 918, 920 (Utah 1997) (citing
State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932 (Utah 1994)).
ANALYSIS
I.

LIABILITY REFORM ACT

15 J 11 9 GenTec and Valley Asphalt argue
that the trial court should have combined
U 7 Bishop argued, with the support of the Bishop's negligence with that of his employjuror affidavits, that the jury's allocation er- er, Valley Asphalt, under the doctrine of
ror reduced the final general and special respondeat superior. Alternatively, GenTec
damages award announced in the jury ver- and Valley Asphalt also argue that if the
dict to a sum that was 25 percent lower than doctrine of respondeat superior does not apthe amount the jury intended to award. ply, the reapportionment provision of the
Bishop maintained that the jury's intent was LRA, section 78-27-39(2)(a), is unconstitufurther evidenced by the fact that its special tional under the Uniform Operation of Laws
damages award was almost exactly 75 per- clause of the Utah Constitution, Utah Const,
cent of the $1,067,000 special damages art. I section 24, and the Equal Protection
amount presented by Bishop's expert witness Clause of the federal constitution, U.S.
to the jury at trial. The trial court conclud- Const, amend. XIV, section 1. The first
ed that Bishop's motion to amend the jury question before us therefore concerns the
verdict was in reality a motion to impeach interaction between the LRA and the com-1
the verdict and ruled that the affidavits were mon law doctrine of respondeat superior.
not admissible pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. Utah has adopted the common law, except
59(a)(2). In its order, however, the trial for instances where the common law is concourt did not specifically address Bishop's trary to or conflicts with the United States
Constitution, the Utah Constitution, a statrule 60 motion to amend.
ute, or Utah public policy. See Utah Code
Ann. § 68-3-1 (2001).
In determining
STANDARD OF REVIEW
whether a state statute pre-empts the com[1-4] 118 The application of the LRA in mon law, we have used the federal model for
apportioning fault is a legal question of statu- determining whether federal law pre-empts
tory construction, which we review for cor- state law. See Gilcjer v. Hernandez, 2000 UT
rectness. Field v. Boyer Co., L.C., 952 P.2d 23, 1111, 997 P.2d 305. The United States
1078, 1079 (Utah 1998). A district court's Supreme Court has stated,
disposition of a summary judgment motion is
[i] Sometimes courts, when facing the
a question of law that we review for correctpre-emption question, find language in the
ness. Schiutz u. BMW of North America,
. . statute that reveals an explicit [legislaInc., 814 P.2d 1108, 1111-12 (Utah 1991).
tive] intent to pre-empt [common] law. [ii]
"We accord a trial court's interpretation of a
More often, explicit pre-emption language
contract no deference and review it for cordoes not appear, or does not directly anrectness." Aquayen Int'l, Inc., v. Calrae
swer the question. In that event, courts
Trust, 972 P.2d 411, 413 (Utah 1998). Mixed
must consider whether the . . . statute's
questions of law and fact are reviewed for
"structure and purpose," or nonspecific
abuse of discretion in applying the law to the
statutory language, nonetheless re\eal a
facts. Woodhaven Apartments v. Washinyclear, but implicit, pre-emptive intent.
»• We note that the general application oi respondeat superior requires an employer lo be responsible for the actions of an emplo\ee where the
ernplo\ce, acting within the scope of her employment, injures a third part\
In this case the
employee is the injured part}, not the part\ caus-

ing injury, and, thus, use of respondeat superior
under such circumstances would be pioblemutic
in any event In this case, howexer, we need not
address this problem because we conclude that
the doctrine has been pie-empted, as discussed
hereafter.
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[a] A . . . statute, for example, may
create a scheme of [statutoryj regulation
"so pervasive as to make reasonable the
inference that [the legislature] left no room
for the [common law] to supplement it."
[b] Alternatively, [statutory] law may
be in "irreconcilable conflict" with [the
common] law. Compliance with both
for example, may be a "physical impossibility," or,
[c] the [common] law may "stand as an
obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of
[the legislature]."
Id. (citing Burnett Bank of Marion County v.
Nelson, 517 U.S. 25, 31, 116 S.Ct. 1103, 134
L.Ed.2d 237 (1996) (citations omitted)).
U 10 The Utah Legislature did not explicitly pre-empt the common law doctrine of respondeat superior when it passed the LRA.
Therefore, we look to the statute's structure
and purpose to determine whether it reflects
an implied legislate, e intent to do so. We
conclude that the state statute and the common lawr principle are in conflict, and that the
common law must necessarily give way to the
statute. Compliance with both is impossible.
Additionally, the "[common] law . .. *stand[s]
as an obstacle to the accomplishment and
execution of the full purposes and objectives
of [the legislature].' " Id.
U l l Application of the common law doctrine of respondeat superior to determine
fault allocation in this case would undermine
the legislature's objectives in enacting the
LRA. Under the plain language of the statute, the only time the principle of respondeat
superior could theoretically apply is in the
initial apportionment of fault under section
78-27-39(1), in cases where the person seeking recovery is not an employee. As reallocation under the statute occurs only when
the plaintiff is an employee of an immune
employer, the principle of respondeat superior cannot operate to combine the employee's
and the employer's fault in the initial allocation pursuant to section 78-27-39(1), or in
the reallocation under section 78-27-39(2)(a).
If it did, the effects of section 78-27-38(2),
permitting recovery for an injured plaintiff
from any defendant "whose fault, combined
with the fault of persons immune from suit,

exceeds the fault of the [plaintiff]," Utah
Code Ann. § 78-27-38(2X2001;, would be
completely nullified. The combined fault of a
defendant and an immune employer would
always be greater than that of the plaintiff7employee if the plaintiff/employee's fault
were to be attributed to the employer; the
combined fault would, by definition, be 100
percent. The LRA must pre-empt the common law; otherwise sections 78-27-38(2) and
78-27-39(2)(a) would be without meaning or
function.
H 12 More explicitly, we believe that the
history of the allocation and reallocation provisions of the LRA reveals a legislate e intent
to override the operation of respondeat superior in this situation. Recent amendments to
the LRA were undertaken by the legislature
in specific response to Sullivan v. Scoulur
Grain Co. of Utah, 853 P.2d 877 (Utah 1993).
One of the issues addressed in Sullivan was
whether a jury could apportion fault to an
injured employee's employer where the employer was a party immune from suit. Upon
a plain reading of the statute and a review of
the legislative history, wre determined that
the LRA required apportionment both to
immune parties and to defendants in order to
prevent a "defendant [from being] held liable
for damages in excess of its proportion of
fault" in violation of the statutory language.
Id. at 879. The dissent in Sullivan pointed
out that the result wrould seriously curtail
employee recovery, id. at 886 (Stewart, J.,
dissenting), but the majority felt obliged to
follow the statutory language. Id. at 881.
The legislature took notice of the case, and,
in 1994 after vigorous debate, amended the
LRA to provide for reallocation of fault in
cases where the fault of all parties immune
from suit is less than 40 percent. Section
78-27-38 was amended by adding the language "under Section 78-27-39" to read, "No
defendant is liable to any person seeking
recovery for an amount in excess of the
proportion of fault attributed to that defendant under Section 78-27-39." Utah Code
Ann. § 78-27-38(3) (2001). The legislature
thus balanced the factors for and against
reallocation of fault and found that reallocation between the plaintiff and the defendant
was a better policy than forcing the plaintiff
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to bear the full burden of the immune party's
fault. "Thus, in some instances the [revised]
statutory scheme itself holds defendants liable for some percentage of fault initially attributable to a person immune from suit."
field v. Boyer Co., L.C., 952 P.2d 1078, 108182 (Utah 1998).
113 Valley Asphalt's and GenTec's reliance on respondeat superior is in effect a
challenge to the operation of the reapportionment provisions of the LRA, section 78-2739(2)(a). Their position, if accepted, would
recreate the Sullivan dilemma. Through the
doctrine of respondeat superior, Valley Asphalt and GenTec seek to reject the legislature's explicit resolution of that dilemma.
GenTec's and Valley Asphalt's contention
that fault should not be reallocated to a
defendant in excess of the liability originally
attributed to that defendant is therefore unavailing in light of the legislature's 1994
amendment to the LRA.2 The trial court
correctly determined that the LRA preempted the common law.
[6,7] 1114 GenTec and Valley Asphalt
also argue that the reallocation provision of
the LRA should be declared unconstitutional
under the Uniform Operation of Laws provision of the Utah Constitution, art. I, section
24, and federal equal protection jurisprudence. Article I, section 24 of the Utah
Constitution provides that "[a]ll laws of a
general nature shall have uniform operation."
"In scrutinizing a legislative measure under
article I, § 24, we must determine whether
the classification is reasonable, whether the
objectives of the legislative action are legitimate, and whether there is a reasonable relationship between the classification and th^
legislative purposes." Blue Cross & Blue
Shield of Utah v. State, 779 P.2d 634, 637
(Utah 1989).
2. We note that anothei historic common law
doctrine abandoned by the LRA, that of joint and
seieial liabihtv, would have made GenTec liable
for the entire amount ot the damages. GenTec
would piesumabh agree that the result compelled by the LRA is belter than the result under
this common law pimciple The legislatuie's
decision to implement the LRA was premised on
fairness. See Float Debate, Utah Senate, 46th
Leg 1986, Geneial Sess . Senate Day 31, Records
No. 63 (Feb 12, 1986). Fairness'includes not
onh fairness to the defendant, but also fairness
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1115 GenTec and Valley Asphalt argue that
the failure to include an injured employee's
fault with that of his or her employer under
the common law doctrine of respondeat superior creates an unconstitutional classification.
They assert that this classification unduly
burdens non-immune defendants because
they may become liable for fault in excess of
the fault initially attributed to them, at least
where the immune party's fault is less than
40 percent.
H 16 AJS explained above, the legislature
never intended the fault initially attributed to
the injured employee to be combined, pursuant to respondeat superior, with the fault of
the employer in the reallocation. The legislature recognized the injustice of a specific
classification where an injured employee or a
partially at-fault defendant third party would
have to bear or share the burden of an
immune employer's fault. The classification
they settled on responds in a rational way to
the conflict between protection of the interests of plaintiff-employees and of defendants.
The amended statute strives to balance and
protect the interests of both. Where the
immune employer's fault is greater than 40
percent, the injured plaintiff-employee bears
the burden of the employer's fault, but where
the employer's fault is less than 40 percent,
the injured plaintiff-employee proportionately shares the burden of the employer's fault
with non-immune defendants. The 40 percent fault threshold is a reasonable cut-off
point; the statutory scheme legitimately
strives to balance and protect both defendants and injured employees. The classification therefore serves a legitimate legislative
purpose: to balance economic burdens between an injured employee and a defendant
where an immune employer is also at fault.
to the plaintiff. The legislature made a policy
judgment after Sullivan that illustrated the dilemma cieated by the original statute and determined that the best policy was to shaie the
burden ol an immune party's liabihtv in certain
cases between the plaintilf and the defendants
instead of making the plaintilf bear the lull burden. We cannot see how spreading this burden
proportionally between parties is unconstitutional Certainly, the result that GenTec and VaIIe\
Asphalt ad\ocate would not be fauei
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1117 Likewise, we conclude that the economic classification undertaken by the legislature here easily meets the "rational basis"
standard required by the Equal Protection
Clause of the federal constitution; the legislature's classification, as discussed above, was
entirely reasonable and legitimate. Therefore, neither the Uniform Operation of Laws
provision nor the Equal Protection Clause
requires us to invalidate the LRA with respect to reallocation; the legislature's policy
choice to reallocate the burden of an immune
party's fault proportionally in some circumstances between defendants and plaintiffs is
constitutional.
II. CONTRACT PROVISIONS
[8J 118 Valley Asphalt argues that the
trial court improperly granted summary
judgment with respect to certain indemnification provisions found on the reverse side of
the GenTec invoice for the equipment involved in Bishop's accident. We have previously stated that "[on] grounds of public
policy, parties to a contract may not generally exempt a seller of a product from strict
tort liability for physical harm to a user or
consumer unless the exemption term 'is fairly
bargained for and is consistent with the policy underlying that [strict tort] liability.' "
Inteiivest Constr. v. Palmer, 923 P.2d 1350,
1356 (Utah 1996) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 195(3) (1981)). Comment (c) to the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, section 195, indicates that agreements
exempting a seller from strict products liability are unenforceable.3
[9-11] 1119 In the context of negligence,
we have consistently held that an "indemnity
agreement which purports to make a party
respond for the negligence of another should
be strictly construed." Freund v. Utah Power & Light Co., 793 P.2d 362, 370 (1990). In
construing such agreements, we have looked
at the "objectives of the parties and the
surrounding facts and circumstances" in interpreting the contractual language. Id. "In
3.

In accoid with the Restatement, the Utah Legislature promulgated section 78-15-7 on March
15, 2000, which voids any agreement to exempt a
seller of a product from strict products liability
on grounds of public policv. Section 78-15-7 is

general, the common law disfa\ors agreements that indemnify parties against their
own negligence because 'one might be careless of another's life and limb, if there is no
penalty for carelessness.' " Hawkins v.
Peait 2001 UT 94, <I 14, 37 P.3d 1062 (citing
Hyde v. Chevron USA, 697 F.2d 614, 632
(5th Cir.1983)). Parties seeking to exempt
themsehes from tort liability must " 'clearly
and unequivocally' express an intent to limit
tort liability" within the contract. See Interwest, 923 P.2d at 1356 (quoting DCR, Inc. v.
Peak Alarm Co, 663 P.2d 433, 438 (Utah
1983)). "Without such an expression of intent, 'the presumption is against any such
intention, and it is not achieved by inference
or implication from general language
' "
Id. (citation omitted). Furthermore, we will
not infer an intention to indemnify against
other kinds of liability, including strict liability, where such intention is not clearly expressed.
11 20 The two pertinent paragraphs found
on the reverse side of the GenTec invoice
read as follows:
INDEMNIFICATION
Customer shall indemnify and hold GenTec
harmless from all expenses (including attorney's fees), claims, demands, suits,
judgments, actions, costs, and liabilities
(including without limitation those alleging
GenTec's own negligence) ivluch arise
from, relate to or are connected witii the
Customer's negligent possessioii, use, operatio)i or resale of the equipment and
other goods described herein or any manuals, instructions, drawings or specifications
related thereto.
(Emphasis added.)
INSTALLATION
Customer shall be solely responsible at its
cost for the installation and erection of the
equipment and other goods purchased. Although GenTec may in some cases provide
a serviceman, data, manuals, instructions,
drawings or specifications to aid Customer
with installation or start-up.[sic] GenTec
inapplicable to the current case because the accident here occurred before the new section \vas>
adopted. The statute nonetheless reflects the
legislature's view of public policy on this question.
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a^umes no responsibility for proper installation or support of the equipment or other
uuods when erected and disclaims any express or implied warranties with respect to
such installation or support. Whether or
not data manuals, instructions, drawings or
specifications are provided or a serviceman
aids in the installation, Customer shall indemnify and hold GenTec harmless from
all expenses (including attorney's fees),
claims, demands, suits, judgments, actions, costs, and liabilities
(including
without limitation those alleging GenTec's
own negligence) which may anse from,
relate to, or be connected with damage or
personal injury ansing out of the installation, erection, staH-up, or use of the equipment and other goods purchased (including
any manuals, instmctions, or drawings related thereto).
(Emphasis added.)
11 21 The plain reading of the paragraph
entitled "INDEMNIFICATION" restricts
Valley Asphalt's agreement to indemnify to
those situations where Valley Asphalt itself is
negligent. Thus, where Valley Asphalt is not
negligent, Valley Asphalt has no duty to indemnify GenTec at all. Furthermore, there
is no reference in the indemnification language to products liability. GenTec included
a parenthetical clause to indicate that "liabilities" specifically included GenTec's own negligence, but we will not read that reference to
include products liability, in view of the principles of strict construction to which we adhere in this area.
1122 Analysis of the paragraph entitled
"INSTALLATION" results in a similar conclusion. In the relevant portion of the "INSTALLATION" paragraph, GenTec purports
to disclaim any liability for damage or personal injury "arising out of the installation,
erection, start-up, or use of the equipment."
That language must be read in accordance
with the paragraph as a whole, which notes
that Valley Asphalt is solely responsible for
installation. Thus, whereas the INDEMNIFICATION paragraph purports to protect
GenTec generally from any liability for negligence when injuries "arise from [Valley Asphalt's] negligent possession, use, operation
or resale" of equipment, the INSTALLA-

TION paragraph specifically protects GenTec for injuries arising out of "the installation, erection, start-up, or use" thereof. By
definition, injuries arising from Valley Asphalt's installation could not be attributed to
the condition of the product when sold (products liability), and therefore the INSTALLATION paragraph cannot be read to provide
indemnification for products liability. Thus,
GenTec is not entitled to indemnification for
Bishop's products liability claim.
[12] U23 GenTec has also argued on appeal that the plaintiffs cause of action
against it was tried to the jury as both a
products liability claim and a negligence
claim, and that it is therefore entitled to the
protections in the INDEMNIFICATION
paragraph for negligence. We disagree.
Bishop's complaint against GenTec contains
only one cause of action, for "Products Liability (Strict Liability in Tort)." The complaint alleges a defective and dangerous
product, and asserts that the product was
defectively designed and manufactured. It
also alleges, as part of the defective design
theory, that GenTec "so negligently, carelessly and recklessly designed, manufactured,
. . . sold, . . . serviced and failed to warn
relative to said silo system . . . so as to
directly and legally cause the accident, injuries and damages to plaintiff as described
herein, . . . as a result of the unreasonably
dangerous defects in the silo system design,
the plaintiffs' husband and father, Douglas J.
Bishop, was fatally injured."
f 24 In several memoranda to the trial
court, and now on appeal, GenTec cites the
foregoing language as evidencing a theory of
recovery for ordinary negligence, which it
argues should bring Bishop's claim within the
negligence language of the INDEMNIFICATION & INSTALLMENT provisions of the
contract. GenTec has misapprehended the
applicable principles of products liability law.
[13] H 25 Products liability always requires proof of a defective product, which can
include "manufacturing flaws, design defects,
and inadequate warnings regarding use."
Gmndberg v. Upjohn Co., 813 P.2d 89, 92
(Utah 1991). Alternative theories are available to prove different categories of defective
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product, including negligence, strict liability,
or implied warranty of merchantability. See,
e.g., Restatement (Third) of Torts: Product
Liability § 2 cmt. n (1997). Alternative theories entail different evidentiary burdens.
For example, proof of a defect under a negligent manufacture theory will necessitate
proof that the defective condition of the product was the result of negligence in the manufacturing process, or proof that the manufacturer knew or should have known of the
defective condition, whereas these elements
are unnecessary under strict liability or
breach of warranty theories. Whatever the
theory, however, the defendant's liability is
for the defective product, and not merely for
any underlying negligence. See generally, 63
Am.Jur.2d Products Liability § 8 (1996) ("In
a products liability action, a defect in a product may consist of a mistake in manufacturing, improper design, or the inadequacy or
absence of warnings regarding the use of the
product.")
II 26 Thus, allegations of negligence contained in a claim for products liability do not
transform the claim into one for ordinary
negligence. GenTec has overlooked this
principle in construing the import of the Special Verdict Form returned by the jury in
this case. The Verdict Form asked: "1. When
the product, the silo, left the defendant GenTec, was it in a defective condition, making
the product unreasonably dangerous to the
decedent?" and "3. Was the manufacturer,
GenTec, negligent?" Both questions were
answered in the affirmative by the jury, and
GenTec now argues that the answer to question three demonstrates that this case was
"submitted to the jury on negligence theories." We conclude, however, that the reference to negligence in question three could
only have been connected to the plaintiffs
theory of a product defect based on negligence, as an alternative to its theory of a
product defect based on strict liability, which
was addressed by question one. At least one
state has expressly held that the adoption of
strict liability doctrine does not abolish the
theory of "product liability negligence" as
proof of a product defect, Big Rivers Elec.
Corp. v. General Elec. Co., 820 F.Supp. 1123,
1127 (S.D.Ind.1992), and no argument has
been made in this case that the theories are
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mutually exclusive or inconsistent. See also
.Monsanto Co. v. Reed. 950 S.W.2d 811, 814
(Ky.1997). Therefore, we reject GenTec's
argument that this claim sounded in negligence and was covered by the invoice's indemnification language.
III.

JURY VERDICT

[14J 1127 Bishop appeals the trial court's
denial of his motion to amend the jury verdict pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 60. Bishop
also appeals the trial court's decision to
strike the juror affidavits. GenTec properly
argues that we should review a trial court's
determination under Utah R. Civ. P. 59 and
60(b) pursuant to an abuse of discretion standard. We do not address rule 59, however,
as rule 59 was not argued by Bishop to the
trial court.
115 J M 28 As noted above, Bishop originally filed a motion with the trial court pursuant
to Utah R. Civ. P. 60(a) or (b) to amend the
jury verdict to correct a clerical error; alternatively, the motion asked the court to
amend the jury verdict pursuant to Utah R.
Civ. P. 59. In spite of the caption of the
motion referring to the alternative theory,
Bishop actually argued at the hearing on the
motion only for a correction of the jury verdict under rule 60. Further, Bishop's counsel orally conceded at the hearing that no
tenable basis for relief existed under rule 59.
"[I]t is the substance, not the labeling, of a
motion that is dispositive in determining the
character of the motion." Bair v. Axiom
Design, L.L.C.. 2001 UT 20, 11 9, 20 P.3d 388.
Thus, even though the motion was captioned
as either a rule 60 or a rule 59 motion, we
conclude that its substance requires us to
treat it as a rule 60 motion to correct a
clerical error.
11 29 Basing its ruling on Rosenlof v. Sullivan, 676 P.2d 372 (Utah 1983), which dealt
with a rule 59 motion for a new trial, the trial
court denied Bishop's motion and struck the
juror affidavits pursuant to rule 59. The
trial court did not state its grounds for denying Bishop's motion under rule 60, other than
explaining that it believed Bishop's motion
was substantively a motion to impeach the
jury verdict pursuant to rule 59. We dis-

agree with the trial judge's characterization
the substance of the motion and conclude
that Utah R. Civ. P. 60 is determinative, that
the affidavits were admissible, and that the
jury verdict should be amended to reflect the
true intent of the jury.
H 30 "The correction contemplated by rule
(30(a) must be undertaken for the purpose of
reflecting the actual intention of . . . the parties." Lindsay v. Atkin. 680 P.2d 401, 402
(Utah 1984). "[I]n this broad approach to
correctability under Rule 60(a), it matters
little whether an error was made by the
court clerk, the jury foreman, counsel, a party, or the judge himself, so long as it is
clearly a formal error that should be corrected in the interest of having judgment, order,
or other part of the record reflect what was
done or intended." Stanger v. Sentinel Sec.
Life Ins. Co., 669 P.2d 1201, 1206 (Utah 1983)
(quoting Jean F. Rydstrom, Annotation, Construction of Rule 60(a) of Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure Authorizing Coirection of
Clerical Mistakes in Judgements, Orders, or
other Parts of Record, and Errors Therein,
13 A.L.R. Fed. 794 (1972)).
0f

1131 Prior to the adoption of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure, we addressed the
issue of whether a trial court could correct a
jury verdict to reflect the true intent of the
jury. In Movlton v. Staats, 83 Utah 197, 27
P.2d 455 (1933), we allowed the trial court to
4.

5.

The court did not decide this issue as it was not
property before the c o u r t on appeal.

A split of a u t h o r i t y currently exists over whether a c o u r t c a n a d m i t evidence, including j u r o r
affidavits a n d testimony, to d e t e r m i n e w h e t h e r
the jury verdict reflects the true intent of the jury
and to c o r r e c t the j u r y verdict. Jurisdictions
admitting e v i d e n c e to correct a jury verdict include: United States v. Stauffer, 922 F.2d 508,
513 (9th Cir.1990) (criminal case); Karl v. Burlington N. R.R. Co., 880 F.2d 68, 73 (8th Cir.
1989) ( n a r r o w l y i n t e r p r e t i n g the clerical erroi
exception to apply to an e r r o r in transmission of
the jury verdict); East ridge Dev. Co. v. Halpert
Assoc."Inc.,
853 F.2d 772, 783 (10th Cir.1988);
Attndge v. Cencotp Div. of Dover Techs. Int'l, Inc..
836 F.2d 113, 116 (2d Cir.1987); Umphiey v.
Spiinkcl. 106 I d a h o 700, 682 P.2d 1247, 1254-55
U983), Latino v. Crane Rental Co., 417 Mass.
426. 630 N . E . 2 d 5 9 1 , 593 (1994); Moisakis v.
Allied Bldg. Prods. Corp., 265 A.D.2d 457, 697
N'.Y.S2d 100, 105-06 (1999) (noting that j u r o r
evidence c a n be used to, correct clerical errors,
but not to d e t e r m i n e the extent of j u r o r confu-

correct a jury verdict to reflect the true
intent of the jury. In Sunilwud Corp. v.
Radclitfe, 576 P.2d 847 (Utah 1978), Justice
Maughan argued that juror affidavits were
admissible "to demonstrate what verdict was
actually agreed upon." Id. at 850 (Maughan,
J., dissenting).1 Similarly we noted in
Brown v. Johnson, 24 Utah 2d 388, 472 P.2d
942 (1970), that "[w]hile jurors may not by
affidavit or otherwise impeach their verdict,
they may give proof to explain it." Id. at 946
n. 1 More recently, the Tenth Circuit Court
of Appeals has also determined that, under
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a jury
verdict may be corrected to reflect the true
intent of the jury. See East ridge Dev. Co. v.
Halpert Assocs., Inc., 853 F.2d 772, 783 (10th
Cir.1988).5
U 32 Bishop is not arguing in this case that
the mistake was a judicial error made in
rendering the judgment, but rather that the
error was clerical and was made by the jury
in "recording the judgment as rendered."
We agree that accurately recording the intent of the jury in its calculation of the
damage award constitutes correction of a
clerical error, not a judicial error. "The
distinction between judicial error and clerical
error . .. depends on whether it was made in
rendering the judgment or in recording the
judgment as rendered." Richards v. Siddosion r e g a i d i n g the verdict as r e n d e r e d ) ; Newpott
Fisherman's
Supply Co. v. Derecktor, 569 A.2d
1051, 1052-53 (R.I.1990); State v.
Williuuette,
190 Wis.2d 677, 526 N.W.2d 144, 151 (1995)
( c r i m i n a l case, but e x t e n d e d by the Wisconsin
S u p r e m e Court to both civil and criminal cases);
i>ee aLo 8 W i g m o r e , Evidence § 2355 (Chadb o u r n e rev. 1978) (discussing the admissibility of
e v i d e n c e to c o r r e c t a j u r y verdict); J.F. Ghent,
Annotation, Competency
of Juror's Statement
or
Affidavit to Show That Verdict in Civil Case Was
Not Correctly Recorded.
18 A . L . R J d 1132 § 3
(1968) (discussing cases that allow clerical e r r o r
exception).
J u r i s d i c t i o n s not a d m i t t i n g evidence to c o n e c t
a j u r y verdict include; Plummer
v.
Spungfield
Term" Ry., 5 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1993), Cyi v.
Michaud,
454 A.2d 1376, 1383-84 (Me. 1983);
McKinney
v. Smith, 63 N.M. 477, 322 P 2d 110,
111 (1958); see aLo J . F . Ghent, Annotation,
Competency
of Juror's Statement
or Affidavit
to
Show That Verdict in Civil Case Was Not Correct l\
Recorded, 18 A . L . R J d 1132, §§ 6-7 (1968) (disc u s s i n g cases that d o not allow clerical e r r o r
exception).
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ivay, 24 Utah 2d 314, 471 P.2d 143, 145 (1970)
(quoting 46 Am.Jur.2d Judgments § 202).
Accordingly, the juror affidavits should have
been admitted. On remand the jury verdict
should be corrected to reflect the true intent
of the jury by increasing the general and
special damages to $1,000,000 and $1,0(37,000
respectively, and then deducting Bishop's
percentage of fault as required by the LRA.
CONCLUSION
1133 We affirm the trial court's holding
that the LRA precludes the application of the
common law doctrine of respondeat superior;
the legislature has pre-empted the common
law. We reverse the trial court's determination on summary judgment that Valley Asphalt must indemnify GenTec for all liability.
Finally, we reverse the trial court's decision
to strike the juror affidavits and instruct the
court below to increase the general and special damages award to $1,000,000 and
$1,067,000 respectively, before deducting
Bishop's percentage of fault.
11 34 Justice DURRANT, Justice
WILKINS, and Judge BENCH concur in
Justice DURHAM'S opinion.
1135 Associate Chief Justice RUSSON
concurs in the result.
II 36 Having disqualified himself, Chief
Justice HOWE did not participate herein;
Court of Appeals Judge RUSSELL W.
BENCH sat.
Co

| KEY NUMBER SYSTEM >

First District Court, Brigham City, Ben H.
Hadlield, J., denied motion. Movant appealed. The Supreme Court held that: (1) indeterminate sentencing scheme did not violate
the separation of powers clause; (2) accomplice liability was not a per se violation of the
Eighth Amendment; and (3) movant could
not use motion as a vehicle to attack underlying conviction.
Affirmed.

1. Constitutional Law c=>80(2)
Sentencing and Punishment c=»1005
Indeterminate sentencing scheme was
valid as against claim that it violated the
separation of pow ers clause because it forced
the sentencing judge to pass on his ultimate
core judicial function of sentencing to the
Board of Pardons and Parole. Const. Ait. 5,
§ 1; U.C.A.1953, 77-18-4.

3. Sentencing and Punishment e=»2280
Claims under rule governing motion to
correct illegal sentence are not restricted by
time limits for bringing notice of appeal.
Rules Crim.Proc, Rule 22(e).

2002 UT51

STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
Travis E. TELFORD, Defendant
and Appellant.
No. 20000654.

4. Sentencing and Punishment o==2279
Claims under rule governing motion to
correct illegal sentence are not waived by
failure to raise them at the first opportunity
before the District Court. Rules Crim.Proc.,
Rule 22(e).

Supreme Court of Utah.
May 17, 2002.
Movant sought to correct murder sentence of five years to life imprisonment. The

t>. Sentencing and Punishment c»2254
Claims under rule governing motion to
correct illegal sentence must be narrowly
circumscribed to prevent abuse.
Rules
Crim-Proc-» ^ u ^ e 22(e).
7. Sentencing and Punishment c=»2250
Motion to correct sentence was not proper vehicle for movant to raise claim that
indeterminate sentencing scheme violated
Sixth Amendment, which only pertained to
rights of accused persons prior to conviction
and did not create any distinct rights related
to sentencing. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 6;
Const. Art. 1, § 12; U.C.A.1953, 77-18-4;
Rules Crim.Proc, Rule 22(e).
8. Sentencing and Punishment 0*2250
Movant could not use motion to correct
sentence as a means to attack underlying
murder conviction, which he attempted to do
by raising constitutional challenges to accomplice liability statute. U.C.A.1953, 76-2-202;
Rules Crim.Proc, Rule 22(e).

2. Sentencing and Punishment c==>1452
Accomplice liability is not a per se violation of the Eighth Amendment, as the accomplice liability statute requires accomplices to
have a comparable degree of culpability as
the principal in order to be convicted of the
same level of offense.
U.S.C.A. Const.
Amend. 8; Const. Art. 1, § 9; U.C.A.1953, 762-202.

5. Sentencing and Punishment <3=*2279
An illegal sentence is void and, like issues of jurisdiction, may be raised at any
time. Rules Crim.Proc, Rule 22(e).
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Cite as 48 P.3d 228 (Utah 2002)

Mark L. Shurtleff, Att'y Gen., Jeffrey T.
Colemere, Asst. Att'y Gen., Salt Lake City,
for plaintiff.
Travis E. Telford, pro se.
PER CURIAM.
111 Defendant Travis E. Telford was convicted of murder and received a sentence of
five years to life. The Board of Pardons and
Parole set his parole date in 2018. Telford
petitioned for extraordinary relief. The distinct court denied the petition, the court of
appeals affirmed, and this court declined to
review the court of appeals' decision on certiorari. See Telford v. Bd. of Pardons, 29
P.3d 1 (Utah 2001).
112 Telford then moved for correction of
his sentence under rule 22(e) of the Utah
Rule* of Criminal Procedure. The district
court denied Telford's motion, and this appeal followed. Telford attacks the constitutionality of Utah's indeterminate sentencing
scheme, section 77-18-4 of the Utah Code.
1- For instance, rule 22(c) may be employed to
coirect a sentence under encumstances where
the sentencing court had no jurisdiction, or to

He claims indeterminate sentencing "forces
the sentencing judge . . . to pass on his ultimate core judicial function of sentencing to
the Utah State Board of Pardons and Parole," in violation of article V, section 1 of the
Utah Constitution, the separation of powers
clause. Telford also maintains indeterminate
sentencing contravenes the Sixth and Eighth
Amendments to the United States Constitution, and article I, sections 9 and 12 of the
Utah Constitution. In particular, he maintains that because he was merely an accomplice to the murder, the State may not impose the same punishment on him as on his
co-perpetrator or, for that matter, any other
person who commits a crime classified as a
first degree felony. Although his brief is not
entirely clear on this issue, Telford appears
to attack indeterminate sentencing on both
per se and as applied grounds. We address
his arguments as follows.
[1J 11 3 This court has already addressed
and rejected the contention that Utah's indeterminate sentencing scheme violates the
separation of powers clause. See Padilla v.
Bd. of Pardons, 947 P.2d 664, 668-69 (Utah
1997). Telford has provided no basis for us
to depart from our established precedent.
We therefore reject his separation of powers
argument.
[2] U 4 To the extent Telford argues accomplice liability under section 76-2-202 of
the Utah Code is a per se violation of the
Eighth Amendment and article I, section 9 of
the Utah Constitution, his contentions likewise fail. The accomplice liability provision
requires the fact finder to determine that the
accomplice had the same mental state as the
person who directly committed the crime.
See Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-202. Because
the statute requires that accomplices bear a
comparable degree of culpability to be convicted of the same level of offense, Telford's
argument is meritless.
L3-6] 11 5 The balance of Telford's arguments are not properly raised under rule
22(e). The purpose of rule 22(e) is to allow
correction of manifestly illegal sentences.1
conect a sentence be\ond the authonzed statutory range See State ~v Babbel. 813 P 2d 86, 87
(Utah 1991)
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EXHIBIT 12

DAVID SLAGLE (A2975)
ROBERT R. HARRISON (A7878)
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
Attorneys for Defendant Ashley Valley Medical Center
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
Post Office Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Telephone: (801)521-9000
IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UINTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

LORI HAASE,
Plaintiff,

DEFENDANT'S PROPOSED JURY
INSTRUCTIONS AND SPECIAL
VERDICT

vs.
ASHLEY VALLEY MEDICAL
CENTER,

No. 98-0800377
Judge Douglas L. Cornaby

Defendant.

Defendant, Ashley Valley Medical Center, hereby requests that the Court instruct the
jury in accordance with proposed instructions numbered 1 through U , inclusive. Defendant
further requests that the Court submit the case to the jury on special verdict in accordance with
the form submitted herewith.
DATED this 2 / f day of February, 2002.
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU

David W.^lagle
(J
Robert R. Harrison
Attorneys for Defendant

INSTRUCTION NO.

>

It is my duty to instruct you in the law that applies to this case, and it is your duty, as
jurors, to follow the law as I state it to you, regardless of what you personally believe the law is
or ought to be. Even if you do not like the laws that must be applied, you must use them. On
the other hand, it is your exclusive duty to determine the facts in this case, and to consider and
weigh the evidence for that purpose.

Your responsibility must be exercised with sincere

judgment, sound discretion and honest deliberation.

INSTRUCTION NO.

^

In this case, the plaintiff alleges she was injured by a surgeon during an operation he
performed in 1996. Her claim against the surgeon, Dr. Thomas Hawkes, has been settled and his
negligence is not at issue in this trial. This trial is about what happened before her surgery.
The plaintiff claims that Ashley Valley Medical Center is responsible for her injury
because it allowed Dr. Hawkes to use its operating room facilities. Specifically, she claims Dr.
Hawkes made mistakes during the surgery; that the mistakes were made because he was impaired;
that the hospital administrators knew or should have known about his alleged impairment; and that
the hospital administrators were negligent in not taking away his privilege to use the operating
room.
The plaintiff must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Dr. Hawkes was
impaired when he performed her surgery; that he would not have caused her injury but for his
impairment; that the hospital failed to meet the standard for evaluating Dr. Hawkes; and that if
the standard were met, it would have chosen to take away his privileges. You will be required
to answer questions on the Verdict Form as to each of these issues. If you find that plaintiff has
not met her burden on each issue, by a preponderance of the evidence, you will answer each such
question "no."

INSTRUCTION NO.

Z

Whenever in these instructions it is stated that the burden, or the burden of proof, rests
upon a certain party to prove a certain allegation made by him, the meaning of such an instruction
is this: That unless the truth of that allegation is proved by a preponderance of the evidence, you
shall find that the same is not true. If the evidence is evenly balanced, as to its convincing force
on any allegation, you must find that such allegation has not been proved.

INSTRUCTION NO. J±
The party upon whom the burden of proof rests must sustain it by a preponderance of the
evidence. You should not base your verdict on speculation or conjecture as to negligence upon
the part of either party or as to the cause of the injury or as to damage claimed.
If the evidence does not preponderate in favor of the party making the claim of negligence,
proximate cause or damage, then that party has failed to fulfill his burden of proof and your
finding must be against that party on that issue.

INSTRUCTION NO.

*(

The term "preponderance of the evidence" means that evidence which, in your minds,
seems to be of the greater weight; the most convincing and satisfactory. The preponderance of
the evidence is not determined by the number of witnesses, nor the amount of the testimony, but
by the convincing character of the testimony, weighed impartially, fairly and honestly by you.
If the evidence is evenly balanced as to its convincing force on any allegation, you must find that
such allegation has not been proved.

INSTRUCTION NO.

io

This case must not be decided for or against anyone because you feel sorry for anyone or
angry at anyone. It is your sworn duty to decide this case based on the facts and the law, without
regard to sympathy, passion or prejudice.

INSTRUCTION NO.

"7

This case must be decided only upon the evidence which you have heard from the
witnesses, and have seen in the form of documents, photographs or other tangible things admitted
into evidence.
Anything you may have seen or heard from any other source may not be considered by you
in arriving at your verdict.
You should not consider as evidence any statement of the lawyers made during trial.

INSTRUCTION NO.

£

Remember, the lawyers are not on trial. Your feelings about them should not influence
your decision in this case. The lawyers are here to represent the best interests of their clients. It
is the duty of the lawyer on each side of a case to object when the other side offers evidence which
the lawyer believes is not admissible. You should not speculate as to the reasons for the
objections, nor should you allow yourself to become angry at a party because a party's lawyer has
made objections.

INSTRUCTION NO.

Q

Your verdict must be based solely and exclusively upon the evidence in this case and upon
the instructions outlining the law as given to you by the Court. You should not be influenced by
preconceived opinions or prejudices or by sympathy or any other motive except to do justice
between the parties to this case. You should not allow any sympathy which you may have for the
Plaintiff to influence you in any degree whatsoever in arriving at your verdict. This does not
mean that you may not sympathize with the Plaintiff, because it is only natural and human to
sympathize with persons who have sustained misfortune, but you are instructed that you must not
permit your feelings of sympathy to influence a fair and impartial consideration of the evidence.
Further, you are not permitted to base your verdict on speculation, guesswork or
conjecture, nor upon what you think ought to be the law or the facts in this case.

INSTRUCTION NO.

^

You are the exclusive judges of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight of the
evidence. In judging the weight of the testimony and credibility of the witnesses, you have a right
to take into consideration any biases, any interest in the result, and any motive or lack of motive
to testify fairly.

You may consider the witnesses' conduct while testifying before you, the

reasonableness of their statements, their apparent frankness or candor, or the want of it, their
opportunity to know, their ability to understand, and their capacity to remember. You should
consider these matters you believe have a bearing on the truthfulness or accuracy of the witnesses'
statements.

INSTRUCTION NO.

'f

In resolving any conflict that may exist in the testimony of medical experts, you may
compare and weigh the opinion of one expert against that of another. In doing this, you may
consider the relative qualifications and credibility of the expert witnesses, as well as the reasons
for each opinion and the facts and other matters on which such opinions are based.

INSTRUCTION NO.

\1s

An opinion is the expression of a conclusion or judgment which does not purport to be
based on actual knowledge. In determining whether a particular statement was a statement of fact
or merely an expression of opinion, you may consider the surrounding circumstances under which
it was made, the manner in which the statement was made and the ordinary effect of the words
used. You may also consider the relationship of the parties and the subject matter with which the
statement was concerned.

INSTRUCTION NO.

/3

The rules of evidence ordinarily do not permit the opinions of a witness to be received as
evidence. An exception to this rule exists in the case of expert witnesses. Witnesses who, by
education, study and experience, have become expert in some art, science, profession or calling,
may state opinions as to any such matter in which that witness is qualified as an expert, so long
as it is material and relevant to the case. You should consider such expert opinion and the
reasons, if any, given for it. You are not bound by such an opinion. Give it the weight you think
it deserves. If you should decide that the opinions of an expert witness are not based upon
sufficient education and experience, or if you should conclude that the reasons given in support
of the opinions are not sound, or that such opinions are outweighed by other evidence, you may
disregard the opinion entirely.

INSTRUCTION NO.

H

A proximate cause of an injury is that cause which, in natural and continuous sequence,
produces the injury and without which the injury would not have occurred. A proximate cause
is one which sets in operation the factors that accomplish the injury. Expert testimony is required
to show proximate cause in a claim of negligent credentialing.

INSTRUCTION NO-

h

On the Special Verdict, which requires you to answer specific questions, you will see that
question number four asks you to find from a preponderance of the evidence, whether the hospital,
through its administrators, was negligent in not restricting Dr. Thomas Hawkes' operating room
privileges. In order to answer this question, if it becomes necessary to do so, you will have to
decide whether the hospital acted below the appropriate standard of care. To do so would be
negligence.
The only way you may properly learn the applicable standard of care is through evidence
presented during this trial by individuals testifying as expert witnesses and through other evidence
admitted for the purpose of defining the standard of care.
In deciding whether a hospital properly fulfilled its duties, you are not permitted to use a
standard derived from your own experience with physicians, hospitals or any other standard of
your own.

INSTRUCTION NO.

/^

The fact that, for purposes of this suit, the hospital has stipulated that Dr. Thomas Hawkes
was negligent during the operation that he performed on Lori Haase, should not be taken by you
as any proof or indication that the hospital was negligent. As you have been told elsewhere in
these instructions, the claims against the hospital are separate and distinct from the issues
concerning whether Dr. Hawkes was or was not negligent.

INSTRUCTION NO.

H

You must determine whether Defendant complied with the standards of care applicable to
it based upon the information available to it prior to the Plaintiffs surgery, rather than on the
basis of facts which are revealed by later developments.

INSTRUCTION NO. JE
The Plaintiff bears the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, which
evidence must include expert testimony, that the hospital's negligence, if any, more likely than
not caused the injury or loss of which the Plaintiff complains.

INSTRUCTION NO.

!

*

Plaintiff is not entitled to your verdict merely by showing, by a preponderance of the
evidence, that a defendant failed to conform to the standard of care elsewhere defined in these
Instructions. Plaintiff must also prove, by a preponderance of expert medical testimony, that the
injury or loss of which he complains would not have occurred if Ashley Valley Medical Center
had conformed to the standard of care. In this connection, it is not enough for Plaintiff to have
shown that the result might have been different, or that there is a possibility that the result would
have been different, had a defendant conformed to the standard of care. In other words, unless
Plaintiff has proved, by a preponderance of the expert medical testimony, that the result probably
would have been different if the Hospital had conformed to the standard of care as defined in these
Instructions, then Plaintiff has not proved that any injury or loss sustained by her was proximately
caused by the conduct of the Defendant.

INSTRUCTION NO.

^

On the Special Verdict which will be submitted to you, you will find that question number
five deals with the issue of damages. The following instruction is given to you to help answer that
question, if it becomes necessary for you to do so.
A party who is injured as a proximate cause of negligence of another party is entitled to
a monetary award which will fairly and adequately compensate the injured party for the injury and
damage sustained.

The plaintiff in this case has the burden of proving her damage by a

preponderance of the evidence. You are not permitted to award damages for detriment which,
although possible, are remote or based on conjecture or speculation.
Further, the fact that I have instructed you on the issue of damages is not to be taken as
an indication that I either believe or do not believe that the Plaintiff is entitled to damages.
With that in mind, there are two kinds of damage:

Special Damage:
Special damages are those that are alleged to have been sustained in reference to the special
circumstances of the plaintiff. They include the reasonable value of medical and nursing care,
both medical and non-medical services and supplies and tools reasonably required and actually
given in the treatment and/or care of the plaintiff and the reasonable value of such items that more
probably than not will be required and given in the future.
Special damages also include lost earnings and loss of future earning capacity or loss of
earning power.
In awarding special damages, you may consider the reasonable value of working time lost
to date. In determining this amount, you should consider (1) evidence of the plaintiffs earning

capacity; (2) earnings; (3) how the plaintiff ordinarily was occupied; and (4) what the plaintiff was
reasonably likely to have earned in the time lost if the plaintiff has not been injured.
If you find the plaintiff has suffered a loss of earning capacity, you should award the
present case value of earning capacity reasonably likely to be lost in the future as a result of the
injury in question.
Special damages also include the reasonable value of the loss of employee-related benefits,
such as loss of or reduction in retirement benefits, health benefits, paid vacation, employee stock
options and savings benefits and the like.
General Damages:
In awarding damages, you may consider any pain, discomfort, and suffering, both mental
and physical, its probable duration and severity, and the extent to which the plaintiff has been
prevented from pursuing the ordinary affairs of life as previously enjoyed. You may also consider
whether any of the above will, more likely than not, continue in the future. If so, you may award
such damages as will fairly and justly compensate the plaintiff for them.
No definite standard or method of calculation is prescribed by law to fix reasonable
compensation for pain and suffering. Nor is the opinion of any witness required as to the amount
of such reasonable compensation. Furthermore, the argument of counsel as to the amount of
damages is not evidence of reasonable compensation. In making an award for pain and suffering,
you shall exercise your authority with calm and reasonable judgment, and the damages you fix
shall be just and reasonable in light of the evidence.

INSTRUCTION NO- 1 \
The law forbids you to decide any issue in this case by resorting to chance. If you decide
that a party is entitled to recover, you may then determine the amount of damages to be awarded.
It would be unlawful for you to agree in advance to take the independent estimate of each juror,
then total the estimates, draw an average from the total, and to make the average the amount of
your award. Each of you may express your own independent judgment as to what the amount
should be. It is your duty to thoughtfully consider the amounts suggested, test them in the light
of the law and the evidence and, after due consideration, determine which, if any, of such
individual estimates is proper.

INSTRUCTION NO.
In this case you may not include in any award to Plaintiff any sum for the purpose of
punishing the Defendant, or to make an example of it for the public good or to prevent other
injuries. Such damages would be punitive rather than compensatory, and the law does not
authorize punitive damages in this action.

INSTRUCTION NO. 2^>
The amount of damages for any loss to be suffered in the future would not be the present
payment of the total of such damages, but must be discounted to the present cash value of such
future benefit. Therefore, in determining the present value of any future benefit lost to the
Plaintiff as a result of the injury, you should calculate the same on the basis that any sum you
might award will be invested with reasonable wisdom and frugality, and that all of it, except the
amount currently needed to compensate for the loss sustained, will be kept so invested as to yield
a rate of return consistent with reasonable security.

INSTRUCTION NO.
It has never been my intention to give any hint that you should return one verdict or
another in this case. Please understand that I do not wish in any way to influence your verdict.
It would be improper for me to do so. Deciding a proper verdict is exclusively your job. I cannot
participate in that decision in any way. Please disregard anything that I may have said or done
if it made you think that I preferred one side over another, that I believed one witness over
another, or that I considered any piece of evidence more important than another.
You are the exclusive judges of the facts and the evidence. It is your duty to render a just
verdict based upon the facts and the evidence.

INSTRUCTION NO.
Your attitude and conduct at the outset of your deliberations is very important. It will not
be productive for any of you, upon entering the jury room, to make an emphatic expression of
your opinion on the case, or to announce a determination to stand for a certain verdict. When that
happens, your sense of pride may be aroused and you may hesitate to recede from an announced
position, even if shown that it is wrong. Remember that you are not partisans or advocates in this
matter, but are judges.

Your deliberations in the jury room are for the ascertainment and

declaration of the truth and the administration of justice.

INSTRUCTION NO.

^

It is your duty to make findings of fact as to the questions I will submit to you. In making
your findings of fact, you should bear in mind that the burden of proving any disputed fact rests
upon the party claiming the fact to be true, and that fact must be proved by a preponderance of
the evidence.
This is a civil action and six members of the jury may find and return a verdict. At least
six jurors must agree on the answer to each question, but they need not be the same six on each
question. As soon as six or more of you have agreed on the answer to each question, have the
verdict signed and dated by your foreperson and then return it to this room.

INSTRUCTION NO.
Upon retiring to the jury room you will select one of you to act as foreperson, who will
preside over your deliberations and sign the verdict to which you agree. The foreperson should
not dominate the jury, but the foreperson's opinion should be given the same weight as the
opinions of the other members of the jury.

IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UINTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

LORIHAASE,
SPECIAL VERDICT
Plaintiff,
vs.

No. 98-0800377

ASHLEY VALLEY MEDICAL CENTER,

Judge Douglas L. Cornaby

Defendant.

We, the jurors empaneled in the above-entitled case, answer the questions put to us as
follows:
1.

Do youfindfroma preponderance of the evidence that Dr Thomas Hawkes was

physically impaired at the time he operated on Lori Haase9
Yes
No

If you answered question number 1 "no" then do not answer the
following questions. Have your foreperson sign the verdict and return to
the courtroom.
2.

Do voufindfrom a preponderance of the evidence that Dr. Thomas Hawkes' physical

impairment was a proximate cause of injury to Lori Haase9
Yes
No

If you answered question number 2 "no" then do not answer the
remaining questions. Have your foreperson sign the verdict and return
to the courtroom.
3.

Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that Ashley Valley Medical Center,

through its administrators, knew or should have known that Dr. Thomas Hawkes was physically
impaired at the time he operated on Lori Haase?
Yes
No

If you answered question number 3 "no" then do not answer the
remaining questions. Have your foreperson sign the verdict and return
to the courtroom.
4.

Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that Ashley Valley Medical Center,

acting through its administrators, was negligent in not restricting Dr. Hawkes" operating privileges at
the time he operated on Lori Haase?
Yes
No

If, and only if, you answered questions numbered 1 through 4
"yes," then answer the following question.

-2-

5.

What sum of money do you find from a preponderance of the evidence will fairly and

adequately compensate Lori Haase for her injuries:
Special damages

$

General damages

$

TOTAL

DATED this

$

day of February, 2002.

Jury Foreperson
N:\10749\151\MN\SPECVERD.DWS

-3-

ROBERT R. HARRISON (A7878)
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
Attorneys for Defendant Ashley Valley Medical Center
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
Post Office Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Telephone: (801) 521-9000

IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UINTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

LORI HAASE,
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
Plaintiff,
vs.

No. 98-0800377
ASHLEY VALLEY MEDICAL CENTER
and COLUMBIA ASHLEY VALLEY
MEDICAL CENTER and JOHN DOE
DEFENDANTS 1 THROUGH 10,

Judge Boyd Bunnell

Defendants.

Pursuant to Rule 4-502, Code of Judicial Administration, Robert R. Harrison of Snow,
Chnstensen & Martineau, attorneys for Defendant Ashley Valley Medical Center, hereby cenifies
that he served upon all counsel of record the following:
DEFENDANT'S PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS AND SPECIAL
VERDICT and SPECIAL VERDICT.

DATED this

/

day of March, 2002.
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU

<d^^^-t^r^3 <pbwi^'>~\
Robert R. Harrison
Attorneys for Defendants

-2-

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I state that I am employed by the law offices of Snow, Christensen & Martineau,
attorneys for defendants herein; that I served the attached CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE (Case
Number 98-0800377, Eighth Judicial District Court in and for Uintah County) upon the parties
listed below by placing a true and correct copy thereof in an envelope addressed to:
Douglas G. Mortensen
Matheson, Mortensen, Olsen & Jeppson
Attorneys for Plaintiff
648 East 100 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Honorable Douglas L Cornaby (Original and one copy)
3612 North 2900 East
Layton, Utah 84040
and causing the same to be hand delivered on the /

N \10749\151\CERTSERV.WPD
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day of March, 2002.

Tab 13

EXHIBIT 13

Douglas G. Mortensen, USB #2329
MATHESON, MORTENSEN, OLSEN & JEPPSON, P.C.
648 East 100 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Telephone (801)363-2244
Attorneys for Plaintiff
IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
OF UINTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

LORI HAASE,
Plaintiff,

PLAINTIFF'S SUBMISSION
OF PROPOSED JURY
INSTRUCTIONS

vs.
ASHLEY VALLEY MEDICAL CENTER
AND COLUMBIA ASHLEY VALLEY
MEDICAL CENTER, AND JOHN DOE
DEFENDANTS 1 THROUGH 10

Civil No. 98-0800377
Judge Douglas L. Cornaby

Defendants.
Plaintiff Lori Haase submits to the court the attached proposed jury
instruction to be submitted to the jury. Plaintiff asks leave to reserve the right to submit
additional instructions and/or withdraw instruction she has submitted based on the
actual evidence presented at trial.

z

DATED this _[_ day of February, 2002.

JEPPSON, P.C.
Attorneys

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
certify that on the
day of February, 2002 I caused to be served via the method
indicated a copy of the foregoing to the following:

Robert R. Harrison
Snow, Christensen & Martineau
10 Exchange Place, 11 th Floor
P.O. Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145

•

U.S. Mail
Facsimile - 363-0400
Hand-Delivered
Federal Express

Jaryl L. Renctorer
EppersopK&lRencher
5th Floor Crandall Building
IpyWest 100 South
£alt Lake City, Utah 84111-1566

/

U.S. Mail
Facsimile - 983-9808
Hand-Delivered
Federal Express

Honorable Douglas L. Cornaby
Eighth District Court Judge
3612 North 2900 East
Layton, UT 84040

•

•
D
•
D

•
•

D

•
•
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U.S. Mail
Facsimile
Hand-Delivered
Federal Express

Lori L i m a /
AssistaXAttomey General
16CT£ast 300 South
P/5. Box 140872
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0872

/

•
•D

U.S. Mail
Facsimile
Hand-Delivered
Federal Express

A
Haase\AshleyValley.PldgJury instructions

-3-

^'

V

INSTRUCTION NO.
CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES
You are the exclusive judges of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight of the
evidence. In judging the weight of the testimony and credibility of the witnesses, you have a right
to take into consideration any biases, any interest in the result, and any motive or lack of motive
to testify fairly. You may consider the witnesses' conduct while testifying before you, the
reasonableness of their statements, their apparent frankness or candor, or the want of it, their
opportunity to know, their ability to understand, and their capacity to remember. You should
consider these matters you believe have a bearing on the truthfulness or accuracy of the
witnesses' statements.
References:
MUJI 2.9

INSTRUCTION NO.
INCONSISTENT STATEMENTS
You may believe that a witness, on some former occasion, made statements inconsistent
with that witness' testimony given here in this case.
That does not necessarily mean that you are required to entirely disregard the present
testimony. The effect of such evidence upon the credibility of the witness is for you to determine.
References:
MUJI2.10

INSTRUCTION NO-

EFFECT OF WILLFULLY FALSE TESTIMONY
If you believe any witness has willfully testified falsely as to any material matter, you may
disregard the entire testimony of that witness, except as that witness may have been
corroborated by other credible evidence.
References:
MUJI2.11

INSTRUCTION NO.
DEPOSITION TESTIMONY
In the present action, certain testimony has been read to you by way of deposition. You
are not to discount this testimony for the sole reason that it comes to you in the form of a
deposition. It is entitled to the same consideration as if the witness had personally appeared.
References:
MUJI2.12

INSTRUCTION NO.
OUT OF STATE/TOWN EXPERTS
The fact that an expert witness resides or pursues his or her profession in
another state or community should not effect the weight you give that witnesses1
testimony. A party may rely upon qualified experts from other states and countries in
presenting evidence to the jury.

MUJI 6.30

INSTRUCTION NO.
CONFLICT BETWEEN MEDICAL EXPERTS
In resolving any conflict that may exist in the testimony of medical experts, you
may compare and weigh the opinion of one expert against that of another. In doing
this, you may consider the relative qualifications and credibility of the expert witnesses,
as well as the reasons for each opinion and the facts and other matters on which
opinions are based.

MUJI 6.31

INSTRUCTION NO.
INTRODUCTORY INSTRUCTION ON NEGLIGENCE
In this case the plaintiff claims the defendant was negligent in failing to protect
her from injury by Dr. Hawkes. In particular, the plaintiff claims that the defendant
negligently extended hospital operating room privileges to Dr. Hawkes and/or failed to
exercise reasonable care in seeing that patients treated by Dr. Hawkes at the hospital
received appropriate care and treatment from a competent, non impaired surgeon. The
plaintiff asserts that the defendant knew or should have known that at the time Dr.
Hawkes performed surgery on her he was not in a fit condition to perform that surgery
and that the injury inflicted during that surgery and the damages flowing therefrom
would not have occurred but for the negligent, reckless or otherwise wrongful acts and
omissions of Columbia Ashley Valley Medical Center in extending hospital operating
room privileges to Dr. Hawkes and/or in otherwise failing to exercise reasonable care to
see that patients treated by him received appropriate surgical care and treatment.
To return a verdict for the plaintiff, you must find by a preponderance of the
evidence that:
1.

The defendant was negligent in one or more of the particulars alleged by
the plaintiff; and

2.

The defendant's negligence was a proximate cause of the plaintiff's
injuries.

If you find in favor of the plaintiff on those two questions, you must then decide
the amount of the damages suffered by the plaintiff.
MUJI 3.1; See also JIFU 2.5 (1957)
INSTRUCTION NO.

RIGHT TO RECOVER FOR NEGLIGENT CONDUCT
A hospital has a duty to use reasonable care to protect patients being treated at
the hospital from injury. "Negligence" simply means the failure to use reasonable care.
The amount of care that is considered "reasonable" depends on the situation.
You must decide what a prudent hospital with similar knowledge and/or with access to
information available here would do in a similar situation. Negligence may arise in
acting or in failing to act.
A party whose injuries or damages are caused by another party's negligent
conduct may recover compensation from the negligent party for those injuries or
damages.

MUJI 3.2
INSTRUCTION NO.

AMOUNT OF CARE REQUIRED VARIES WITH CONDITIONS
The amount of care that is considered "reasonable" depends on the situation.
Some situations require more caution because an institution of ordinary prudence
would understand that more danger is involved. In other situations, less care is
expected, such as when the risk of danger is low or when the situation happens so
suddenly that a person of ordinary prudence would not appreciate the danger.

MUJI 3.6

INSTRUCTION NO.
AMOUNT OF CAUTION REQUIRED FOR DANGEROUS ACTIVITIES
Because of the great danger involved in human surgery, those who are engaged
in providing facilities for such surgery are held to a higher-than-ordinary standard of
care and must exercise extra caution for the protection of patients undergoing surgery.
The greater the danger, the greater the care that must be used.

MUJI 3.8

INSTRUCTION NO.
ROLE OF CUSTOM IN JUDGING BEHAVIOR
When deciding whether a corporation is negligent, you may consider customs of
behavior, such as business customs or industry customs, However, following a custom
does not necessarily mean a corporation exercised ordinary care. It is merely a factor
you may consider. A custom or standard may be negligent in and of itself.

MUJI3..10

INSTRUCTION NO.
VIOLATION OF INDUSTRY STANDARD
A violation of an industry standard intended to protect patients from harm is
evidence of negligence if it is shown that:
1.

The person injured belongs to a class of people the standard intended to
protect; and

2.

The standard intended to protect against the type of harm which in fact
occurred as a result of the violation.

MUJI3.11

INSTRUCTION NO.
NEGLIGENCE OF COMMISSION VERSUS OMISSION
Negligence is of two kinds. The first kind is the doing of something that an
ordinarily careful and prudent person or, in this case, hospital, would not have done
under the same or similar circumstances; the second kind is the omission to do
something than an ordinarily careful and prudent person or, in this case, hospital, would
have done in the same situation.

INSTRUCTION NO.
NON NEGLIGENCE OF PLAINTIFF
You are instructed as a matter of law that the plaintiff, Lori Haase, was not
negligent.

INSTRUCTION NO.
DUTY OF HOSPITAL TO COMPLY WITH STANDARD OF CARE
A hospital is required to exercise the same degree of care ordinarily possessed
and used by other hospitals in good standing. The law requires a hospital to exercise
the degree of care that other qualified hospitals would ordinarily exercise under the
same circumstances.

MUJI 6.1

INSTRUCTION NO.
DUTY OF HOSPITAL TOWARD PATIENT
It is the duty of a hospital toward a person received as a patient to use
reasonable care in the selection of both its employees and its staff physicians and
surgeons and in otherwise providing for the needs of the patient.
If the hospital undertakes, through the agency of any person in its employ, to
provide to the patient the services of a surgeon, the hospital's duty is to perform such
services in accordance with the standard of care required by law of such surgeon.

MUJI 6.20

INSTRUCTION NO.
CORPORATION'S LIABILITY FOR ITS EMPLOYEES'
NEGLIGENCE AND BREACH OF DUTY OF CARE
In this case, Columbia Ashley Valley Medical Center leased certain employees to
Dr. Hawkes. While those employees were performing services for the benefit of Dr.
Hawkes and his medical practice, they remained employees of Columbia Ashley Valley
Medical Center. If you find that any such employee breached a duty to act in the best
interests of patients of Columbia Ashley Valley Hospital, either by acting or failing to act,
such breach of duty is imputed to the medical center itself. Columbia Ashley Valley
Medical Center is liable for the acts and omissions of its employees under the Doctrine
of Respondeat Superior, including the employees it leased to Dr. Hawkes.

MUJI 25.7

INSTRUCTION NO.
CORPORATION ACTS THROUGH ITS AGENTS

Columbia Ashley Valley Medical Center is a corporation and, as such, can act
only through its officers and employees, and others designated by it as its agents.
Any act or omission of an officer, employee or agent of a corporation, in the
performance of the duties or within the scope of the authority of the officer, employee or
agent, is the act or omission of the corporation.

MUJI 25.1

INSTRUCTION NO.
LIABILITY OF PRINCIPAL FOR ACTS OF AGENT
The acts or omissions of an agent are, in contemplation of law, the acts and
omissions of the agent's principal, so long as they are done within the scope of the
agent's employment. If, therefore, an employee of Columbia Ashley Valley Medical
Center was acting within the scope of his or her employment at the time the events in
question occurred, then Columbia Ashley Valley Medical Center is responsible for such
conduct.

J1FU 10.1 cf BAJI 54-A See CJS 11.82 Agency, Section 91

INSTRUCTION NO.
SCOPE OF AGENTS AUTHORITY DEFINED
In order for Columbia Ashley Valley Medical Center to be held responsible for the
act or acts of one or more of its employees, the act or acts must be within the scope of
the agent's employment authority either expressed or implied. However, it is not
necessary that the specific act, or failure to act, be expressly authorized by the
employer to bring it within the scope of the agent's employment. An act is within the
scope of an agent's authority

INSTRUCTION NO.
SCOPE OF AGENT'S AUTHORITY DEFINED
In order for Columbia Ashley Valley Medical Center to be held responsible for the
act or acts of one or more of its employees, the act or acts must be within the scope of
the agent's employment authority either expressed or implied. However, it is not
necessary that the specific act, or failure to act, be expressly authorized by the
employer to bring it within the scope of the agent's employment. An act is within the
scope of an agent's authority if it is done while the agent is doing anything which his or
her contract of employment expressly or impliedly authorizes him or her to do or which
would be reasonably incidental to his or her employment.

JIFU 10.2

INSTRUCTION NO.
AGENCY ESTABLISHED
It has been established that Ron Perry, Sherry Stettler and

,

,

, were acting as agents for Columbia Ashley Valley Medical Center and
within the scope of their employment at the time the events in question occurred. If you
find, therefore, that any alleged act or omission of any of these persons occurred, such
act or omission is attributable or chargeable to the employer, Columbia Ashley Valley
Medical Center.

JIFU 10.3

SCOPE OF EMPLOYMENT
INSTRUCTION NO.

_

Scope of employment refers to those acts which are so closely connected with
what the employee is employed to do, and so fairly and reasonably incidental to it, that
they may be regarded as methods, even though quite improper ones, of carrying out
the objectives of the employment. In general, the servant or employee's conduct is
within the scope of/her employment if it is of the kind of whicfy^she is employed to
perform, occurs substantially within the authorized limits of time and space, and is
actuated, at least in part, by a purpose to serve the employer.

References:
Burknerv. Salt Lake County, 771 P.2d 1053 (Utah 1989);
W. Keetori, Prosser & Keeton On The Law of Torts Section 70, at 502 (5th
Edition 1984);
Restatement (Second) of Agency Section 228

INSTRUCTION NO.

SCOPE OF EMPLOYMENT

An employer is liable for the act or omission of its employee when the employee
is acting within the scope of the employee's employment authority at the time of the act
or omission. An employee is acting within the scope of the employee's employment
authority if each of the following is true:
1.

The employee is engaged in conduct of the general kind the employee
was employed to perform; in other words, the employee was engaged in
carrying out the duties assigned by the employer, as opposed to being
wholly involved in a personal endeavor; and

2.

The employee's conduct occurs within working hours, and within the
normal work place; and

3.

The employee's conduct was motivated, at least in part, by the purpose of
serving the employer's interest.

If you find that, at the time of the act or omission in question, the employee
deviated from the employer's express or implied orders or wishes or attended to
business other than that of the employer, but was serving the employer's interests at
the same time, the employee was acting in the scope or course of employment and the
employer shall be held liable for the acts or omissions of the employee.

MUJI 25.6

INSTRUCTION NO.
LIABILITY FOR PHYSICIAN PREDICATED ON LACK OF SUPERVISION
A hospital owes to its patients a duty, irrespective of whether the physician who
treated the patient was its employee or agent or was an independent contractor, to
review, monitor and supervise the care and treatment administered within its facility. If
you find from the evidence that Columbia Ashley Valley Medical Center deviated from
the standards of care required of it in the performance of this duty and that the injury to
Mrs. Haase resulted from such breach of duty, you must find the hospital liable.

Kellevv.Wiqgin. 724 SW2nd 443 (Ark. 1987); Traxler v. Varadv. 12 Cal App. 4th 1321,
16 Cal Rptr 2d 297 (1993); Camacho v. Mennonite Bd of Missions. 703 P2d 598 (Colo.
1985); Cronicv. Doud. 523 NE 2d 176 (III. 1988); Yanev v. McCrav Mem. HOSD. 496
NE2d 135 (Ind. App. 1986); Siblev v. Board of Supervisors of Louisana State Univ.. 446
S2d 760 (LA. App. 1983); Oehler v. Humana. Inc.. 775 P2d 1271 (Nev. 1989); Marek v.
Professional Health Services. Inc.. 432 Atl 2d 538 (NJ. Super. 1981); Schoenina v.
Gravs Harbor Community HOSP.. 698 P2d 593 (Wash. 1985).

INSTRUCTION NO.
LIABILITY FOR PHYSICIAN PREDICATED ON NEGLIGENCE
IN EXTENDING AND/OR CONTINUING STAFF PRIVILEGES
The law requires a hospital to screen its medical staff to ensure that only
competent physicians are permitted to treat its patients. If, therefore, you find from the
evidence that Columbia Ashley Valley Medical Center knew or ought to have known
that Dr. Hawkes' condition or propensities made him a danger to patients and that but
for Ashley Valley's failure to remove him, failure to adequately monitor and supervise
him or failure to cease extending him privileges to operate in the hospital Mrs. Haase's
injury would have not occurred, you must find for the plaintiff against the hospital.

Townsend v. Kiracoff. 545 F. Supp. 465 (D. Colo. 1982); Focke v. U.S.. 597 F. Supp.
1325 (D. Kan. 1982); Jackson v. Power. 743 P2d 1376 (Alaska 1987); Ziealerv.
Superior Court of Pima County. 656 P2d 1251 (Ariz. 1982); Park North General
Hospital v. Hickman. 705 SW2d 262 (Texas App. 1985); Alexander v. Gonser. 711 P2d
347 (Wash. 1985); Greenwood v. Wierdsma. 741 P2d 1079 (Wyo. 1987).

INSTRUCTION NO.

LIABILITY FOR PHYSICIAN PREDICATED ON OSTENSIBLE AGENCY
In this action there is evidence tending to show that Dr. Hawkes was not an
employee of Columbia Ashley Valley Medical Center but was an independent
contractor. Should you determine this to have been so, if you find from the evidence
that the hospital held itself out to the public as an institution furnishing doctors, staff and
facilities for the care of the public, and that Mrs. Haase undertook treatment by Dr.
Hawkes by reason of reasonable reliance of such a holding out, your verdict on the
question of liability for any resulting injury should be for the plaintiff against the hospital.

Jackson v. Power, 743 P2d 1376 (Alaska 1987); Gilbert v. Sycamore Mun. Hosp.. 622
NE 2d 788 (III. 1993); Golden v. Kishwaukee Community Health Services Center. 645
NE2d 319 (III. App. 1994); Adamski v. Tacoma General Hospital. 579 P2d 970 (Wash.

INTRODUCTORY INSTRUCTION ON PROXIMATE CAUSE

In my introductory statement to you on the concept of negligence, you will recall
that I informed you that in order for any party to prevail on a claim of negligence against
another party, that party must prove that the other party's negligence was a proximate
cause of the injury complained of. I will now explain to you the concept of proximate
cause.
A proximate cause of an injury is that cause which, in natural and continuance
sequence, produces the injury and without which the injury would not have occurred. A
proximate cause is one which sets in operation the factors that accomplish the injury.

References:
MUJI 3.13 (1993) (Modified by adding 1st paragraph to connect Causation to
Negligence)

Proximate Cause Established by Negligence
Which Increases Risk of Harm

Instruction No.

Proximate cause may be established by evidence that the negligence of a party
was a substantial factor in bringing about the injury or in increasing the risk of harm
to the plaintiff.

References:
George v. LDS Hospital, 797 P2d 1117 (Ut App 1990)
Restatement (Second) of Torts, Section 323

INSTRUCTION NO.
CONCURRENT PROXIMATE CAUSES
There may be more than one proximate cause of the same injury. If the
negligence a person and a corporation combines to produce an injury, and the
negligence of each of them is a proximate cause of the injury, then the person and the
corporation must share liability for the resulting injury, in proportion to their individual
negligence.

MUJI3.15

INSTRUCTION NO.
RES IPSA LOQUITUR
You may draw an inference of negligence on the part of a physician or hospital if
each of three elements is established by a preponderance of the evidence:
1.

That the patient's injury was of a kind which, in the ordinary course of
events, would not have happened had due care been observed; and

2.

That the patient's actions were not responsible for the injury; and

3.

That the cause of the injury was under the exclusive management or
control of the physician or hospital.

If you find each of the foregoing elements by a preponderance of the evidence,
then negligence on the part of the physician or hospital may be inferred and would be
sufficient to support a finding of negligence. The defendant may introduce evidence to
rebut the inference of negligence. It is your duty to resolve conflicts in the evidence.

MUJI 6.32

INSTRUCTION NO.
PROXIMATE CAUSE
A proximate cause of an injury is that cause which, in natural and continuous
sequence, produces the injury and without which the injury would not have occurred. A
proximate cause is one which sets in operation the factors that accomplish the injury.
To find "proximate cause," you must first find a cause and effect relationship
between the negligence and plaintiff's injury. But cause and effect alone is not enough.
For injuries to be proximately caused by negligence, two other factors must be present:
1.

The negligence must have played a substantial role in causing the
injuries; and

2.

A reasonable person could foresee that injury could result from the
negligent behavior.

MUJI 3.13 and 3.14, combined and modified

INSTRUCTION NO.
RES IPSA LOQUITUR

y
X

You may draw an inference of negligence on the pa^of a physician or hospital if
each of three elements is established by a preponderance of the evidence:
1.

That the patient's injury was of a kirfd which, in the ordinary course of
events, would not have happened had due care been observed; and

2.

That the patient's action^were not responsible for the injury; and

3.

That the cause of thpinjury was under the exclusive management or
control of the physician or hospital.

If you find each of tbre foregoing elements by a preponderance of the evidence,
then negligence on theypart of the physician or hospital may be inferred and would be
sufficient to support^ finding of negligence. The defendant may introduce evidence to
/

rebut the inference of negligence. It is your duty to resolve conflicts in the evidence.

MUJI 6.32

INSTRUCTION NO.
INTRODUCTORY INSTRUCTION ON DAMAGES
If you find the issues in favor of Lori Haase and against Columbia Ashley Valley
Medical Center, then it is your duty to award Lori Haase such damages that you find
from a preponderance of the evidence will fairly and adequately compensate her for the
injury and damage sustained.

MUJI 27.1

GENERAL DAMAGES
INSTRUCTION NO.
In awarding damages, you may consider any pain, discomfort, and suffering,
both mental and physical, its probable duration and severity, and the extent to which the
plaintiff has been prevented from pursuing the ordinary affairs of life as previously
enjoyed. You may also consider whether any of the above will, more likely than not,
continue in the future. If so, you may award such damages as will fairly and justly
compensate the plaintiff for them. Such damages are called general damages.
No definite standard or method of calculation is prescribed by law to fix
reasonable compensation for pain and suffering. Nor is the opinion of any witness
required as to the amount of such reasonable compensation. Furthermore, the
argument of counsel as to the amount of damages is not evidence of reasonable
compensation. In making an award for pain and suffering, you shall exercise your
authority with calm and reasonable judgment, and the damiages you fix shall be just and
reasonable in light of the evidence.

References:
MUJI 27.2 (1993) (Modified)

SPECIAL DAMAGES
INSTRUCTION NO.
The law also allows you to award special damages. Special damages are those
that are alleged to have been sustained in reference to the special circumstances of the
plaintiff. They include the reasonable value of medical and nursing care, both medical
and non-medical services and supplies and tools reasonably required and actually
given in the treatment and/or care of the plaintiff and the reasonable value of such
items that more probably than not will be required and given in the future.
Special damages also include lest wagec and loss of future earning capacity or
loss of earning power.
In awarding special damages, you may consider the reasonable value of working
time lost to date. In determining this amount, you should consider (1) evidence of the
plaintiff's earning capacity; (2) earnings; (3) how the plaintiff ordinarily was occupied;
and (4) what the plaintiff was reasonably likely to have earned in the time lost if the
plaintiff had not been injured.
If you find the plaintiff has suffered a loss of earning capacity, you should award
the present cash value of earning capacity reasonably likely to be lost in the future as a
result of the injury in question.
Special damages also include the reasonable value of the loss of employeerelated benefits, such as loss of or reduction in retirement benefits, health benefits, paid
vacation, employee stock options and sayings benefits and the like.

Reference:
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 353, 354 (5th ed. 1979)
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 396 (7th ed. 1999)

MUJl 27.3 (1993)
MUJl 27.4 & 27.5 (1993) (modified)

AMOUNT OF DAMAGE NEED NOT BE
PROVED WITH PRECISION
INSTRUCTION NO.
Although an award of damages may not be based only on speculation, some
degree of uncertainty in the evidence of damages will not relieve a defendant from
recompensing a wronged plaintiff. As long as there is some rational basis for a damage
award, it is the wrongdoer who must assume the risk of some uncertainty. Where there
is evidence of the fact of damage, a defendant may not escape liability because the
amount of damage cannot be proved with precision. The amount of damages may be
based on approximations if the fact of damage is established and the approximations
are based on reasonable assumptions or projections.

References:
Atkin Wright & Miles v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 709 P.2d 330, 336 (Utah
1985)
Bastian v. King, 661 P.2d 953, 957 (Utah 1983)
Sampson V. Richins, 770 P.2d 998, 1007 (Utah Ct App. 1989)

DAMAGE AWARD NOT TO BE DIMINISHED
BY COLLATERAL SOURCE PAYMENTS, IF ANY.
INSTRUCTION NO.
Any fact or inference in the evidence that any portion of Mrs. H ^ x a ^ e
damages may have been paid by some person or entity other than Mrs. f W \ $ C is not
to be considered by you or used to diminish the damage award you make, if any. The
fact, if it be a fact, that any of the plaintiffs claimed expenses or damages were or may
be paid by some source other than the plaintiffs own funds does not effect the plaintiffs
right to recover for such expenses or damages.
It is the court's duty following trial to see that what other damages are awarded
are allocated or distributed to the party who, by law, is entitled to receive them. You are
instructed not to concern yourself with such matters. They will be handled by the court
in due course following trial. This instruction applies with respect to past, present and
future damages.

References:
MUJI 14.16
MUJI 27.3, comment to MUJI 27.3
Utah Health Care Malpractice Act (UCA §78-14-1 et seq.)

INSTRUCTION NO.
FAILURE TO PRODUCE EVIDENCE
In this case you have heard mention of drug screen tests administered to Dr.
Hawkes prior to his perform surgeries at the hospital. You have also heard mention of
a report from a surgeon in Texas who operated on Dr. Hawkes' neck in the Spring of
1995. You have also heard mention of Dr. Hawkes having received treatment on more
than one occasion in the emergency room of Columbia Ashley Valley Hospital. Finally,
there is evidence that the surgery Dr. Hawkes performed on Mrs. Haases' knee was
videotaped. Where evidence which would properly part of a case is within the control of
the party in whose interests it naturally would be to produce it, and without satisfactory
explanation the party fails to produce it, you may infer that the evidence would be
unfavorable to that party if the party had produced it. In other words, the failure of
Columbia Ashley Valley Medical Center to produce evidence on the matters in question
or to provide a satisfactory explanation for its failure to do so permits you do believe
that had the missing evidence been produced, it would have been unfavorable to the
hospital.

Burns v. Cannondale Bicycle Company. 876 P2d 415 (Utah App. 1994); Nation-wide
Check Corp. v. Forest Hills Distribs. Inc. 692 F2d 214, 217-18 (First Cir. 1982); National
Association of Radiation Survivors v. Turnaae. 115 F.R.D., 543, 557, 58 (N.D. Cal.
1987); Williams, et al. v. Washington Hospital Center. 601 A.2d 28, 31 (D.C. Col. 1991)

EFFECT OF FAILURE TO PRODUCE
AVAILABLE STRONGER EVIDENCE
INSTRUCTION NO.
If you should find that it was within the power of a party to produce stronger and
more satisfactory evidence than that which was offered on a material point, you may
view with distrust any weaker and less satisfactory evidence actually offered by him or
her on that point, unless such failure is satisfactorily explained.

References:
JIFU3.13;BOJ130;
Cram v. Reynolds, 55 Utah 384, 186 P. 100.

WHEN UNFAVORABLE PRESUMPTION
IS JUSTIFIED
INSTRUCTION NO.
You are instructed that the highest proof of which any fact is susceptible is that
which presents itself to the senses of the court or jury. Neglect, then, to produce such
evidence by any party who has it in his power justifies an unfavorable presumption
against that party and you are at liberty to draw an unfavorable inference against such
party if you think it warranted under all the circumstances and believe such party has
failed to produce any such evidence.

References:
State v. Campbell, 116 Utah 74. 208 P.2d 530 (Utah 1949)

INSTRUCTION NO.
PUNITIVE DAMAGES
Punitive damages may be awarded if compensatory or general damages are
awarded and it is established by clear and convincing evidence that the acts or
omissions of the responsible party are the result of willful and malicious intentional
fraudulent conduct, or conduct that manifests a knowing and reckless indifference
toward, and a disregard of, the rights of others.
You are instructed that under current Utah law in any judgment where punitive
damages are awarded and paid, fifty percent of the amount of the punitive damages in
excess of $20,000 shall, after payment of attorneys' fees and costs, be remitted to the
State Treasurer for deposit into the State's General Fund.

UCA §78-18-1 (1)(a)and(3)(1991).

